November 18, 2017
The US opioid epidemic seems
to many to have come out of nowhere, and there’s been much finger-pointing in
recent years about how this state of affairs came to be. Some have argued
that inadequate
mental healthcare is to blame. Others have
postulated that doctors were naively over prescribing them as a way to
quickly treat pain and please their patients. But, according to a recently
published draft report, at least some of the blame should be attributed to
the way pharmaceutical companies have manipulated patent extensions over the
past decade.
In the 1970s and 80s, doctors
were looking for better ways to control pain, and many believed
opioids a good, non-addictive option. In the 1990s, drug manufacturers
began aggressively marketing the
painkillers to doctors and patients. Soon, patients (or their
loved oneswho stole their pills) were developing tolerances for low doses,
and graduated to abusing the drugs by crushing them and either snorting or
liquefying and injecting the powders, or turning to heroin, often fatally. By
the time the science caught up in the early 2000s, it was too late: Thousands of
people were addicted to opioids. Opioids have killed over 560,000 people in the
US since 2000. Last month, president Donald Trump declared the crisis a public
health emergency.
Pharmaceutical companies
profited from this demand, and the exclusive rights they had to make these
compounds. This allowed them to pump even more money into marketing, which
inevitably led to doctors prescribing more of them.
From the moment a drug company
patents a compound, it has 20 years of exclusive manufacturing and selling
rights on it. In theory, a company’s monopoly on a drug dissolves after its
patents expire and generics flood the market. But drug companies usually file
for patents in the discovery stages as a way of staking their territory in the
field. The approval process for drugs from the US Food and Drug Administration
involves lengthy clinical trials, which usually take around 12 years—meaning
that manufacturers typically only get to actually sell their drugs exclusively
for about
eight years before generics come onto the market. So they often seek
ways to extend this exclusive period.
Perhaps the most common way is
to change a drug ever so slightly. For example, a company can file a new patent
if it makes a version of a drug with a slightly different dosage, or with a
different way it’s released in the body over time.
“Our patent system doesn’t
require something to be better, just different,” says Robin Feldman, the
director of the Institute for Innovation Law at the University of California
Hastings College of Law. “Rather than creating new medicines, pharmaceutical
companies are largely recycling and repurposing [drugs].” The manufacturer can
then hold off generic competition for a few more years. Competitors (or anyone
else) could theoretically make the case in court that these compounds aren’t
actually different, but the legal battle would likely be too costly and time
consuming to be worth it.
Feldman, together with Connie
Wang, a law student at Stanford University, meticulously went through a
decade’s worth of versions of the US Food and Drug Administration’s “Orange
Book” and US Patent and Trademark Office website listings to investigate
the relationship between patent filings, exclusivity extensions, and drug
approvals.
They found that of the 100
best-selling drugs from 2005 to 2015,about
80% (paywall) had a patent extension filed on them at least once.
About 50% of these drugs had multiple extensions.
That, Feldman argues, can
create a dangerous cycle. “The immense monopoly profits allow drug companies
like Purdue to aggressively market their drugs to doctors,” explains Feldman.
“Physicians preferentially prescribe these particular drugs. Where drugs are
addictive and problematic, that’s dangerous.”
Purdue Pharma is the company
behind one of the most popular prescription opioids. OxyContin first came on
the market in 1996 and has since brought in billions of
dollars of revenue. Purdue’s patent for OxyContin was originally
supposed to expire in 2013. But by making minor tweaks to the drug’s chemical
structure to create a slow-release pill the company markets as “abuse-proof,”
Purdue has been able to file new patents for OxyContin 13 times with the US
Patent and Trademark Office over the past decade, thereby extending its
exclusive selling rights on the drug through 2030.
Purdue did not respond
directly to Feldman’s analysis when forwarded a copy by Quartz, instead
providing a statement noting, “One potentially important step towards the goal
of creating safer opioid analgesics has been the development of opioids that
are formulated to deter abuse. FDA considers the development of these products
a high
public health priority. Purdue reformulated OxyContin with abuse-deterrent
properties recognized by FDA, and the Patent and Trademark Office granted
Purdue patents for inventions that went into the development of those
properties.”
The most prominent example is
a patent Purdue filed
in 2003 for “abuse-proof” OxyContin. It was made of materials that are
harder to crush, and forms a gel that is more viscous and harder to inject. In
theory, it would make for a safer alternative to regular OxyContin. However,
the same patent claims that “intravenous administration of such a gel would
most probably result in obstruction of blood vessels, associated with serious
embolism or even death of the abuser.” In all likelihood, people crushing these
pills to get high would still seriously harm, if not kill, themselves.
Technically, the abuse-proof
pills worked: When researchers from Washington University in St. Louis informally surveyed more
than 2,500 people taking opioids to see if this pill really was more
abuse-proof than before, they found that the number of people who admitted to using
it to get high dropped from about 35% to about 13% two years later. However,
two thirds of respondents said they had switched to other opioids instead—often
heroin, which is less expensive and easy to use.
It’s not Purdue’s fault
doctors kept prescribing (and overprescribing) these pills in an attempt to
alleviate pain, nor that the loved
ones of patients often took instead to get high. It’s also not the
company’s fault there weren’t better resources for those who found themselves
addicted—drugs like buprenorphine, methadone and naltrexone can help ease
addiction, but as recently as 2016, they
still weren’t being given to patients in two-thirds of US addiction
clinics.
That said, Purdue spent many
years and huge sums of money convincing doctors that OxyContin was non
addictive. In fact, the company has paid over $600
million (paywall) in fines to federal and state agencies, as well as
individual patients, to settle claims that it falsely marketed OxyContin as
safe from abuse. Three of the company’s executives pled guilty to
“misbranding,” which is a criminal violation.
The company is still profiting
off “abuse-deterrent” OxyContin. Though there are currently “authorized
generics” of OxyContin available, these are made by manufacturers with licenses
to use Purdue’s formula. In other words, Purdue makes money off them. And
there are currently no approved abuse-deterrent generics in the US. In
September of this year, FDA commissioner Scott Gottlieb said that
soon the agency plans to issue guidelines to assist companies who are trying to
file applications for these types of generics. No word on when that document
will be published, however.
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