Sinicisation
by Slavoj Žižek
When Alain Badiou claims that
democracy is our fetish, this statement is to be taken in the precise Freudian
sense, not just to mean that we elevate democracy into an untouchable Absolute.
‘Democracy’ is the last thing we see before confronting the ‘lack’ constitutive
of the social field, the fact that ‘there is no class relationship,’ the trauma
of social antagonism. When confronted with the reality of domination and
exploitation, of brutal social struggle, we say, ‘Yes, but we have democracy!’
as if that were enough to ensure that we can resolve or at least regulate
struggle, preventing it from exploding. An exemplary case of democracy as
fetish is provided by such bestsellers and blockbusters as The Pelican Brief or
All the President’s Men, in which a couple of ordinary guys uncover a scandal
that reaches all the way to the president, eventually forcing him to step down.
Corruption is everywhere in these stories, yet their ideological impact lies in
their upbeat takeaway message: what a great democratic country this is where a
couple of ordinary guys like you and me can bring down the mightiest man on
earth!
This is why it is so
inappropriate to give a radical new political movement a name that combines
socialism and democracy: it combines the ultimate fetish of the existing world
order with a term that blurs the key distinctions. Everyone can be a socialist
today, even Bill Gates: it suffices to profess the need for some kind of
harmonious social unity, for a common good and for the care of the poor and
downtrodden. As Otto Weininger put it more than a hundred years ago, socialism
is Aryan and communism is Jewish.
An exemplary case of today’s
‘socialism’ is China, where the Communist Party is engaged in a campaign of
self-legitimisation which promotes three theses: 1) Communist Party rule alone
can guarantee successful capitalism; 2) the rule of the atheist Communist Party
alone can guarantee authentic religious freedom; and 3) continuing Communist
Party rule alone can guarantee that China will be a society of Confucian
conservative values (social harmony, patriotism, moral order). These aren’t
simply nonsensical paradoxes. The reasoning might go as follows: 1) without the
party’s stabilising power, capitalist development would explode into a chaos of
riots and protests; 2) religious factional struggles would disturb social
stability; and 3) unbridled hedonist individualism would corrode social
harmony. The third point is crucial, since what lies in the background is a
fear of the corrosive influence of Western ‘universal values’: freedom,
democracy, human rights and hedonist individualism. The ultimate enemy is not
capitalism as such but the rootless Western culture threatening China through
the free flow of the internet. It must be fought with Chinese patriotism; even
religion should be ‘sinicised’ to ensure social stability. A Communist Party
official in Xinjiang, Zhang Chunxian, said recently that while ‘hostile forces’
are stepping up their infiltration, religions must work under socialism to
serve economic development, social harmony, ethnic unity and the unification of
the country: ‘Only when one is a good citizen can one be a good believer.’
But this ‘sinicisation’ of
religion isn’t enough: any religion, no matter how ‘sinicised’, is incompatible
with membership of the Communist Party. An article in the newsletter of the
party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection claims that since it is a
‘founding ideological principle that Communist Party members cannot be
religious’, party members don’t enjoy the right to religious freedom: ‘Chinese
citizens have the freedom of religious belief, but Communist Party members are
not the same as regular citizens; they are fighters in the vanguard for a
communist consciousness.’ How does this exclusion of believers from the party
aid religious freedom? Marx’s analysis of the political imbroglio of the French
Revolution of 1848 comes to mind. The ruling Party of Order was the coalition
of the two royalist wings, the Bourbons and the Orleanists. The two parties
were, by definition, unable to find a common denominator in their royalism,
since one cannot be a royalist in general, only a supporter of a particular
royal house, so the only way for the two to unite was under the banner of the
‘anonymous kingdom of the Republic’. In other words, the only way to be a
royalist in general is to be a republican. The same is true of religion. One
cannot be religious in general: one can only believe in a particular god, or
gods, to the detriment of others. The failure of all attempts to unite
religions shows that the only way to be religious in general is under the
banner of the ‘anonymous religion of atheism’. Effectively, only an atheist
regime can guarantee religious tolerance: the moment this atheist frame
disappears, factional struggle among different religions will explode. Although
fundamentalist Islamists all attack the godless West, the worst struggles go on
between them (IS focuses on killing Shia Muslims).
There is, however, a deeper
fear at work in the prohibition of religious belief for members of the
Communist Party. ‘It would have been best for the Chinese Communist Party if
its members were not to believe in anything, not even in communism,’ Zorana
Baković, the China correspondent for the Slovenian newspaper Delo, wrote
recently, ‘since numerous party members joined churches (most of them
Protestant churches) precisely because of their disappointment at how even the
smallest trace of their communist ideals had disappeared from today’s Chinese
politics.’
In short, the most serious
opposition to the Chinese party leadership today is presented by truly
convinced communists, a group composed of old, mostly retired party cadres who
feel betrayed by the unbridled capitalist corruption along with those
proletarians whom the ‘Chinese miracle’ has failed: farmers who have lost their
land, workers who have lost their jobs and wander around searching for a means
of survival, others who are exploited by companies like Foxconn etc. They often
take part in mass protests carrying placards bearing quotes from Mao. This
combination of experienced cadres and the poor who have nothing to lose is
potentially explosive. China is not a stable country with an authoritarian
regime that guarantees harmony and is thus able to keep capitalist dynamics
under control: every year thousands of rebellions of workers, farmers and
minorities have to be squashed by the authorities. No wonder official
propaganda talks incessantly of a harmonious society. This very insistence
bears witness to its opposite, the ever present threat of chaos and disorder.
One should apply the basic rule of Stalinist hermeneutics here: since the
official media do not openly report on the troubles, the most reliable way to
detect them is to search for the positive excesses in state propaganda – the
more harmony is celebrated, the more chaos and antagonism should be inferred.
China is full of antagonisms and barely controlled instabilities that
continually threaten to explode.
It is only against this
background that one can understand the religious politics of the Chinese Party:
the fear of belief is effectively the fear of communist ‘belief’, the fear of
those who remain faithful to the universal emancipatory message of communism.
One looks in vain at the ongoing ideological campaign for any mention of the
basic class antagonism made evident in the workers’ protests. There is no talk
of the threat of ‘proletarian communism’; all the fury is directed instead
against the foreign enemy. ‘Certain countries in the West,’ the party secretary
of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences wrote in June 2014,
advertise their own values as
‘universal values’, and claim that their interpretations of freedom, democracy
and human rights are the standard by which all others must be measured. They
spare no expense when it comes to hawking their goods and peddling their wares
to every corner of the planet, and stir up ‘colour revolutions’ both before and
behind the curtain. Their goal is to infiltrate, break down and overthrow other
regimes. At home and abroad certain enemy forces make use of the term
‘universal values’ to smear the Chinese Communist Party, socialism with Chinese
characteristics, and China’s mainstream ideology. They scheme to use Western
value systems to change China, with the goal of letting Chinese people renounce
the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership and socialism with Chinese
characteristics, and allow China to once again become a colony of some
developed capitalist country.
Some of this is true, but the
particular truths cover over a more general lie. It is of course right that one
cannot and should not trust the Western powers’ promulgation of the ‘universal
values’ of freedom, democracy and human rights: that universality is false, and
conceals the West’s ideological biases. Even so, is it then enough to oppose
Western values with a particular alternative, such as the Confucianism that is
‘China’s mainstream ideology’? Don’t we need a different universalism, a
different project of universal emancipation? The irony here is that ‘socialism
with Chinese characteristics’ effectively means socialism with capitalist
characteristics, i.e. a socialism that fully integrates China into the global
market. The universality of global capitalism is left intact, quietly accepted
as the only possible frame; the project of Confucian harmony is mobilised only
in order to keep a lid on the antagonisms that come along with global
capitalist dynamics. All that remains is a socialism with Confucian ‘national
colours’: a national socialism, whose social horizon is the patriotic promotion
of one’s own nation, while the antagonisms immanent in capitalist development
are projected onto a foreign enemy who poses a threat to social harmony. What
the Chinese party aims at in its patriotic propaganda, what it calls ‘socialism
with Chinese characteristics’, is yet another version of ‘alternative
modernity’: capitalism without class struggle.
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