"These documents look more like legislation than search warrants."
By Timothy B.
Lee, Published: June 20, 2013 at 5:27 pm
One of the
National Security Agency’s key talking points since the PRISM program was
revealed two weeks ago has been that its surveillance activities are subject to
oversight by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. In his latest scoop,
the Guardian’s Glenn Greenwald has revealed two
of the documents the government submits to the court prior to engaging in
surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
These
documents are often compared to the warrants the government ordinarily needs
for searches of Americans. But they’re dramatically different from a
conventional search warrant. A warrant is supposed to “particularly” describe
who will be targeted by a search. It will typically include a suspect’s name,
as well as the address to be searched or the phone number to be wiretapped.
The
documents released by the Guardian don’t look like that at all. The first
document is nine pages long and explains in some detail the factors the NSA
uses to determine whether a potential surveillance target is a “US person”—if
the answer is yes, then the agency cancels the planned surveillance. The second
document, also nine pages, describes what the NSA does if it accidentally
collects the private communications of Americans.
These
documents look more like legislation than search warrants. They define legal
concepts, describe legal standards to be applied and specify procedures for NSA
officials to follow. For example, the second document states that “a person
known to be an alien admitted for permanent residence loses status as a United
States person if the person leaves the united States and is not in compliance
with 8 USC § 1203 enabling re-entry into the United States.”
But rather
than being drafted, debated and enacted by Congress, the documents were drafted
by Obama administration lawyers and reviewed by the FISC.
Congress is
much better equipped than the courts to review this kind of quasi-legislative
proposal. It has thousands of staffers and can spend months debating the
details of a proposal. Members have the power to call witnesses and to amend
legislation if it’s not to their liking. And they debate in public, giving
academics, public interest groups and members of the general public an
opportunity to point out flaws and suggest improvements.
In contrast,
the FISC has only 11 members and a limited staff. In most cases it hears
testimony only from the government, and only in secret. It must make decisions
within 30 days. In principle it has the power to modify proposed orders, but it
lacks the manpower and expertise to exercise this power effectively. The FISC’s
secretive review process leaves no meaningful opportunities for third parties
to point out flaws in the government’s proposal and suggest alternatives.
And once the
courts sign off on these general targeting procedures, no one outside the
executive branch performs the function traditionally performed by the courts:
double-checking that the government actually follows the rules. The government
has some internal oversight mechanisms, but no one in the judicial branch
verifies that the individuals the government targets for surveillance are
actual foreigners, as the law requires.
The
Constitution specifies that Congress should write laws and that the courts
should interpret them. The founders set things up that way for a reason.
Allowing the executive branch to effectively write its own rules, get them
rubber-stamped by a secretive court and then comply with them on an honor
system is guaranteed to produce rules that are more favorable to the government
and less carefully drafted than rules drafted the old-fashioned way.
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