The troika was peddling an
economic fantasy: Greeks have paid the price
Incoming Greek prime minister
Alexis Tsipras is being far more realistic about austerity and growth than
European officials who want the beatings to continue until morale improves. Photograph:
Michael Kappeler/EPA
Alexis
Tsipras, leader of the left-wing Syriza coalition, has become prime
minister of Greece.
He is the first European leader elected on an explicit promise to challenge the
austerity policies that have prevailed since 2010. And there will be many
people warning him to abandon that promise, to behave “responsibly”.
So how has that responsibility
thing worked out so far?
To understand the political
earthquake in Greece, it helps to look at Greece’s May 2010 “standby
arrangement” with the International
Monetary Fund, under which the so-called troika – the IMF, the European
Central Bank and the European
Commission – extended loans to the country in return for a combination of
austerity and reform. It’s a remarkable document, in the worst way. The troika,
while pretending to be hardheaded and realistic, was peddling an economic
fantasy. And the Greek people have been paying the price for those elite
delusions.
False assumptions
The economic projections that
accompanied the standby arrangement assumed that Greece could impose harsh
austerity with little effect on growth and employment. Greece was in recession
when the deal was reached, but the projections assumed this downturn would end
soon – that there would be only a small contraction in 2011, and that, by 2012,
Greece would be recovering. Unemployment, the projections conceded, would rise
substantially, from 9.4 per cent in 2009 to almost 15 per cent in 2012, but
would then begin coming down fairly quickly.
What actually transpired was
an economic and human nightmare. Far from ending in 2011, the Greek recession
gathered momentum. Greece didn’t hit the bottom until 2014 and, by that point,
it had experienced a full-fledged depression, with overall unemployment rising
to 28 per cent and youth unemployment rising to almost 60 per cent. And the
recovery now under way is barely visible, offering no prospect of pre-crisis
living standards.
What went wrong? I fairly
often encounter assertions to the effect that Greece didn’t carry through on
its promises, that it failed to deliver promised spending cuts. Nothing could
be further from the truth. In reality, Greece imposed savage cuts in public
services, wages of government workers and social benefits. Public spending was
cut much more than the programme envisaged, and it’s about 20 per cent lower
than it was in 2010.
Yet Greek debt troubles are if
anything worse than before the programme. One reason is the economic plunge has
reduced revenues: the Greek government is collecting a substantially higher
share of gross domestic product in taxes, but GDP has fallen so quickly that
overall tax take is down. Furthermore, the plunge in GDP has caused a key
fiscal indicator, the ratio of debt to GDP, to keep rising even though debt
growth has slowed and Greece received some modest debt relief in 2012.
Why were the original
projections so wildly over-optimistic? As I said, because supposedly hardheaded
officials were in reality engaged in fantasy economics. Both the European
Commission and the European Central Bank decided to believe in the confidence
fairy – that is, to claim that the direct job-destroying effects of spending
cuts would be more than made up for by a surge in private-sector optimism. The
IMF was more cautious, but it underestimated the damage of austerity.
And here’s the thing: if the
troika had been truly realistic, it would have acknowledged it was demanding
the impossible. Two years after the programme began, the IMF looked for
historical examples where Greek-type programmes, attempts to pay down debt
through austerity without major debt relief or inflation, had been successful.
It didn’t find any.
Unable to lecture
So now that Tsipras has won,
European officials would be well advised to skip the lectures calling on him to
act responsibly and to go along with their programme. The fact is they have no
credibility; the programme they imposed on Greece never made sense. It had no
chance of working.
If anything, the problem with
Syriza’s plans may be that they’re not radical enough. But it’s not clear what
more any Greek government can do unless it’s prepared to abandon the euro, and
the Greek public isn’t ready for that.
Still, in calling for a major
change, Tsipras is being far more realistic than officials who want the
beatings to continue until morale improves. The rest of Europe
should give him a chance to end his country’s nightmare. – (New York Times)
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