http://inthesetimes.com/article/17561/zizek_greece_syriza
Critics of our institutional democracy often complain that,
as a rule, elections do not offer a true choice. What we mostly get is the
choice between a center-Right and a center-Left party whose program is almost
indistinguishable. Next Sunday, January 25, this will not be the case—as on
June 17, 2012, the Greek voters are facing a real choice: the establishment on
the one side; Syriza, the radical leftist coalition, on the other.
And, as is mostly the case, such moments of real choice throw
the establishment into panic. They paint the image of social chaos, poverty
and violence if the wrong choice wins. The mere possibility of a Syriza victory
has sent ripples of fear through markets all around the world, and, as is usual
in such cases, ideological prosopopoeia has its heyday: markets have begun to
“talk,” as if they are living people, expressing their “worry” at what will
happen if the elections fail to produce a government with a mandate to continue
with the program of fiscal austerity.
An ideal is gradually emerging from this European
establishment’s reaction to the threat of Syriza victory in Greece, the ideal
best rendered by the title of Gideon Rachman’s comment in the Financial
Times: “Eurozone’s
weakest link is the voters.”
In the establishment’s ideal world, Europe
gets rid of this “weakest link” and experts gain the power to directly impose
necessary economic measures; if elections take place at all, their function is
just to confirm the consensus of experts.
From this perspective, the Greek elections cannot but appear
as a nightmare. So how can this catastrophe be avoided? The obvious way would
be to return the fright—to scare the Greek voters to death with the message,
“You think you are suffering now?
You ain’t seen nothin’ yet—wait for the
Syriza victory and you will long for the bliss of the last years!”
The alternative is either Syriza stepping out (or being
thrown out) of the European project, with unforeseeable consequences, or a
“messy compromise” when both sides moderate their demands. Which raises another
fear: not the fear of Syriza’sirrational behavior after their victory,
but, on the contrary, the fear that Syriza will accept a rational messy
compromise which will disappoint voters, so that discontent will continue, but
this time not regulated and moderated by Syriza.
What maneuvering space will the eventual Syriza-led
government have? To paraphrase President Bush, one should definitely not
misunderestimate the destructive power of international capital, especially
when it is combined with the sabotage of the corrupted and clientelist Greek
state bureaucracy.
In such conditions, can a new government effetively impose
radical changes? The trap that lurks here is clearly perceptible in Thomas
Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century. For Piketty,
capitalism has to be accepted as the only game in town, so the only feasible
alternative is to allow the capitalist machinery to do its work in its proper
sphere, and to impose egalitarian justice politically, by a democratic power
which regulates the economic system and enforces redistribution.
Such a solution is utopian in the strictest sense
of the term. Piketty is well aware that the model he proposes would only work
if enforced globally, beyond the confines of nation-states (otherwise capital
would flee to the states with lower taxes); such a global measure requires an
already existing global power with the strength and authority to enforce it.
However, such a global power is unimaginable within the confines of today’s
global capitalism and the political mechanisms it implies. In short, if such a
power were to exist, the basic problem would already have been resolved.
Plus what further measures would the global imposition of
high taxes proposed by Piketty necessitate? Of course the only way out of this
vicious cycle is simply to cut the Gordian knot and act.
There are never perfect conditions for an act—every act by definition comes too
early. But one has to begin somewhere, with a particular intervention; one just
has to bear in mind the further complications that such an act will lead to.
And what to do with the enormous debt? European policy
towards heavily indebted countries like Greece is the one of “extend and
pretend” (extending the payback period, but pretending that all debts will
eventually be paid). So why is the fiction of repayment so stubborn? It is not
only that this fiction makes debt extension more acceptable to German voters;
it is also not only that, while the write-off of the Greek debt may trigger
similar demands from Portugal, Ireland, Spain. It is that those in power do not
really want the debt fully repaid.
The debt providers and caretakers accuse the indebted
countries of not feeling enough guilt—they are accused of feeling innocent.
Their pressure fits perfectly what psychoanalysis calls superego. The paradox
of the superego is that, as Freud saw it clearly, the more we obey its demands,
the more we feel guilty.
Imagine a vicious teacher who gives to his pupils impossible
tasks, and then sadistically jeers when he sees their anxiety and panic. The
true goal of lending money to the debtor is not to get the debt reimbursed with
a profit, but the indefinite continuation of the debt which keeps the debtor in
permanent dependency and subordination.
Take the example of Argentina. A decade or so ago, the
country decided to repay its debt to the IMF ahead of time (with the financial
help from Venezuela), and the reaction of the IMF was surprising: Instead of
being glad that it got its money back, the IMF (or, rather, its top
representatives) expressed their worry that Argentina will use this new freedom
and financial independence from international financial institutions to abandon
tight financial politics and engage in careless spending.
Debt is an instrument to control and regulate the debtor,
and, as such, it strives for its own expanded reproduction.
The only true solution is thus clear: since everyone knows
Greece will never repay its debt, one will have to gather the courage and write
the debt off. It can be done at a quite tolerable economic cost, just with
political will. Such acts are our only hope to break out of the vicious cycle
of cold Brussels neoliberal technocracy and anti-immigrant false passions. If
we don’t act, others, from Golden
Dawn to UKIP,
will do it.
In his Notes Towards a Definition of Culture, the great
conservative T.S. Eliot remarked that there are moments when the only choice is
the one between heresy and non-belief, i.e., when the only way to keep a
religion alive is to perform a sectarian split from its main corpse. This is
our position today with regard to Europe: only a new “heresy” (represented at
this moment by Syriza), a split from the European Union by Greece, can save
what is worth saving in the European legacy: democracy, trust in people,
egalitarian solidarity.
The American media is portraying Syriza's victory as a catastrophe.
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