Posted on July 18, 2016 by Yves
Smith
Yves here. The updates in this
MacroBusiness report are consistent with our reading on the arm-wrestling
between Matteo Renzi versus the ECB and other Eurocrats. Short version: since
early this year, Renzi has been trying to get what has widely been described as
a “bail out” for sick Italian banks, of which there are many. The term “bail
out” makes Renzi’s plan seem more generous than it is, since he is not
proposing to prop up diseased banks, but to have them spin out their bad assets
into a “bad bank”. This is similar to the approach used in the US savings &
loan crisis and in Sweden’s widely praised early 1990s bank rescues. A good
bank/ bad bank approach leave the cleaned up banks considerably smaller. Some
banks may have so many bad loans that there is no or pretty much no “good bank”
left, so you can expect this approach to lead to some consolidation too. I have
to confess that am not clear as to how Renzi proposes to change the operations
of the “good banks” that needed state intervention to survive.
It would seem to make eminent
good sense to give Renzi the waivers he needs to rescue the banks since:
If Italian banks start falling
over, the dominoes will quickly reach Deutsche Bank
As the article below points
out (and we’ve stressed earlier), if Renzi is forced to do bail-ins, small
Italian savers will take a big hit. Many were fraudulently sold subordinated
bonds and told they were the same as deposits. That’s not true, since they will
be next in line after bank equity to be wiped out in a bail-in. Any meaningful
losses to these small savers would both further damage Italy’s already weak
economy, and boost the Five Star movement, which already has good odds of
winning in elections this fall. Five Star has promised a referendum on exiting
the Eurozone. The UK leaving the EU would be very damaging economically but
it’s remotely possible that it might not be a total disaster. By contrast,
Italy leaving the Eurozone would be cataclysmic.
So with the stakes so high,
one would think the ECB and Eurocrats would relent, since they have a perfectly
good face-saving excuse for retreating from their barmy bail-in scheme: with
Brexit in play, banks are already looking wobbly, and the new bail-in rules
allow for rescues under extraordinary circumstances. But Renzi tried that
argument, as well as another escape hatch, public interest, and was told “Nein”
both times.
Why are the European banking
regulators being so self-destructive? Part of the answer may be prejudice
against periphery countries. But as David Llewellyn-Smith indicates, again
consistent with what other analysts have sad, the authorities are wedded to the
newly-nstituted bank regulations, even though banking experts all deem the
bail-in procedures to be guaranteed to produce runs and shake confidence. While
bail-ins would be a useful tool in a regulator’s arsenal, the bail-in rules are
“one size fits all,” making them unsuitable for real-world use.
This situation is disturbingly
analogous to Lehman. After the Bear Stearns rescue, there was such a strong
political backlash that the Bush Administration decided it was not doing that
again. Moreover, it was obvious from the media that they were not going to
relent. Yet Dick Fuld nevertheless convinced himself that Lehman would get
government help if he could not find a moneybags to save Lehman. That led him
to blow up the one deal he could have had, an investment by the Korean
Development Bank in a Lehman “good bank”. Fuld regarded it as unacceptable to
have to wind down the bad parts of Lehman.
Oh, and in a telling bit of
history…the successor to Creditanstalt is over 96% owned by Unicredit, Italy’s
biggest bank.
While the politics are
different, we again have political imperatives trumping real-world
consequences. And here, the downside is more obvious than it was with Lehman.
By David Llewellyn-Smith,
founding publisher and former editor-in-chief of The Diplomat magazine, now the
Asia Pacific’s leading geo-politics website. Originally posted at MacroBusiness
From the AFR:
Platinum, the Sydney-based
global value investor, is defying the bearish mood and buying more European
bank stocks after its positions in banks accounted for almost half of the fund
manager’s losses so far this year.
The Platinum Unhedged Fund’s
latest report shows that its value fell 10 per cent in 2015-16 compared with a
1 per cent fall for global equities. Platinum is not alone; many
Australian fund managers who invest globally have seen returns hurt by the
Brexit vote through falling positions in European bank stocks such as Lloyds
Banking Group, including at PM Capital and Magellan among others.
…What is unusual is Platinum’s
willingness to buy more
…”The banks’ share prices are
factoring in fear of further political risk, namely, a full break-up of the
European Union. The impact of recency bias plays a big role here. As we have just
seen, a large country making a shock exit, suddenly the probability of further
exits feels significantly heightened,” the fund manager told clients. “But
we need to take into account that the European governments will react and
concessions will be made.”
I am sure that Platinum is
joking when it says that European banks are priced for a “full break-up of
the European Union”. They have fallen a long way, however, and that rather
amusing statement does not mean that it is wrong about Europe giving ground on
Italy, from Bloomie:
It may seem like there are
many different ways this critical situation can pan out, but all bar one would
be fatal for the euro zone. The only option is to bail out the banks without
“bailing in” investors.
Of course the banks will be
rescued. This column has previously outlined how Italian banks will be saved
precisely because the alternative is the collapse of the Italian economy, which
would likely precipitate the breakup of the euro.
So the crunch decision is
whether bond investors share some of the cost of that bailout. Since January,
the EU has legislated that investors must be bailed in, and bail-ins have
happened elsewhere, e.g. 54% haircut for senior creditors of Heta Asset
Resolution in Austria.
Surely the EU can’t blatantly
break its own new rules just for Italy? That would set a bad precedent,
completely undermine its authority, create large moral hazard within the euro
zone, and weaken the euro.
But it can. And it most likely
will. Because the alternative is much scarier. In Italy, too much of the
subordinated bank debt is owned by private individuals. If they’re made to pay
for this, then Italy’s constitutional referendum in October will fail,
resulting in Prime Minister Renzi resigning and the collapse of the government.
Italy will be in crisis, and
anti-EU sentiment will gain a significant boost at a time when the euroskeptic
Five-Star Movement has already become the most popular party. Again, the euro
zone will be in serious jeopardy.
So there’s really only one
path to be followed: the one that doesn’t threaten to break up the euro zone.
The Italian banks will be bailed out and investors will not be bailed in.
This will be a boost to global
equities and positive- yielding bonds, yet another boon for emerging markets.
It will be less good for the euro, which is trading within 1% of its 18-month
high versus a trade-weighted index.
That is probably too black and
white and a partial bail-in is more likely with a distinction made between
small and large bond holders. So, to that extent, Platinum is probably right.
Except that that is not the
real problem. This is, from The Telegraph:
The bondholders’ losses risk
harming the government’s reputation at a delicate moment.
Prime Minister Matteo Renzi is
already facing a close-fought referendum over a planned constitutional reform.
If he loses the vote, it could mean the end of his government, and polls
indicate that the eurosceptic Five Star party, headed by Beppe Grillo, could
perform well in a general election, spreading further political instability
through the European Union.
Italian pragmatists argue the
cost of a government-backed bailout would be worth paying, to avoid financial instability. Yet the equation is not
that simple.
The EU insists bondholders
have to bear the cost of the recapitalisation, sparing taxpayers and forcing
investors to think about the risks they are taking, to help stop future crises
at banks and in governments’ finances.
Officials at the Eurogroup and
European Central Bank are digging in their heels – they do not want the past
five years of financial reforms undermined immediately by Italy.
Such a result would sap their
own authority and open the door to similar state-backed deals in Portugal,
which is also suffering from bad bank loans.
Still, even a bailout would
bring political risks to Mr Renzi.
Lorenzo Codogno, former
director- general of the Treasury Department at the Italian economy ministry,
says there is a risk that a bail-in of retail investors could be politically
toxic, even if a conversion of debt into equity, could be a “gift” for many
bondholders who now have illiquid subordinated debt.
“The risk is clearly that it
is not taken well by the electorate, affecting political support for the PM,”
says Codogno, the current chief economist of LC Macro Advisors.
Does Platinum understand
Italian politics so deeply (making it pretty unique) that it knows how this is
going to play with the polity amid BREXIT, French attacks, a rising Five Star
Movement, as well as the likelihood that any European bailout concession will
very likely come with reform conditions that will do great harm to growth
before anything improves? Platinum clearly did not see BREXIT coming so why
would it be any better on Italy? The blood is up in Europe, this is not just a
numbers game anymore.
Perhaps holding on at this
juncture makes sense given Platinum’s losses but buying more?
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