FEATURES » APRIL 26, 2019
The universal retirement
programs are Biden’s go-to sacrificial lambs.
Former Vice President Joe
Biden, who officially announced his presidential campaign on Thursday, is
positioning himself as the defender of the embattled working
class: giving speeches to union
audiences, tapping organized labor for early
support, walking the Stop & Shop picket lines, and pairing his
announcement with a reportedly impending endorsement from the International
Association of Firefighters, who have
pledged to help him raise money.
However, an episode from the
not-so-distant past cuts against this “friend of the working man” image:
Biden's leading role in the Obama administration's 2011 efforts to slash the deficit
by offering Republicans spending cuts to Medicare and Social Security.
At the time, the GOP had just
finished giving then-President Obama a “shellacking” in the 2010 midterms, with
a brand new majority in the House to show for it. Obama was largely focused on
three things: raising the debt ceiling to avoid a looming and potentially
catastrophic debt default; avoiding a government shutdown; and reaching a
“grand bargain” with Republicans over spending, including to so-called
entitlement programs like Social Security and Medicare that had long been in
the crosshairs of the GOP and other deficit hawks.
Obama had been open about his
plans to take on Social Security and Medicare, pledging to
the staff of the Washington Post only a few days before his 2009
inauguration that he would “spend some political capital on this.” He tasked
Biden, a veteran of congressional wheeling and dealing, with spearheading
negotiations.
Biden had an ambivalent
relationship with government spending. Considered in
the 1980s to be one of the Democratic Party's new “neoliberals,” Biden
called then for a spending freeze on Social Security and a higher Social
Security retirement age. In 1995, he cast his vote for a balanced budget
constitutional amendment, despite his earlier criticisms of it. The choice was,
he said, “an imperfect amendment or continued spending.” When he ran for
president 12 years later, he again
called for the Social Security retirement age to go up.
In journalist Bob Woodward's
2012 book The
Price of Politics, he portrays Biden during Obama’s first term eager to
sacrifice Social Security and Medicare for the sake of bipartisan compromise
and achieving what would be, in the eyes of Washington, a political victory.
Biden first displayed his friendliness
to GOP entitlement hawks when he appointed former Wyoming Sen. Alan
Simpson to co-chair the president's National Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility, created in February 2010 via executive order. Simpson was one
of Congress's most high-profile foes of entitlements and a proponent of Social
Security privatization. In Woodward's telling, Biden even had to lightly
pressure a somewhat reluctant Simpson to take the role.
Sure enough, the
Simpson-Bowles Commission, as it came to be known, recommended
cuts to Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security, leading liberal
economist Paul Krugman to label
the commission “terrible.” Failing to secure
enough votes from the commission to recommend the plan to Congress,
the proposals were never taken up.
But Biden took a far more
direct role in undermining Social Security and Medicare when he headed tax
policy negotiations with Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell in December
2010. In Woodward's telling, Biden's eagerness to cut a deal with the
Republicans sometimes elicited outrage from his fellow Democrats, who felt he
was giving too much away.
An Obama priority was to end
the Bush tax cuts on top earners. Woodard reports that, to achieve this,
Biden's team at one point considered dropping the poorest
citizens—anyone who didn’t pay income taxes—from the Obama stimulus payments of
$400 a year. Economist Gene Sperling, then a counselor to Treasury Secretary
Timothy Geithner, strongly objected, calling the idea “immoral.” At Sperling’s
urging, Biden’s team instead proposed a holiday for payroll taxes, which are
used to fund Social Security and Medicare.
The final deal extended
the Bush tax cuts, cut payroll taxes by $112 billion and met a host of other
Republican demands: a lower estate tax with a higher exemption, new tax
write-offs for businesses, and a maximum 15 percent capital gains tax rate
locked in for two years. In return, unemployment insurance was extended for 13
months and the Opportunity Tax Credit for two years.
House Democrats were furious at
both the estate tax provision and the Bush tax cut extension, partly because,
according to Woodward, Biden had failed to mention the extension was on the
table when he briefed Democratic leaders during the talks. Even conservative
Democrats like House Whip Steny Hoyer had strongly opposed the extension, and
the deal drew consternation from across the party. Dianne
Feinstein balked at its size, and Bernie Sanders and two other
senators interrupted Biden's presentation of the package. Sanders later vowed
to “do everything I can to defeat this proposal,” including filibuster it.
However, enough Democrats eventually capitulated, with some grumbling, for the
deal to pass, overcoming an eight-hour
filibuster by Sanders.
Biden subsequently led the
debt negotiations with then-House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, Sen. Jon Kyl and
other Republicans. Biden's “opening bid” was cutting $4 trillion in spending
over ten years, with a 3 to 1 proportion of cuts to revenue. Biden later
proposed $2 trillion in cuts to general spending, federal retirement funds,
Medicare and Medicaid, and, at Cantor's urging, food stamps.
At one point, Biden suddenly
called for $200 billion more in cuts that had never been discussed, which,
according to Woodward, led then-Maryland Rep. Chris Van Hollen—also involved in
the negotiations—to believe Biden had gone over to the Cantor-Kyl side. Biden
again crossed Van Hollen when he offered to take revenue-raising out of the
“trigger”—a combination of revenue raising and spending cuts meant to be
equally unpalatable to both parties, which would automatically kick in if a
deal failed to be reached.
Later in the negotiations,
Biden dangled the possibility of Medicare cuts in return for more
revenue—meaning higher taxes. Soon after, he suggested Democrats might be
comfortable raising the eligibility age for entitlements, imposing means
testing and changing the consumer price index calculation, known as CPI. (Means
testing is often seen a Trojan horse for chipping
away at these programs, because their universality is one of the reasons
they've remained virtually untouchable for almost a century. It’s also been
criticized for imposing an unnecessary
and discouraging layer of bureaucracy.)
At one point, Biden reportedly
called the Medicare provider tax a “scam.” “For a moment, Biden sounded like a
Republican,” Woodward notes. Biden’s team was forced to remind him that such a
move would force states to cut services to the poor, to which he replied,
“We're going to do lots of hard things,” and so “we might as well do this.”
As Woodward writes, “this was
a huge deal” for Cantor (“Biden had caved”), and showed the administration had
adopted the Republican view on the matter of the Medicare provider tax. Despite
this giveaway, the Republicans continued their stubborn opposition to any
revenue increases in the proposed deal.
The negotiations were
ultimately scuttled by Cantor, after Biden inadvertently revealed to him that
then-Speaker of the House John Boehner was secretly holding his own “grand
bargain” talks with Obama. But the Biden portrayed in Woodward's book continued
this pattern of bending over backwards to achieve the Republicans' cooperation
in subsequent negotiations.
When Obama later in 2011 put
forward what he called the “big deal”—$4 trillion in deficit reduction, namely
through “bend[ing] the cost curve” of Medicare, Medicaid, and possibly even
Social Security—Biden insisted to Republicans this approach was the best way
forward on cutting spending. According to Woodward’s account, Biden later
appeared to offer Boehner a deal of one dollar cut from Medicare and Medicaid
for every dollar of revenue.
Months into the negotiations
with recalcitrant Republicans, Biden admitted that he and the administration
had given away everything in their attempt to strike the “grand bargain.”
“We've given up on revenues,
we've given on dollar for dollar,” Woodward quotes Biden telling McConnell.
“All the major things we're interested in we've given up. So basically you've
pushed us to the limit.”
Ironically, the fact that the
“grand bargain” never happened—and that the Obama administration failed to team
up with Republicans to cut Social Security and Medicare—was a result of a
stubborn GOP's refusal to give ground on just about any issue.
Yet there are indications that
another “grand bargain” may be in the cards should Biden win the presidency. In
a speech last
year at a joint event held by the Brookings Institution and the Biden
Foundation, Biden said, “Paul Ryan was correct when he did the tax code. What’s
the first thing he decided we needed to go after? Social Security and Medicare.
We need to do something about Social Security and Medicare.” At the event,
Biden suggested the programs should be means tested, and would require
“adjustments.”
Biden’s willingness to go
after the last remnants of the New Deal may well win him points from the
political establishment, which has long
treated such an approach as a mark of seriousness. Whether it wins him
points among voters, who are overwhelmingly
supportive of such programs, is another story altogether.
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