by Rob Hager
Those “damn
emails.” One could have thought that epithet a clever strategy to
ingratiate a stranger at the party to the anointed one’s retinue, pending the
results of the FBI investigation.
But when those results were
announced the new Bernie Sanders was so distracted doing his “awkward
dance” to the tune of that damn
Platform that one might think him unaware that he had his last best chance
to win the Democratic nomination snatched from him in broad daylight.
Republicans appeared far more disturbed than Sanders about Clinton sewing up
the nomination by beating her secret server rap on dubious legal grounds. Since
polls have consistently
shown Sanders, not Clinton, to be the strongest candidate to beat their guy,
one might expect not Republicans, but Sanders, to be out front on this issue.
But its 2016, when the “progressive”
revolutionary is endorsing
the establishment plutocrat.
In Thursday, June 7,
“emergency” congressional oversight hearings, FBI Director James B. Comey was
questioned about his unprecedented Tuesday press conference Statement
justifying the Bureau’s mutually contradictory factual and legal conclusions
from its long-pending investigation of Hillary Clinton’s “servergate” problem.
Republicans under committee Chair Jason Chaffetz (R-UT) conducted a
professional, informed and fair interrogation of Comey that considerably
advanced the debate. Comey’s less than convincing legal justification for his
decision opened as many lines of inquiry as it closed. The purpose of this
article is to assess that justification in detail, based in part on , but not
limited to, Congress’ inititial inquiries.
Before going into the details,
a useful introduction to the subject was provided by Trey Gowdy, (R- SC), a
former federal prosecutor. He walked Comey through the false statements
that Clinton told his Benghazi Committee in October. This evoked a sworn
on-the-record FBI endorsement of what amounted to several counts of a potential
criminal indictment of Clinton for lying under oath. Having virtually framed
the indictment of Clinton for lying to Congress, Gowdy then delivered
a Socratic lesson to Comey on the subject of how such “false exculpatory
statements” by Clinton, along with Clinton’s pervasive and “complex scheme that
was designed for the very purpose of concealing the public record” could have
been used in the “servergate” case to prove her requisite criminal intent, the
supposedly key element of the crime which Comey claimed he could not find.
Gowdy completed his attack on
Comey’s central evasion for not indicting Clinton by instructing
him that intent is rarely proven by direct evidence, such as Comey seemed to
suggest was needed. “You have to do it with circumstantial evidence,” Gowdy
said. Gowdy outlined in less than five minutes for Comey what the FBI was
somehow unable to piece together over what Comey proudly claimed was 3 years
equivalent of investigatory work.
Circumstantial evidence has
been used in similar cases. In the notorious
case of Jeffery Sterling, DoJ was able to imprison a CIA agent on the sole
basis of circumstantial evidence amounting to no more than speaking to a
reporter. The case was partially motivated
by retribution for Sterling’s racial discrimination claim against the agency.
Another entirely circumstantial case
was made against a mid-level bureaucrat for talking with a reporter without
direct proof of intent, let alone of any unlawful transfer of particular
information.
This initial examination of
Comey by Gowdy and other Republican committee members supports the suggestion
that Comey’s formal statement denying Clinton’s criminal intent, quoted below,
constitutes one of a series
of “coincidental shams and deceptions deeply rooted in a corrupt political
system.” This sham includes a) the extended delay
and timing of what appears to have been a superficial and artificially limited
investigation designed to exculpate, b) the unethical ex parte meeting between
Comey’s boss and Bill Clinton at the Phoenix airport, c) AG Lynch’s refusal to
recuse herself for that ethical breach, d) but instead abdicate
the DoJ’s prosecutorial judgment to a political FBI Director, e) Clinton (who
“believes in gestures”) making anonymous leaks
that “she may decide to retain Ms. Lynch,” f) Obama’s endorsement of and
North Carolina campaign stop with Clinton timed to deflect attention from the
FBI’s criticism of her documented lies and “extremely careless” conduct in high
office, g) unprecedented
signature of non-disclosure agreement for agents on this case, and then h) the
very nature of the Statement itself, both the unprecedented PR exercise of its
being made public and the FBI’s straying well beyond its proper duties and
expertise to make and announce the operative legal decision not to prosecute.
Reciting some of these coincidences Rep. Mica observed
“what’s come down, it almost looks like a choreography.”
It may be only a coincidence
that Lynch was appointed attorney general by Obama very shortly after Clinton
started deleting her “servergate” files in February 2015. And it may be a
coincidence that Comey was appointed around the time in 2013 that Clinton’s
potential crime was coming to light. But was it a coincidence that Obama failed
to appoint a State Department inspector general during all four years of
Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State? Or was that beyond gross negligence in
hindsight?
Selling a Technical Fix for a
Political Problem
The FBI does not prosecute,
and does not evaluate or fire prosecutors. It investigates federal crime, which
is a technical and not political process. It is not the FBI’s job to tell
prosecutors how to do theirs, but rather to provide the investigation needed
for prosecutors to make legal decisions based on reliable and thorough facts.
Jason Chaffetz (R- UT) called
out (3:34) how unprecedented it was for Comey to go public with such a
statement, and then also to do so about more than just the facts discovered by
the FBI, but also to publicly pre-judge the legal questions involved in a possible
prosecution, indictment, and trial. Rep, Mulvaney also repeated
this criticism as an assertion and a question: “It is unprecedented that an FBI
Director gave the type of press conference that he did and took a position that
an unreasonable prosecutor would only take this case forward. Why would do you
that?” Comey agrees, “Yes, it’s a great question.”
Comey’s opinion delivered in
unprecedented fashion was that commission of the crime detailed in the FBI’s
investigation should nevertheless not be prosecuted because of insufficient
“intent” by Clinton. This opinion was not only based on a failure to marshal
available evidence, as Rep. Gowdy pointed out, but also a misinterpretation of
well-settled law, as discussed below. It also prejudices any future prosecution
the Justice Department might have decided, or may still decide to pursue in the
future, unless Comey’s opinion is discredited as an abuse of the FBI Director’s
authority
As Matthew Miller, a former
Justice Department official, judged,
Comey’s performance was “a gross abuse of his own power,” in part because he
“substituted his judgment for that of prosecutors.” The FBI’s autocratic legend
who was not shy about expanding the powers of the Bureau, J. Edgar Hoover
himself, decreed:
“We are a fact gathering organization only. We don’t clear anybody.” Sixty
years later, Comey has now added a corollary to this rule: “except a Clinton,”
given the opportunity to determine the next president.
Comey’s unprecedented polemic
about Clinton’s intent violated the general rule that one does not ever speak
publicly about a pending investigation or litigation because it can distort due
process. He engaged in dramatically improper conduct for political purposes. It
is one reason why Comey should be at least fired, if not formally reprimanded
or impeached by Congress.
The argument for impeaching
Comey is that if Comey does not suffer serious consequences in public, the
Clinton case cannot be effectively prosecuted. He has spoiled the case, and
failed to faithfully execute “the Laws.” (Art. II, Sec. 3.) He has also
established a dangerous precedent for abuse of FBI power that needs to be
soundly rebuked. That is difficult to do in any other politically responsible
manner than the constitutional process for checking inappropriate executive
action, an impeachment vote by the House of Representatives. (Art. II, Sec.
4.). His errors in stating the governing law on which he based his
institutionally improper opinion provide yet other reasons for disciplinary
action. His advice to the American people and Congress on the law of intent was
so distorted, however cleverly presented, as to constitute either malpractice
or a breach of his professional duty to represent his client the United States,
not the Clinton family.
This impropriety of the chief
federal investigator acting as prosecutor, grand jury, judge, and jury arose
out of the context where Comey’s boss Loretta Lynch had said she would abdicate
to the FBI her duty to make the legal and political decision on the Clinton
case, rather
than simply recuse herself for her ethical lapse in holding a secret ex
parte meeting with a potential target and surrogate of the main target of the
investigation.
By making the legal decision
himself rather than properly leaving it to senior Justice Department lawyers
and the attorney general, Comey clearly did a political favor not only for
Lynch but also for President Barack Obama,
who also has a flair
for improperly prejudging pending cases, as
he did this one. Both of them would otherwise have had to take political
responsibility, with an historically dissatisfied
electorate, for an unpopular
and controversial partisan political decision, the first of its kind in U.S.
history, based on a distorted legal analysis. Both had conflicts of interest as
political partisans of the same stripe as Clinton. Obama would have effectively
pardoned his endorsed successor for preserving his plutocratic
legacy. Lynch would be exonerating her potential future employer,
who may well eventually appoint her to be the first
black woman on the Supreme Court much has her husband had appointed Lynch
to be US Attorney.
Both the ethical lapse at the
airport and the ensuing abdication, rather than recusal, deserve separate
reprimand of Lynch. In her hearings the barest scent of impeachment was in the
air. Rep. Goodlatte
(31), lawyer and Chairman of the powerful House Judiciary Committee, and not
known to make such accusations lightly, charged that Lynch’s abdication was
“not [a]… responsible way to uphold [her] constitutionally sworn oath.” The
hearing established that “servergate” was the first time Lynch had announced
such an abdication of duty ahead of time, that she would follow recommendations
of a committee rather than make her own decision. This abdication of
responsibility under the pretense that it would remedy her ethical lapse, according
to Rep. Jordan
(2:13), actually “made a bad situation worse.” AG Lynch’s rehearsed,
run-out-the-clock, stonewall demonstration before the Committee of “prodigious
dissimulation skills” (Franks,1:50)
in furtherance of her abdication bordered on contempt of Congress. On the
merits, Rep. Gowdy, who knows how to conduct cross-examination, could not get a straight answer from Lynch to
the simple question of why a specific intent standard was applied by the DoJ
when the statute does not demand it, which is the central issue. Her riposte to
nearly every question is that her sole decision was to, in effect, abdicate her
duty and that questions on the details should be referred to Comey.
Comey’s highly improper public
recitation of facts sufficient to indict denied Clinton, for his own political
reasons, the opportunity to controvert those facts in court by indicting her.
This was undoubtedly the price Comey had to pay to prevent mutiny
from the professionals
inside his Bureau. One former spy who is closely following the case predicted
that “there are high-ranking spies who [we]re perfectly willing to leak the
sordid details of …. exactly what Hillary Clinton did,” had Comey failed to
make a credible accounting. But FBI investigators take institutional
responsibility solely for “fact gathering,” as Hoover established, not for
Comey’s personal venture into political fixes at the presidential level, nor
for his idiosyncratic legal conclusions that Lynch improperly allowed him to
make, with some cover provided by unnamed DoJ attorneys on a committee.
Evidence of Intent: looking in
all the wrong places
Comey was able to make a
political decision appear to be a technical decision by basing it upon his
peculiar views of the evidence necessary to prove intent, at least in this one
case. After reciting facts that have long been known
by the public, and that contradicted
exculpatory public statements by Clinton, the FBI’s operative finding delivered
by Comey was that “we did not find clear evidence that Secretary Clinton or her
colleagues intended to violate laws governing the handling of classified
information.” As Rep. Gowdy explained to Comey, this technical decision about
intent failed to take proper account of the inferences to be drawn from the
circumstantial evidence that shows Clinton’s intent to break the law.
Among the other similar lapses
of judgment that Comey defended, he did not think it germane to an assessment
of her intent that Clinton, and nine of her former top aides, refused to be
interviewed by the State Department inspector general. A person of innocent
intent would have no reason to avoid such an interview by her former employer
on a matter within the legitimate scope of her employment.
Comey’s refusal to comment on
the existence or not of a related Clinton Foundation investigation suggests
that, contrary to speculation, the very public allegations of Clinton’s
handling of systemic conflicts of interest was not part of the secret server
investigation. Such a joint investigation of the two potentially related
matters would have justified the delay FBI’s investigation. Not taking into
account the Clinton Foundation line of inquiry, however, excluded consideration
of a potential
motive for Clinton’s prioritizing over keeping the nation’s secrets, instead,
keeping her “private” emails secret from the government. About half of the
total emails were allegedly private, representing a quite intensive “private”
life for someone in such a responsible public office who overly into computers.
This division of attention would be consistent with the widespread allegation
that Clinton was busy serving her family Foundation at the same time she was
serving the public. See Peter Schweizer, Clinton Cash: The Untold Story of How
and Why Foreign Governments and Businesses Helped Make Bill and Hillary Rich
(2015). Investigator Greg Palast points
out that notionally private communications, because addressed to Clinton’s
family and its conflicting business interest, did nevertheless involve the
official business of selling the country’s foreign policy in exchange for
“contributions” to the Clinton Foundation.
That potential motive would
have been far more nefarious than the motives that Comey does approve for
prosecution in other cases, such as whistleblowing on matters of mismanagement
or torture.
The damage done may also have been greater. William Binney, a former
high-ranking NSA official, claimed
that the “rather devastating compromise of technical capability and a
commensurate loss of high value intelligence” from just one 2011 Clinton email
released by the State Department may be “difficult for the public to understand
and comprehend, but it is … much worse than what Julian Assange or Chelsea
Manning or any of the other whistleblowers have done.” The email wasn’t
redacted because it was sent to Clinton by Sid Blumenthal, a private citizen
with no security clearance. But as shown in many other emails he sent to
Clinton, he somehow had access to the latest top secret NSA information that
revealed the NSA’s sources and collection methods.
As it turned out, such a
motive of keeping corrupt activities private from government security officials
and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) investigators might have been ineffective
in any event. In another coincidence, on the same day Comey gave his presentation
clearing Clinton, a bipartisan D.C. Circuit panel ruled that government email
records on private equipment are subject to FOIA if they are not held under a
claim of private right. See Competitive Enterprise Institute v. Office of
Science and Technology Policy (2016)
(Sentelle)(“If a department head can deprive the citizens of their right to
know what his [sic] department is up to by the simple expedient of maintaining
his departmental emails on an account in another domain, that purpose [of FOIA]
is hardly served.”)
In the oversight hearing on
July 7th, Comey did not demonstrate a full grasp of relevant facts, such as who
paid for Clinton’s server. He did not
personally interview Clinton nor did he talk with all of the “five or six”
agents who did. Another painfully obvious example was when Comey
was asked
by Rep, Meadows “did [Clinton] contradict some of [her] public statements in
private? Because you said she didn’t lie to the FBI, but it’s apparent that she
lied to the American people. So did she change her statements in [her]
testimony with you last Saturday?” Comey’s incredibly ignorant response was “I
haven’t gone through that to parse that…” Rep. Meadows requested “Can you do that
and get back to this Committee?” When asked again by Rep. Mulvaney: “why she
told y’all one thing and told us another?” Comey replied “I don’t know as I sit
here. I mean, I can — I’ll figure that out,” even though he agreed “that
[could] have been of interest to [the FBI] in helping to establish intent.”
This is Congress asking the
FBI to apply one of its most common enforcement tools, trapping people into
making false statements, as if it were some novel enforcement tool the FBI had
not thought of before. It will be important to monitor whether Congress will
insist that Comey satisfy Rep. Meadows’ request, and Comey’s promise, to
“figure that out” why Clinton is not being prosecuted for false statements to
the FBI.
Due to repeated professions of
ignorance of this kind, Comey’s formula that he did not “find clear evidence”
was less than convincing that he had looked in the right places.
Comey’s finding was not that
Clinton’s conduct did not possibly violate the law, but an inference from
Clintons’ “Whoops, sorry, didn’t mean to, didn’t know, won’t do it again:”
Voila! No intent; no crime. As Gowdy’s questioning suggested, if when Comey
used the word “clear” to describe the quality of evidence of intent that he was
looking for he actually meant “direct,” that kind of evidence almost never
happens in the real world. The evidence of intent, unless confessed, is always
inferential, circumstantial, and indirect, not “clear” in the possible
colloquial use of that term that Comey seemed to employ. He admittedly used the
same tactic of using a colloquial term when speaking of the legal concept of
gross negligence, as discussed below.
Since “clear evidence” is not
a legal term, the country is left to guess what Comey’s subjective meaning for
the term is. The impression left by Comey, which Gowdy forcefully
challenged, was that indirect and inferential evidence was not considered by
Comey to be “clear” evidence, and therefore Clinton could only be indicted if
she confessed. Indeed, Comey distinguished
the very similar Deutch case on the grounds that Deutch “admitted, ‘I knew I
wasn’t supposed to be doing this.” The idea that no prosecution can be
maintained without a confession is of course the most arrant nonsense. Rep.
Duncan reported
that when he was a judge he “saw many cases where the evidence of criminal
intent was flimsier than the evidence in this case.” But Comey has so far, at
this initial stage of inquiry, gotten away with asserting the contrary.
The kind of clarity that Comey
was seeking would have to dispel his opinion
about, among other things, Clinton’s apparent denial that she understood
classification markings within a text of a document: “I think it’s possible —
possible that she didn’t understand what a “c” meant.” Then Rep. Meadows questioned
whether it is reasonable to doubt such a denial, i.e., “wouldn’t a reasonable
person think that someone who has the highest job of handling classified
information would understand that?” Comey replied, “I think that’s the
conclusion a reasonable person would draw. It may not be accurate.” One can
observe Comey retreating here, from applying the legal reasonable doubt
standard into some subjective standard of his own labeled “clear evidence.”
Provided Clinton insisted on
her own ignorance, which no jury would likely accept, if Comey was looking for
other “clear” evidence of intent, he was looking for some abstraction that does
not exist, and which the law does not require. No matter how much one looks no
other direct evidence will be found without extraordinary investigatory
measures. Comey was apparently not looking for it by using such surveillance
measures. He did not disclose the existence of wiretaps or bugs to monitor
Clinton’s private conversations for which he likely did have probable cause.
But the inferential and circumstantial kind of evidence that Gowdy recited, and
which is commonly sufficient to convict of the intent element of all ordinary
crimes where the issue might arise, was not discovered under Comey’s leadership
because it was that evidence which was apparently not “clear” enough for him to
notice.
Comey’s “Reasonable
Prosecutor”
Comey’s opinion about the lack
of “clear evidence” departed from the traditional standard of reasonable doubt
in favor of some unknown subjective standard of his own premised upon his
personal view that “the conclusion a reasonable person would draw…. may not be
accurate.” This application of a super-reasonable doubt standard is only
compounded by his error in defining the legal element of intent which is
discussed in detail below. First, it should be pointed out that Comey offered
his opinion on these matters to support his “judgment … that no reasonable
prosecutor would bring … a case” for Clinton’s “potential violations of the
statutes regarding the handling of classified information.” As mentioned, this
judgment went beyond Comey’s position as FBI director to give, and it was given
on the basis of his own idiosyncratic legal tests.
The other leg for that
conclusion rested on his analysis of DoJ precedent. In his July 5th statement,
Comey explained:“Prosecutors necessarily weigh a number of factors before
bringing charges. There are obvious considerations, like the strength of the
evidence, especially regarding intent. [That erroneous statement is discussed
below] Responsible decisions also consider the context of a person’s actions,
and how similar situations have been handled in the past. In looking back at
our investigations into mishandling or removal of classified information, we
cannot find a case that would support bringing criminal charges on these facts.
All the cases prosecuted involved some combination of: clearly intentional and
willful mishandling of classified information; or vast quantities of materials
exposed in such a way as to support an inference of intentional misconduct; or
indications of disloyalty to the United States; or efforts to obstruct justice.
We do not see those things here.”
Comey’s characterization of
these different categories of precedent will be discussed separately. Again,
Comey probably did not “see those things” because he did not look, mainly
because he was looking for the wrong thing. Clinton’s server did involve “vast
quantities of materials exposed in such a way as to support an inference of
intentional misconduct.” It was not just a mistaken channeling of a few emails
through her separate personal email. It was systemic and vast removal of her
routine official email traffic from secure government channels to her insecure
private server domain used for her “hdr22@clintonemail.com” address.
This pervasive arrangement was
therefore all but certain to expose national secrets.
Clinton deliberately
commingled the personal and the public, permitting her at her own and her
lawyer’s discretion to later delete the public’s communications under the
unverifiable, and apparently inaccurate, excuse that she only deleted her
personal communications. There is no reliable way of knowing what she deleted
because the data was wiped nearly clean.
A fiduciary who commingles
financial assets is guilty of crime. Clinton commingled real assets, national
secrets owned by the public, with her private information, and put them both in
her private insecure server. This violates several federal statutes. But Comey
did not see this.
What would be enough evidence
of intent for a “reasonable prosecutor” to pursue a conviction for this
violation is again left to Comey’s own subjective standard. An objective
standard would be met, first, by restraining the FBI Director within the proper
scope of his duties, then appointing a professional unbiased special prosecutor
to separately assess the legal implications of the facts the FBI produced. The
prosecutor should be free of political ties and conflicted interests, such as
job retention or promotion in a new administration. Then the case should be
presented to a grand jury by an independent prosecutor for possible indictment
to determine its objective validity.
That is the constitutional
process to achieve objectivity in prosecutions of this political kind of
matter. But as mentioned above, the case cannot now be prosecuted unless Comey
himself suffers consequences for his improper and unprecedented conduct that
relegated the legal and policy decision of whether to prosecute to his own
subjective standards under the pretext of being a technical decision backed by
the prestige of the FBI.
Before anyone searching for
such an independent prosecutor takes Comey’s word about his standard for
“reasonable” prosecutors, they might want to first check with his FBI Sacramento
office about whether they would agree with Comey that Assistant United
States Attorney Jean M. Hobler should be considered unreasonable for successfully
prosecuting the case of a reservist named Bryan Nishimura for “removing and
retaining” on his private computer classified material acquired when he was
serving as a Naval Engineer in Afghanistan.
The FBI investigated this case
as a violation of 18 U.S.C. §1924, and published a press
release just one year ago lacking any suggestion that the FBI considered
Hobler to be anything but a “reasonable prosecutor” for winning this case.
Though not nearly as significant as Clinton’s similar conduct, this case was
virtually identical as far as the element of intent goes. Intent was not an
issue. In fact, the investigation of the Nishimura case found no motive “to
distribute classified information to unauthorized personnel,” which is not
quite true of the Clinton case. But lack of wrongful motive was not a problem
for the prosecution of Nishimura. Comey contended
the Nishimura case could be distinguished when it was raised by a committee
member at the hearing, but he did not actually say how.
Congress needs to ask the
Director to put together a dossier of similar cases that the FBI has
investigated, and that Comey might have thought could be distinguished although
their relevant facts are similar to Clinton’s case. Since in his July 5th
presentation Comey said “we cannot find a case that would support bringing
criminal charges on these facts,” we need to know if his definition of “these
facts” include only relevant facts, or if he considers distinctions that are
political or otherwise legally unpersuasive.
Congress needs to ask Comey
for all the available legal memoranda distinguishing such cases as the
Nishimura case, or the John
Deutch case, and others,
so people can determine whether these cases really are so different in
principle from Clinton’s case after they have a “complete accounting of the
facts” which Comey claimed they do not now have, but which he does have. It is
almost certain that none of the cases prosecuted under the relevant statutes
prohibiting mishandling of government records could be distinguished with
respect to the element of intent.
Many commentators, including
Representatives Gowdy, Chaffetz, and other oversight committee members
concluded that Comey is operating within the framework of a two-tiered
system of justice by providing an evasive justification of insufficient
intent. The elite political class has one kind of law and everyone else has
another. See Matt Taibbi, The Divide: American Injustice in the Age of the
Wealth Gap (2014). At the same time that police are murdering people
on the streets with impunity, the political elite in the capital is placed
above accountability to the law.
Confusing motive with intent
Comey has not only misled the
public by his demand for evidence that Clinton’s violation of the law was
“clearly intentional and willful” according to some subjective evidentiary
standard of his own. More importantly, in his discussion of precedents, quoted
above, he deliberately confuses these terms relating to intent with the
separate concept of motive. Comey’s description of his search for
precedent suggests that he was not really looking for intent, but rather
different varieties of motives involved in cases where forbidden material had
been placed on private computer devices, or otherwise compromised. When he
mentions the “context of a person’s actions” as an important variable, he is
referring to motive, not intent, the term to which he juxtaposes the phrase.
As Supreme Court justices
Alito and Thomas said in another context, Comey’s quoted statement about
controlling Justice Department precedent “confuses two fundamentally distinct
concepts: intent and motive…. [O]ur cases have recognized that a lawful motive (such
as necessity, duress, or self-defense) is consistent with the mens rea
necessary to satisfy a requirement of intent.” Rosemond v. United States (2014).
Any motive whatsoever, innocent
or otherwise, can be used as evidence of intent, but rarely, if ever, can
motive be used to disprove intent for purposes of determining guilt. From the
defense perspective, as the Supreme Court observed: “Motives are most relevant
when the trial judge sets the defendant’s sentence …” Wisconsin v. Mitchell,
508 U.S. 476, 485 (1993)
(hate crime). Thus motive might affect punishment, but ordinarily not guilt,
except for proving the element of intent or as circumstantial evidence for
identifying the culprit of proven bad acts, which is not in question here. Only
the intent of the known culprit for the known acts is in question.
In the Sterling
Espionage Act case, proof of an alleged motive for disloyalty to the CIA
was virtually substituted for the lack of any direct evidence linking the
defendant to the crime. Such trumped up cases invite a jury to illegitimately
convict a person for imputed bad thoughts, i.e., motives, when there is
insufficient evidence of the defendant’s bad acts. But where motive is not an
element of the crime, evidence that one does not have bad thoughts cannot be
used for defensive purposes, to exculpate, as Comey has used it.
In the end, Comey’s argument
amounted to little more than an opinion about the success of such a “bad
thoughts” case against Clinton. But it ignored that Clinton’s “bad acts” was
all he needed to prove, and Clinton’s connection to those acts, unlike the
Sterling case, are virtually unquestioned. By cleverly diverting his legal
analysis of intent to the issue of motive, Comey made an inherently arbitrary
political distinction between motives that the administration can tolerate by
its friends and motives it disapproves. This is a violation of the rule of law
which does recognize such political preferences but rather defines a crime
applicable to everyone irrespective of their friends in high places or the
kinds of motives their friends find politically threatening or not threatening
to themselves.
This highly limited, solely
evidentiary, role of motive in all ordinary criminal prosecutions is shown to
be violated by Comey’s reference to the kind of “intent” that he said was
defined by Justice Department precedent concerning “disloyalty to the United
States; or efforts to obstruct justice.” “Disloyalty to the United States” was
the imputed motive in the Sterling Case, for example. Obstruction of justice
may have been Clinton’s actual motive, as discussed above. Such categories
involving motives for committing a crime must be distinguished from the element
of intent to commit the underlying crime of mishandling the nation’s secrets,
and other government information. Whether the criminal conduct was done for
reasons of disloyalty, obstruction, or any other motive in not necessary to
proof of intent. These “fundamentally distinct concepts” of motive and intent
are jumbled up here on Comey’s list of precedents together with his discussion
of “intentional mishandling” or “intentional misconduct,” instead of focusing
on the actual element of intent to commit the acts which constitute a crime.
Comey’s description of the
precedent he consulted thus appear to share a concern more about the motive of
the accused to accomplish some specific purpose by means of violating the law,
rather than looking to the intent simply to violate a law. Again, intent is an
element of a criminal offense, but motive – with very rare and particular
exceptions – is not. Comey has let Clinton off because he did not find evidence
of a motive sufficiently objectionable by his subjective standards, even though
under the relevant statutes catalogued below motive is not even an element of
the crime that needs be proven at all. It is not necessary to unpack Clinton’s
motives in order to convict her of the crime. It is not necessary to make out a
bad thoughts case here because it is not a circumstantial case on the other
elements of the crime. Clinton’s professions of innocent motive does not
obviate that she had the necessary intent to commit the acts that constitute
several crimes.
There is evidence, of course,
that Clinton did reveal her motive by telling
to a confidant, “I don’t want any risk of the personal being accessible.” This
is evidence of her intent to make her own rules that would better protect her
own inordinate interest in personal privacy for half her email traffic rather
than to follow the State Department rules for her communications to protect the
public’s interests in security of the other half. Her publicly expressed
motive for having a secret server was different. She told the public it was
for her own “convenience” that she risked making accessible to foreign
countries and hackers the nation’s secrets entrusted to her, along with “the
personal.”
Clinton said it was for this
interest of convenience that she wanted to use only one communications device,
which is a somewhat less suspect motive than an unprecedented and unauthorized
obsession with secrecy. It was Clinton’s decision to put both “the personal”
and the public information equally at risk through her insecure server rather
than risk some disclosure of “the personal” to the internal processes of the
State Department. This judgment raises questions about whether she might be
hiding from the public (although not from foreign hackers) information as
important to her as the nation’s secrets.
An unnamed former NSA official
familiar with the effort to get Clinton to obey the rules, now asks, “What
did she not want put on a government system, where security people might see
it?” She must have known that her own server was not only less secure than the
government’s, it was also “less secure than,“ Google’s ordinary Gmail account,
according to Comey.
The alleged motive of Clinton
wanting to use only one mobile device for convenience appears to be a lie in
any case, because the FBI found she actually had used more than one device.
Apparently, Clinton bought an iPad in 2010, just one year into her tenure as
Secretary of State, while continuing to use her BlackBerry. If Comey’s sworn
testimony does disprove Clinton’s convenience motive, that she wanted to have
the personal and the public communications all on one device, then as the
former prosecutor Rep. Gowdy pointed out to Comey, lying about her motives
would be highly probative evidence of her intent. Rep. Gowdy contends,
“if it were convenience Director, she wouldn’t have waited two years to return
the documents and she wouldn’t have deleted them four years after they were
created.” Comey made no coherent response.
A person lacking any intent to
break a law would not need to invent motives for breaking the law, in order to
disguise other more nefarious motives. A person with no intent lacks the state
of mind to have a motive. Satisfying the legal element of intent only requires
that Clinton acted deliberately, not that she acted with an particular
subjectively evil motive.
Comey’s use of the term
“willfully” in his “precedent” argument quoted above, as if it, like Comey’s
subjective term “clear,” required some proof of motive, or a showing of such
specific intent, is legally outdated. The Supreme Court long ago rejected the
idea that, without more, the term “’willfully’ requires proof of any motive
other than an intentional violation of a known legal duty.” United States v.
Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 11-12, (1976). The sole question that “willfully” can
raise is whether Clinton knew she had a legal duty not to “remove and retain”
confidential or other national defense information, or otherwise mishandle the
public’s information.
It is not necessary to parse
Supreme Court decisions to understand the fundamental difference between motive
and intent that Comey confused. The distinction is embedded deeply in criminal
law. A popular nineteenth century legal handbook, for example, stated quite
clearly that “motive with which an act was done is immaterial in deciding the
question of criminality. A crime can be committed with a good motive…” “Motive
may … sometimes be shown in evidence; but it is merely as evidence of intent.
Motive must not be confounded with intent.” May’s Criminal Law (Beale, ed., 2d
Ed.: 1893) 18.
Comey, in violation of these
black-letter law principles, precisely did “confound [motive] with intent.”
Though we may not be able to impute more than a political motive for his doing
so, we could say it was intentional. In saying that Clinton lacked sufficient
criminal intent according to the precedent he described, what he was actually
saying was that the FBI did not have clear evidence of the kind of motive that
he himself found sufficiently offensive, not what Congress required to
prosecute her violation of the law. His argument, discussed further below, was
that the unprecedented nature of the professed motives for a Secretary of State
to commit the crime of systematically mishandling the nation’s secrets about
foreign affairs that were entrusted to her was an excuse for exonerating the
crime. This argument is not a reason not to prosecute, though as
the Supreme Court said it may be an appropriate argument at sentencing. But it
would likely be another unprecedented feature of Comey’s approach to this case
if it were be made by the prosecutor at sentencing rather than the defense
counsel.
Clinton clearly intended to
give classified information to her lawyers who lacked security clearances, as
well as to allow her uncleared tech support to have access. Comey had no good
answer for such facts. Rep. Chaffetz asked
Comey specifically about when Clinton gave “non-cleared people access to
classified information… what do you think her intent was?” Comey’s answer
related solely to a possible motive “to get good legal representation … to make
the production to the State Department.” But Chaffetz accurately rejected
Comey’s motive diversion in this instance, instructing him in Criminal Law 101,
that “criminal intent [is] the idea that you allow somebody without a security
clearance access to classified information. Everybody knows that Director,
everybody knows that.” But the success of Comey’s fix depends on everybody not
knowing that motive is not the element of intent.
It was not Congress that
created such a hierarchy of motives in the relevant statute, a hierarchy that
would exonerate the unprecedented motives of corrupt elites but not the
quotidian motives of those without power. In order to achieve the political aim
of exonerating Clinton, it was her executive branch political allies, on
delegation to the FBI Director, who reinterpreted the law to insert a motive
element of the crime, where none exists.
Intent is Presumed
Even more important than
Comey’s confusion of motive and the ordinary intent element of a crime is his
related view of the amount of evidence needed for its proof. The fact of
motive, being subjective, may be difficult to prove. The legal element of
intent, once properly disentangled from motive, is nowhere near as difficult to
prove as Comey wants us to believe. Again, it has been long established in
criminal law that, “one [who] does an unlawful act … is by the law presumed to
have intended to do it, and to have intended its ordinary and natural
consequences.” Id. 19.
When Clinton arranged to have
her public business conducted on an unauthorized private email server in her
basement against the rules of the State Department, and therefore in violation
of a number of federal laws – that act alone was sufficient to prove the intent
element of the crime, the same as it would be for any mentally competent, sane,
adult. The burden is on Clinton, not Comey, to prove by persuasive evidence
that she peculiarly lacked the capacity to have the same intent any reasonable
person would have in taking the actions she did. Comey therefore misled the
public and Congress when he claimed that as a general rule prosecutors are
concerned about “the strength of the evidence, especially regarding intent.”
Intent is ordinarily the least “especial” element of a crime, since it is the
only element that is routinely presumed.
Comey justified his political
fix by saying, “I don’t think our investigation established she was
particularly sophisticated with respect to classified information.” A
predecessor of Clinton as Secretary of State, her election surrogate Madeleine
Albright, lectured
her employees that “if you are not professional about security, you are a
failure.” Even if the kind of ignorance and failure in dealing with the
nation’s secrets that apparently persuaded Comey about Yale Law School graduate
Clinton’s motive were ever to be believed by a jury, or anyone other than
Comey, ignorance of laws (not to mention Comey’s new standard of “lacking
sophistication” about laws) concerning such matters is normally not a defense.
When Comey was challenged
by Rep. Farenthold on this point, Comey’s reply was that “you must be aware of
the generally wrongful nature of your conduct.” But that does not exclude the
case of Clinton. Comey acquitted her because of lack of very specific knowledge
about specific emails, not lack of general awareness that her server would
inevitably contain classified information if she used it exclusively for all
her work as Secretary of State. Her ignorance defense would be even more
difficult to sustain in view of signed
documents where she acknowledged
her understanding under oath, for example, that “classified information is
marked or unmarked classified information.”
There are some obvious
exceptions to the general rule that evidence of motive is unnecessary to proof
of the crime, such as for hate crimes, civil rights violations, and treason
where evil motive is an express element of the crime. There are also some less
obvious exceptions where “Congress may decree otherwise” by expressly adding a
“willful” element for criminalizing “not inevitably nefarious” regulatory
offenses, such as involving taxation, or currency structuring. See Ratzlaf v.
United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
Neither has Congress generally created such a motive element for the laws
intended to protect the government’s interest in secure communications, nor are
such laws normatively neutral regulatory measures of the kind that do require
specific intent because most people would not expect the ordinary conduct
involved to be a regulatory offense. Moreover the government has not treated
these laws as requiring a nefarious specific intent in cases like the Deutch
case where the motive was similarly one of mere convenience, and nothing more.
One writer who offers legal
credentials as authority for rendering political opinion has supported
the FBI’s decision to exonerate Clinton. He claims it was justified by “a legal
concept called mens
rea. As a general rule, most crimes require prosecutors to prove that an
individual acted with a particular state of mind before they can be convicted
of a specific crime.” First, this statement is misleading to the extent it
suggests that “most crimes” require specific (“particular”) intent, or motive.
As mentioned above, very few crimes do. “As a general rule,” intent is presumed
from the commission of the illegal act, and prosecutors have little concern
about difficulties with proving intent.
Second, criminal laws do not
necessarily require prosecutors to prove intent. For example, a Florida
drug-law was
held constitutional that provided “knowledge of the illicit nature of a
controlled substance is not an element of any offense under this chapter. Lack
of knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is an affirmative
defense,” meaning that the defendant has to disprove the element of intent,
with evidence sufficient to rebut the common-sense presumption that people know
what is in containers they control, whether it may be illegal drugs or
classified information.
Third, this writer, like
Comey, expressly limits his analysis to laws involving classified information,
though other laws listed below were also implicated by Clinton’s secret server
that go beyond just classified information to include all public records, or at
least records involving national defense and foreign relations, without regard
to their classification. On the assumption that only mishandling of classified
information is prohibited, the mentioned writer thus draws the conclusion: “She
had to have acted with knowledge that specific information was classified when
it was transmitted. There is little, if any, evidence that Clinton possessed
this state of mind.”
This statement, which
reproduces the premise for Comey’s fix, can only be called nonsense. A general
presumption of intent can be presumed from the act of setting up an insecure
private communication process that would inevitably include routing classified
materials and other materials about national defense and foreign relations
through an insecure private server. No such specific information about any one
particular communication was required by any law. Executive Order 13526,
Sec. 1.4(d) (2009) defines “classified,” in part, as information relating to
“foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States” which “could
reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the
national security.” Almost any information that a Secretary of State would be
handling could have such an impact, some more credibly than others, since
the Executive Order further provides that any “foreign government information
is presumed to cause damage to the national security.”
It is the job of a Secretary
of State to deal with “foreign government information” for the nation on a
daily basis. Comey was unable to disagree with Representative Chaffetz’
observation that Clinton would reasonably expect to be communicating classified
information through her insecure server on a regular basis. Chaffetz pointed
out, “She’s not the head of Fish and Wildlife.”
Unlike the Espionage
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793(a),
which applies
to anyone and
not just public officials, those few laws that Comey selected as within the
scope of the FBI inquiry regarding Clinton’s emails, such as § 793(f), do not
require a specific motive that the mishandled information was “to be used . . .
to the advantage of any foreign nation.” Under § 793(f) the material
itself only needed to relate to national defense, an element which does not
concern motive but rather describes the kind of information protected by that
particular statute.
This statute does not mention
classification. The statute concerning classification is 18 U.S.C. § 1924 which applies
when “an officer …of the United States … by virtue of his office … becomes
possessed of documents or materials containing classified information …
knowingly removes such documents or materials without authority and with the
intent to retain such documents or materials at an unauthorized location.” This
statute does not apply to the general public who cannot be expected to know
what officials can be expected to know. The public therefore is protected by a
specific intent requirement such as § 793(a)‘s. Similarly §
793(f) applies to
a potentially even narrower group of persons, presumably officials, who are
entrusted with or have lawful possession of a national defense document. It is
this statute that lowers the mens rea to gross negligence.
Clinton did not
have “authority” for removing her materials from the State Department communications
system and did retain them at an unauthorized location, which she did until she
was forced to return them nearly two years after she left office. There is
certainly circumstantial evidence of intent to retain and never return the
material, had the existence of her server not been discovered. Asked
about whether “keeping the servers at home … obviously is not in compliance
with the department’s policies,” Comey answered “Yes.” In response to Rep.
Buck’s proposition:
“that [Clinton] knew that she didn’t have authority to have this server in her
basement?” Comey replied: “Yes, that’s true.” Any reasonable person would have
known that classified information would be “removed and retained” by Clinton’s
secret server operation. Rep. Buck established
this fact by asking: “as secretary of state, she also knew that she would be
receiving classified information.” Comey replied, “Yes, in
general.” On these facts general intent to commit the crime is
presumed.
No Precedent, or Bad
Precedent?
Representative Gowdy concluded
his questioning by attacking the lack of precedent excuse that Comey gave for
recommending against prosecution. As discussed above there is ample precedent
for presuming intent in such cases. Comey’s lack of precedent argument is about
motive. It stems from the fact that no prior Secretary of State had
systematically removed their communications including the nation’s secrets from
the State Department to their basement where secrets were insecure. Over their
lifetime of scandals and corruption, such as the engine for global conflicts of
interest labeled “The Clinton Foundation,”
the Clinton’s atrophied ethics have always tended to break new ground. The
sleaze that led to Bill Clinton’s historic impeachment was also unprecedented.
The fact that there is and would be no precedent for Clinton’s particular
motive for secrecy resulted in her extraordinary conduct in pursuit of that secrecy.
Both Gowdy and Chaffetz
turned the “no precedent” claim around against Comey, suggesting that instead
of lack of precedent being an excuse not to prosecute, that Comey was himself
making bad precedent by failing to prosecute on the ground of lack of intent.
There is now no disincentive for Clinton or her staff or anyone else not to
operate the same privatized communications system whether in the presidency or
in any other high position of trust, provided they have the political clout to
fix the FBI Director to abuse official powers as an investigator and
prosecutor, alter the reasonable doubt standard, confuse motive with intent,
forget the elementary criminal law principle that intent is presumed, or that
it may be proven by circumstantial evidence if it does arise as an issue.
Artificially limited scope of
investigation
Comey reported only three
possible charges that could have been brought against Clinton or her aides:
intentional or grossly negligent mishandling of “classified information,” both
felonies under § 793(f);
and knowingly removing and retaining classified information, a misdemeanor
under .
Comey indicated that his recommendation
was limited to “laws governing the handling of classified information,”
although the statute governing two of his possible charges, § 793(f) does not
mention classified information. He failed to mention the various other laws
implicated by Clinton’s mishandling of her emails, or by her false statements
about it in various venues.
The FBI apparently did not
record or take sworn testimony of its interview with Clinton, probably the most
important interview in the history of the FBI. Comey’s subjective judgment that
there was no evidence that she made false statements to the FBI, a charge the
FBI can usually gin
up in such a case, cannot be objectively tested because the interview was
so informal as not to be recorded and there is not
even a transcript of Clinton’s testimony. Rep. Mica requested the “302” account
of the interview from Comey and this must be made public. Jeopardy has not
attached to Clinton, so Congress should set up a special prosecutor’s office
with full investigatory powers who would conduct a proper interview, suitable
to the profound importance of the case.
Comey admitted to the Chairman
of the House Oversight Committee that the FBI did not investigate lies
told to the Benghazi Committee under oath because it did not have a “referral”
from Congress. Committee chair Chaffetz responded:
“You’ll have one in the next few hours.” One wonders if the FBI will
investigate the question whether Clinton intentionally lied to Congress as
gingerly and at the same level of competence as the FBI’s first limited
investigation, which even non-lawyers on the Oversight Committee were able to
effectively criticize.
Will the FBI also need a
referral to investigate the other possible crimes committed by Clinton with
respect to her email practices? These would include possible violations of 18
U.S. Code § 641 (one who “disposes of any record … of any department or
agency”); 18 U.S.C. § 1030
(1) (exceeding authorized
access to computer to obtain government information “unauthorized [for]
disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations”); 18 U.S. Code
§ 1512(c) (one who “destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record … with the intent
to impair … availability for use in an official proceeding,” such as a FOIA
proceeding, perhaps?); 18 U.S. Code § 1519 (the same, evidence tampering, to
“influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States,” like the
Clinton Foundation charity conflicts
of interest or bribery, perhaps?); 18 U.S. Code § 2232 (“Destruction or
removal of property to prevent seizure”); and 18 U.S. Code § 2071 (punishing
one who “takes and carries away any record … in any public office”).
The FBI’s “thorough”
investigation, taking 3 years of workhours, did not cover Clinton’s associates
who sent her classified information and who clearly did have specific intent
about particular messages, as revealed when Rep. Massie inquired
about “someone down the chain being investigated.” They also seemed
to miss the State Department inspector general’s finding
that Clinton “did not comply with the Department’s policies that were
implemented in accordance with the Federal Records Act” and were therefore
punishable under § 2071. See n.
41 and 44 U.S. Code § 3105(2). This
potential violation was somehow voluntarily excluded from the scope of the
FBI’s inquiry. Cf. Lynch
(1:30)(“not under purview”) with Comey
(Q: “did Secretary Clinton in fact comply with the department’s policies or the
Federal Records Act? Comey: I don’t think so.”)
Another matter raised at the
hearings that Comey didn’t pursue was that Clinton may have had on her
insecure secret server the names of covert
CIA officers, the disclosure of which is a felony under the Intelligence
Identities Protection Act.
Gross negligence
Bernie Sanders
has been preoccupied
with convincing his followers that the Democratic Party platform is relevant,
by performing his new role in the Kabuki
theatre of the corporate Democrats. He is too busy acting out a supposedly
important public debate over the irrelevant
platform to get involved in this real and personal “servergate” example of
impunity for plutocrats. Instead of leading his followers in calling for fair
application of the law to his FBI-certified “extremely careless” rival, he was planning
to endorse her for the Democratic Party nomination that was stolen from
him, without effectively demanding party rules
that would prevent current and future such election
theft, and/or any other
valuable bargaining chip in return.
Therefore, with the newly
docile Bernie silenced from any effective action, it was left to Green Party
candidate Jill Stein to point
out, along with many others,
that — aside from the above analysis of Comey’s legalistic obfuscation of the
true legal meaning of and limited proof necessary for the element of intent –
there was one violation that could be easily understood and accepted by all.
“All the elements necessary to prove a felony violation were found by the FBI
investigation, specifically of Title 18 Section 793(f) of the federal penal
code…. Director Comey said that Clinton was ‘extremely careless’ and ‘reckless’
in handling such information. Contrary to the implications of the FBI
statement, the law does not require showing that Clinton intended to harm the
United States, but that she acted with gross negligence.”
Section 793(f) punishes anyone
“entrusted with … any … information, relating to the national defense, [who]
through gross negligence permits the same to be removed from its proper place
of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or to be lost,
stolen, abstracted, or destroyed.” No one disputes that the FBI’s “extremely
careless” and “reckless” factual findings, which Comey described
as common-sense terms that mean “real sloppiness,” precisely satisfy this statute’s
reduced intent standard of “gross negligence.” Comey explained
that he did not want to apply these literal terms of a statute that reduces the
ordinary element of intent to this lower standard, He asserted some
institutional disagreement with the statute, although it matches the precise
factual findings of the FBI and the law remains on the books to be used to
intimidate others.
This stand by Comey, if
legally mistaken, would risk violating the constitutional obligation of the
executive branch to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” (Art. II,
Sec. 3.) Unless Comey can now produce a cogent constitutional argument that
requiring lesser intent in this statute is a violation of due process, then his
refusal to indict presents a separation of powers crisis. There is no governing
precedent permitting the Justice Department not to enforce this law because it
disagrees with it. Congress should either amend the statute to conform it to
constitutional principles or alternatively insist that it be enforced on pain
of impeachment for failure to execute a valid law so the Supreme Court can
decide the issue. Leaving an invalid law on the books after Congress has been
formally told that the Justice Department refuses to enforce it is itself of
constitutional concern.
Beyond the response of
requiring the Justice Department to produce a fully articulated argument for
unconstitutionality of the “gross negligence” standard to Congress, one capable
of convincing Congress to repeal the law, this gross negligence issue is
something of a red herring from the real issue that Comey has dodged: the
existence of objective evidence necessary to prove the element of intent, by
his confusion of intent with motive. As Rep. Gowdy accurately pointed
out, the problem is that Comey is “reading a specific intent element into a
gross negligence statute, not even general intent.” In other words Comey is
using the standard deception technique of setting up a false dichotomy between
specific intent, which none of the statutes support, and gross negligence,
which 793(f)
supports. Comey is thereby trying to ignore the fact that what Gowdy calls
“general intent” or the ordinary intent element of most crimes can be easily
proven by the evidence of Clinton’s conduct. Comey has in fact invented his own
statute that would require not just specific intent of some important factor,
but specific intent with respect to each separate instance of mishandling of
classified material rather than general intent for a pattern and practice that
any reasonable person would understand would result in mishandling of
classified information. No reasonable legislator would write such a statute.
It is unlikely that Comey’s
highly flawed legal explanation for the FBI’s institutionally inappropriate
spiking of the prosecution of Hillary Clinton will escape the political verdict
rendered by Trump and others that it was “rigged.” Whether the motive for
rigging was more anti-Sanders or pro-Clinton, Trump will be its main
beneficiary. He would almost certainly lose to Sanders, while it is likely he
will now be conveniently pulling
ahead of Clinton in the final
polls prior to his next hurdle, the July 18 Republican Convention. As the Wall
Street Journal wrote,
“Washington rewards officials who are best at currying public favor, best at
surviving, best at creating unfounded legends.” Such an official who has “spent
a lifetime with one eye on politics and one eye on his résumé would have
behaved exactly as Mr. Comey did.”
It is clear that by
eliminating Sanders’ last best hope for nomination Comey has significantly
helped elect his future boss, of either party. But Clinton’s history suggests
that there is more to this deal yet to be uncovered.
Rob Hager is a public
interest litigator who filed an amicus
brief in the Montana sequel to Citizens United and has
worked as an international consultant on anti-corruption policy and
legislation.
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