Sunday, July 22, 2012

Why We Love Sociopaths



By ADAM KOTSKO

My greatest regret is that I’m not a sociopath. I suspect I’m not alone. I have written before that we live in the age of awkwardness, but a strong case could be made that we live in the age of the sociopath. They are dominant figures on television, for example, and within essentially every television genre. Cartoon shows have been fascinated by sociopathic fathers (with varying degrees of sanity) ever since the writers of The Simpsons realized that Homer was a better central character than Bart. Showing that cartoon children are capable of radical evil as well, Eric Cartman of South Park has been spouting racial invective and hatching evil plots for well over a decade at this point. On the other end of the spectrum, the flagships of high-brow cable drama have almost all been sociopaths of varying stripes: the mafioso Tony Soprano of The Sopranos, the gangsters Stringer Bell and Marlo of The Wire, the seductive imposter Don Draper of Mad Men, and even the serial-killer title character of Dexter. In between, one might name the various reality show contestants betraying each other in their attempt to avoid being “voted off the island”; Dr. House, who seeks a diagnosis with complete indifference and even hostility toward his patients’ feelings; the womanizing character played by Charlie Sheen on the sitcom Two and a Half Men; Glenn Close’s evil, plotting lawyer in Damages; the invincible badass Jack Bauer who will stop at nothing in his sociopathic devotion to stopping terrorism in 24—and of course the various sociopathic pursuers of profit, whether in business or in politics, who populate the evening news.

On a certain level, this trend may not seem like anything new. It seems as though most cultures have lionized ruthless individuals who make their own rules, even if they ultimately feel constrained to punish them for their self-assertion as well. Yet there is something new going on in this entertainment trend that goes beyond the understandable desire to fantasize about living without the restrictions of society. The fantasy sociopath is somehow outside social norms—largely bereft of human sympathy, for instance, and generally amoral—and yet is simultaneously a master manipulator, who can instrumentalize social norms to get what he or she wants.

It is this social mastery that sets the contemporary fantasy sociopath apart from both the psychopath and the real-life sociopath. While many of the characters named above are ruthless killers, they are generally not psychopathic or “crazy” in the sense of seeking destruction for its own sake, nor do they generally have some kind of uncontrollable compulsion to struggle with. Indeed, they are usually much more in control of their actions than the normal “sane” person and much more capable of creating long-term plans with clear and achievable goals.

This level of control also sets them apart from a more clinical definition of sociopathy. I do not wish to delve into the DSM or any other authority in the field of psychology, where the usefulness of sociopathy as a diagnostic category is in any case disputed. Yet as I understand it, real-life sociopaths are pitiable creatures indeed. Often victims of severe abuse, they are bereft of all human connection, unable to tell truth from lies, charming and manipulative for a few minutes at most but with no real ability to formulate meaningful goals. The contemporary fantasy of sociopathy picks and chooses from those characteristics, emphasizing the lack of moral intuition, human empathy, and emotional connection. Far from being the obstacles they would be in real life, these characteristics are what enable the fantasy sociopath to be so amazingly successful.

It is curious to think that power would stem so directly from a lack of social connection. After all, we live in a world where we are constantly exhorted to “network,” to live by the maxim that “it’s all about who you know.” Yet the link between power and disconnection is a persistent pattern in recent entertainment, sometimes displayed in the most cartoonish possible way. Take, for instance, Matt Damon’s character in the various Bourne movies (The Bourne Identity,The Bourne Supremacy, and The Bourne Ultimatum— soon to be followed, as Damon has joked, by The Bourne Redundancy). In the first film, Jason Bourne is fished out of the ocean with no idea of who he is. As the story unfolds, he finds that he is unexpectedly the master of everything he tries to do: from hand-to-hand combat, to stunt driving, to speaking apparently every language on earth. His skills apply interpersonally as well, as the very first woman he meets (Franka Potente) becomes his partner in crime and then lover.

The narrative explanation for Bourne’s near superhero status is an elite CIA training program. Yet that training is directly tied to Bourne’s amnesia, as the program’s goal is to create the ultimate “sleeper” agents. The program culminates with a thorough brainwashing, after which the agents don’t remember they’re agents until their programming is triggered by some signal. The life the CIA sets up for the agent is, in true sociopathic style, only an act that can be left behind at any time. What’s more, a later film reveals that Bourne’s trainers only regarded him as truly ready to work once they had induced him to kill in cold blood someone he believed to be an innocent man. Lack of social ties and ruthless amorality thus fit together seamlessly with virtual superpowers in this movie.

The pattern isn’t limited to superheroes. For instance, Don Draper of Mad Men, arguably the most iconic and exemplary contemporary TV sociopath, becomes a powerful ad executive who appears to do little but drink all day and wait for random flashes of inspiration. And as if securing a wife who looks like Grace Kelly isn’t enough, he repeatedly seduces interesting, substantial women, because for most of the series’ run, the standard route of seducing naïve young secretaries is simply beneath him. What enabled this miraculous rise? Stealing the identity of a man who has literally just died in front of him and then abandoning his family!

Many of these sociopathic characters are, of course, “psychologically complex,” particularly in shows with high-brow ambitions. Don Draper is never sure what he wants, though he nearly always gets it, and Tony Soprano famously seeks out therapy to help him deal with the stress of being a mob boss. Dexter gets a voiceover where he muses about what it must be like to feel sympathy or happiness or sadness, while House is subjected to endless amateur psychoanalysis by his friends and co-workers, distraught about how he can be so rude and cynical.

It is hard to believe, however, that the exploration of the dark side of the human psyche for its own sake is behind the appeal of these sociopathic characters. What, then, is going on in this trend? My hypothesis is that the sociopaths we watch on TV allow us to indulge in a kind of thought experiment, based on the question: “What if I really and truly did not give a fuck about anyone?” And the answer they provide? “Then I would be powerful and free.”

In order to get at why this thought experiment would be appealing, and even more why this somewhat counter-intuitive answer would be compelling, I believe it will be helpful to take a detour through awkwardness.

At first glance, the TV sociopath appears to be nearly the opposite of the awkward character. I’ve previously defined awkwardness as the feeling of anxiety that accompanies the violation or absence of a clear social norm. It could happen when someone commits a social faux pas, such as telling a racist joke (what I’ve called “everyday awkwardness”), or it could occur in situations where there are no real social expectations to speak of—for instance, in cross-cultural encounters where one cannot appeal to a third “meta-culture” to mediate the interaction (what I’ve called “radical awkwardness”). In both cases, we are thrown into a situation in which we don’t know what to do. At the same time, however, this violation or lack of social norms doesn’t simply dissolve the social bond. Instead, awkwardness is a particularly powerful social experience, in which we feel the presence of others much more acutely—and more than that, awkwardness spreads, making even innocent bystanders feel somehow caught up in the awkward feeling. This “raw” feeling of social connection can be so anxiety-producing, in fact, that I have even hypothesized that awkwardness comes first and social norms are an attempt to cope with it.

In contrast to the sociopath, then, whose lack of social connection makes him or her a master manipulator of social norms, people caught up in awkwardness are rendered powerless by the intensity of their social connection. Thus we might say that at second glance, the TV sociopath is the exact opposite of the awkward character—the correspondence is too perfect to ignore.

To understand why this connection might exist, I’d like to look more closely at my distinction between the violation and the lack of a social norm. The distinction between these two situations is not hard and fast, because in many cases, it’s not clear how to react to the violation of a social norm. Many social norms function as straightforward commandments—for example, “thou shalt not take cuts in line”—but fail to prescribe a punishment or designate an agent who is qualified to administer it. As a result, when someone does take cuts, there seems to be nothing anyone can do.

In fact, the person who does decide to confront the offender may well come out looking like the asshole in the situation, because in many cultural settings there is a strong bias against unnecessary confrontation. The awkward person sits and fumes, or else confronts the cutter and quickly retreats. If we could define something like the everyday sociopath, it would be the person who is not only callous enough to take cuts in the first place, but is able to manipulate social expectations to shame the person who calls out the violation.

The transition to the fantasy of TV sociopathy comes when the awkward person shifts from “I hate that guy” to “I wish I were that guy.” In everyday settings, this shift is unlikely. Even if the line is unbearably long, most well-adjusted people would prefer not to disobey their ingrained social instincts and, if confronted with a queue-jumper, would console themselves with the thought that at least they are not such inconsiderate people, etc. Similar patterns repeat themselves in other areas of life—a man may wish, for instance, that he were a suave seducer, but at bottom he feels that the seducer is really a douche bag. Even though envy is probably inevitable, a feeling of moral superiority is normally enough to stave off outright admiration of the everyday sociopath.

In order to get from the everyday sociopath to the fantasy sociopath, we need to think in terms of my third class of awkwardness, which I’ve called cultural awkwardness, but perhaps should have called culture-wide awkwardness. Falling in between the types of awkwardness stemming from a violation and a lack of a social norm, cultural awkwardness arises in a situation where social norms are in the process of breaking down. Just as it’s easier to criticize than to create, a social order in a state of cultural awkwardness is perfectly capable of telling us what we’re doing wrong—but it has no convincing account of what it would look like to do things right. My favorite encapsulation of this Kafkaesque logic remains a quote from Gene Hackman’s character in Royal Tenenbaums: “It’s certainly frowned upon, but then what isn’t these days?”

In Awkwardness, I argued that the proper response to our culture-wide awkwardness is simply to embrace rather than try to avoid awkwardness. After all, if the social bond of awkwardness is more intense than our norm-governed social interactions, it also has the potential to be more meaningful and enjoyable. Such a strategy sacrifices comfort and predictability, but it’s not clear that comfort and predictability in our interactions are always desirable anyway.

What our cultural fascination with the fantasy sociopath points toward, however, is the fact that the social order doesn’t exist simply to provide comfort and predictability in interpersonal interactions. One would hope that it might also deliver some form of justice or fairness. The failure to deliver on that front is much more serious and consequential than the failure to allay our social anxieties, though the pattern is similar in both cases. In a society that is breaking down, the no-win situation of someone flagrantly cutting in line repeats itself over and over, on an ever grander scale, until the people who destroyed the world economy walk away with hundreds of millions of dollars in “bonuses” and we’re all reduced to the pathetic stance of fuming about how much we hate that asshole—and the asshole also has the help of a worldwide media empire (not to mention an increasingly militarized police force) to shout us down if we gather up the courage to complain.

At that point, the compensation of moral superiority no longer suffices. We recognize our weakness and patheticness and project its opposite onto our conquerors. If we feel very acutely the force of social pressure, they feel nothing. If we are bound by guilt and obligation, they are completely amoral. And if we don’t have any idea what to do about the situation, they always know exactly what to do. If only I didn’t give a fuck about anyone or anything, we think—then I would be powerful and free. Then I would be the one with millions of dollars, with the powerful and prestigious job, with more sexual opportunities than I know what to do with. In short order, it even comes to seem that only such people can get ahead.

This interpretation has much to recommend it. The people who run our world do a lot of terrible things, and the highest level of contrition they display is seldom more than a token gesture—in fact, officials regularly “take full responsibility” for things without suffering any apparent consequences at all. It takes a special kind of person to order the invasion of a country with no provocation, to cut social programs that millions rely on in order to meet the demands of bondholders, or to deprive people of their livelihood because a set of numbers isn’t adding up in the right way. One can easily argue that the various managers and administrators who control our lives are overpaid, but the callousness they routinely display really does represent a rare skill set. I know that I couldn’t cope with the guilt if I behaved like them—right?

Yet perhaps I could. Perhaps the problem isn’t that we’re being ruled by sociopathic monsters, but rather by people who are just as susceptible to social forces as the rest of us. One might think here of the frequently observed phenomenon of people being perfectly nice one-on-one, but obnoxious and unbearable when part of a group—something often associated with gender-segregated adolescent groups.

Individual members of a fraternity or sports team, for example, might be uncomfortable with the way they are expected to behave toward women—they might have a less constrained view of who counts as “attractive” or be uncomfortable with hook-up culture—but they conform in order to avoid getting made fun of by the other guys. And why will those other guys make fun of them? Because they will be made fun of if they take the non-conformist’s side. The dynamic whereby these young men have to continually prove that they’re “real men” or else face ostracization doesn’t require any individual young man to be a bad person going in. 

And though the addition of a genuinely malicious person might exacerbate the problem, the dynamic is basically self-sustaining without the need for any external “evil” inputs.

Similar dynamics obviously happen in the corporate and political worlds as well, particularly in light of how insular those social circles can be. A politician must be willing to make “tough choices”—and somehow that tough choice is always somehow related to piling further burdens on the already disadvantaged. Of course no one wants to be a bleeding heart, or an idealist, or a wimp, and so no one seriously pushes back. Yet all these spineless conformists style themselves, à la John McCain, as straight-shooting mavericks who aren’t afraid to tell it like it is.

For every average Joe saying to himself, “I wish I was like Tony Soprano,” then, there’s a member of the ruling class saying to himself, “You know, I am kind of like Tony Soprano—it’s not always pretty, but I do what needs to be done.” What both fail to recognize is that Tony Soprano’s actions are no more admirable or necessary than the decision to exclude some poor schlub from the in-group on the playground. More fundamentally, both fail to recognize that what is going on is a social phenomenon, a dynamic that exceeds and largely determines the actions of the individuals involved—not a matter of some people simply being more callous or amoral (though some people certainly are) or being more clear-eyed and realistic (as few of us really are in any serious way).

The fantasy of the sociopath, then, represents an attempt to escape from the inescapably social nature of human experience. The sociopath is an individual who transcends the social, who is not bound by it in any gut-level way and who can therefore use it purely as a tool. The two elements of the fantasy sociopath may not make for a psychologically plausible human being, but they are related in a rigorously consistent way.

Indulging in the fantasy of the sociopath is thus the precise opposite of the strategy of indulging in the primordial social experience of awkwardness. Both approaches, however, respond to the same underlying reality, which is a social order that is breaking down, making impossible demands while failing to deliver on its promises.

Easy intro to Fredric Jameson…



FREDRIC JAMESON builds on the work of previous theorists in his understanding of ideology. He is particularly influenced by Jacques Lacan and those post-Marxist theorists who have made use of Lacan's distinction between reality and "the Real" in order to understand ideology (Louis Althusser, Chantalle Mouffe, and Ernesto Laclau). (See the Lacan module on the structure of the psyche.) At one point, Jameson quotes Althusser's Lacanian definition of ideology: "the representation of the subject's Imaginary relationship to his or her Real conditions of existence" (Postmodernism 51). Those "Real conditions of existence" remain, by definition, outside of language. History therefore functions for Jameson as an "absent cause," insofar as, in its totality, it remains inexpressible; however, it nonetheless does exist as that which drives real antagonisms in the present (for example, between social classes). We may not be able to get out of ideological contradiction altogether; however, Jameson asserts the importance of attempting, nonetheless, to acknowledge the real antagonisms that are, in fact, driving our fantasy constructions.

Jameson also makes it clear that there is not one ideological dominant in any period. In this, Jameson follows Raymond Williams' useful distinctions among "residual" ideological formations (ideologies that have been mostly superceded but still circulate in various ways); "emergent" ideological formations (new ideologies that are in the process of establishing their influence); and "dominant" ideological formations (those ideologies supported by what Louis Althusser terms "ideological state apparatuses"; e.g. schools, government, the police, and the military). Jameson insists on the value of such a model because "If we do not achieve some general sense of a cultural dominant, then we fall back into a view of present history as sheer heterogeneity, random difference, a coexistence of a host of distinct forces whose effectivity is undecidable" (Postmodernism 6).

By determining the dominant of our age in his book, Postmodernism, Jameson hopes to provide his reader with a "cognitive map" of the present, which then can make possible effective and beneficial political change. The problem with our current postmodern age, according to Jameson, is that "the prodigious new expansion of multinational capital ends up penetrating and colonizing those very precapitalist enclaves (Nature and the Unconscious) which offered extraterritorial and Archimedean footholds for critical effectivity" (Postmodernism 49). Any effort to contest dominant ideology threatens to be reabsorbed by capital, so that "even overtly political interventions like those of The Clash are all somehow secretly disarmed and reabsorbed by a system of which they themselves might well be considered a part, since they can achieve no distance from it" (Postmodernism 49). Given such a situation, Jameson argues that what is needed is a "cognitive map" of the present, one that reinjects an understanding of the present's real historicity. Jameson compares the situation of the individual in postmodern late capitalist society to the experience of being in a postmodern urban landscape: "In a classic work, The Image of the City, Kevin Lynch taught us that the alienated city is above all a space in which people are unable to map (in their minds) either their own positions or the urban totality in which they find themselves: grids such as those of Jersey City, in which none of the traditional markers (monuments, nodes, natural boundaries, built perspectives) obtain, are the most obvious examples" (Postmodernism 49). The notion of a "cognitive map" enables "a situational representation on the part of the individual subject to that vaster and properly unrepresentable totality which is the ensemble of society's structures as a whole" (Postmodernism 51). Jameson expands this concept of cognitive mapping to ideological critique, suggesting that his task is to make sense of our place in the global system: "The political form of postmodernism, if there ever is any, will have as its vocation the invention and projection of a global cognitive mapping, on a social as well as a spatial scale" (Postmodernism 54).

One "cognitive map" Jameson for example turns to is Algirdas Greimas' semiotic square, which he calls "a virtual map of conceptual closure, or better still, of the closure of ideology itself, that is, as a mechanism, which, while seeming to generate a rich variety of possible concepts and positions, remains in fact locked into some initial aporia or double bind that it cannot transform from the inside by its own means" ("Foreword" xv). Using Greimas' semiotic square, Jameson seeks to find the dominant ideological contradictions of a given text or cultural work. (For more on the semiotic square, see the Greimas module on the semiotic square.)

[...]

Saturday, July 21, 2012

USA continues move toward Authoritarian State-Run Capitalism


U.S. Admits Surveillance Violated Constitution At Least Once

by Spencer Ackerman

The head of the U.S. government’s vast spying apparatus has conceded that recent surveillance efforts on at least one occasion violated the Constitutional prohibitions on unlawful search and seizure.

The admission comes in a letter from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence declassifying statements that a top U.S. Senator wished to make public in order to call attention to the government’s 2008 expansion of its key surveillance law.

“On at least one occasion,” the intelligence shop has approved Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) to say, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court found that “minimization procedures” used by the government while it was collecting intelligence were “unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Minimization refers to how long the government may retain the surveillance data it collects.  The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution is supposed to guarantee our rights against unreasonable searches.

Wyden does not specify how extensive this “unreasonable” surveillance was; when it occurred; or how many Americans were affected by it.

In the letter, acquired by Danger Room (.pdf), Wyden asserts a serious federal sidestep of a major section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

That section — known as Section 702 and passed in 2008 — sought to legalize the Bush administration’s warrantless surveillance efforts. The 2008 law permitted intelligence officials to conduct surveillance on the communications of “non-U.S. persons,” when at least one party on a call, text or email is “reasonably believed” to be outside of the United States. Government officials conducting such surveillance no longer have to acquire a warrant from the so-called FISA Court specifying the name of an individual under surveillance. And only a “significant purpose” of the surveillance has to be the acquisition of “foreign intelligence,” a weaker standard than before 2008.

Wyden says that the government’s use of the expanded surveillance authorities “has sometimes circumvented the spirit of the law” — a conclusion that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence does not endorse. 

The office does not challenge the statement about the FISA Court on at least one occasion finding the surveillance to conflict with the Fourth Amendment. Danger Room initially misunderstood the letter to mean that its author, top intelligence official Kathleen Turner, made the statements she was merely informing Wyden he could to issue publicly without revealing classified information.

But this is a far cry from how Director of National Intelligence James Clapper typically describes the new FISA law. When the law was up for reauthorization this spring, Clapper wrote to congressional leaders to say its renewal was his “top priority in Congress,” (.pdf) as the law “allows the Intelligence Community to collect vital information about international terrorists and other important targets overseas while providing robust protection for the civil liberties and privacy of Americans.”

Suspicions about abuse of the government’s new surveillance powers are almost as old as the 2008 expansion of the law. In 2009, citing anonymous sources, the New York Times reported that “the N.S.A. had been engaged in ‘overcollection’ of domestic communications of Americans. They described the practice as significant and systemic,” if unintentional. The Justice Department told the Times that it had already resolved the problem.

But as the American Civil Liberties Union noted in a May letter to lawmakers, “There is little in the public record about how the government implements” the expanded law. An ACLU Freedom of Information Act request discovered that the Justice Department and intelligence bureaucracy refer to “compliance incidents” (.pdf) in their internal accounting of the new surveillance — which seemed to suggest difficulty staying within the broadened boundaries of the law. (Full disclosure: My wife works for the ACLU.)

Wyden has been a lonely congressional voice against renewing the government’s broadened surveillance powers. Last month, he quietly used a parliamentary maneuver to stall the renewal after it passed a key Senate committee.

Wyden’s argument was that the government had not fully disclosed the extent of its new surveillance powers. 

It argued to Wyden that it is “not reasonably possible to identify the number of people located in the United States whose communications may have been reviewed under the authority of the [FISA Amendments Act].” Separately, the National Security Agency insisted that it would violate Americans’ privacy even to tally up how many Americans it had spied upon under the new law.

[...]

Democracy is the Enemy: here's one reason


Sheldon Adelson gave half of June donations to pro-Romney super PAC


by Chris Moody

Restore Our Future, a super PAC supporting Mitt Romney's campaign for president, raised about $20 million in June, more than three times the amount pulled in by the main super PAC behind President Barack Obama's re-election bid.

Just under half of the donations came from Las Vegas casino magnate Sheldon Adelson and his wife, who each donated $5 million apiece to the effort.

The group also received gifts of $1 million or more from a handful of sources, including Boston-based private equity leader John W. Childs, Texas-based real estate investor Harlan Crow and businessman Bill Koch. 

Foster Friess, who supported former Pennsylvania Sen. Rick Santorum's Republican primary bid, gave $200,000.

So far this calendar year, Restore Our Future has raised $52 million and has $23 million left in cash on hand, according to financial disclosures filed with the Federal Election Commission Friday. The June haul is a significant boost from May, when the group raised $4.9 million.

Priorities USA Action, which supports Obama, took in $6.1 million in the same month.

Welcome to the Anthropocene


Welcome to the Anthropocene from WelcomeAnthropocene on Vimeo.

We Need Centralization without Totalitarianism: here’s one reason



by Johannes Urpelainen, Ph,D.

A recent study in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, entitled “Expertise and Credibility in Climate Change,” reports the results of an analysis of the expertise of climate scientists. The results are not particularly surprising:

1) Among scholars who publish regularly on climate, an overwhelming majority accept anthropogenic global warming.

2) Most of the scholars who contest anthropogenic global warming have a less credible scientific record than those who accept.

While this should not come as a surprise to anyone who has followed the debate on climate science, I doubt it will convince the skeptical public. 

The reason is that in addition to the most obvious interpretation of these facts — scientific expertise leads individual scholars to accept the strong evidence for climate change — alternative "theories" may resonate with skeptics:

1) Perhaps skeptics are systematically not allowed to publish in journals, so that they seem less experienced than other scholars?

2) Perhaps the public pressure to accept anthropogenic global warming is particularly heavy among top scientists?

3) Perhaps the authors of the study are themselves supporters of anthropogenic global warming, and thus use data selectively to make their case?

This brings us to the deeper problem with climate science and the media: it does not matter much how credible the evidence for climate change is, as long as influential special interests continue to benefit  from  contesting it. Almost any fact regarding the credibility of climate science can be explained away using a conspiracy theory, and individuals who are already inclined towards rejecting science are probably also inclined towards accepting such conspiracy theories. Thus, deeper institutional changes may be necessary to improve the public understanding of climate science.

Adding Iron to Ocean Would Backfire, Study Suggests


By Charles Q. Choi


Fertilizing the oceans with iron — a tactic that "geoengineers" have proposed to fight global warming — could inadvertently spur the growth of toxic microbes, warn scientists who analyzed water samples from past iron-fertilization experiments.

Toxin-producing algae that thrive on iron and can contaminate marine life are more widespread than suspected, the researchers said.  The finding could impact proposed iron-fertilization projects.

"This work definitely reveals a wrinkle in those plans," said researcher Kenneth Coale, director of Moss Landing Marine Laboratories in California.  "It is much easier to break an ecosystem than it is to fix one."

To combat rising levels of carbon dioxide — a "greenhouse gas" that traps heat from the sun — some researchers have suggested seeding the oceans with iron. That, they say, would help spur the growth of the marine plants known as phytoplankton that naturally suck carbon dioxide from the air. [Should We Geoengineer Earth's Climate?]

However, recent findings suggest that even a massive phytoplankton bloom would result in only a modest intake of carbon dioxide. Now Coale and fellow researcher Mary Silver find that iron-fertilization projects could also trigger rapid growth of harmful algae.

"Large areas of the ocean have very little iron in them — that's why the waters there are so clear and blue, because these plants can't live there to cloud the waters," said  Silver, a biological oceanographer at the University of California, Santa Cruz. "It's the same as you see with plants in a garden — if they don't have enough nitrogen and phosphorus, they can't grow. If these ocean plants don't have any iron, they can't grow."

Algae known as Pseudo-nitschia generate toxic domoic acid. These diatoms occur regularly in coastal waters, and when their populations boom, the toxin can contaminate marine wildlife, poisoning the birds and marine mammals that feed on polluted fish, and closing shellfish and sardine fisheries.

These algae were once thought limited to coastal waters. Now researchers find they are common in the open sea as well.

"There was nothing in the science journals suggesting that such toxin-producing algae are so widespread in the open sea, nor documenting that they can get very abundant," Silver told LiveScience.

Normally, Pseudo-nitschia cells are sparse in the high seas, "so they don't have much effect," Silver said. "But these species are incredibly responsive to iron, often becoming dominant in algal blooms that result from iron fertilization. Any iron input might cause a bloom of the cells that make the toxin."

In 2007, on a research cruise to study iron chemistry in the Gulf of Alaska, Silver and her colleagues often discovered Pseudo-nitschia in samples collected at sea. Analyses back in the lab revealed the associated toxin was present, too.

Silver then teamed up with Coale to analyze old water samples collected during two iron-fertilization experiments conducted in 1995 and 2002.

"We thought the toxin would have broken down, but it was still there," Silver said.

The researchers also investigated water samples from three expeditions in the North Pacific independent from the iron-fertilization experiments. Their analysis indicated that waters throughout the Pacific naturally contain Pseudo-nitschia linked with neurotoxin.

Oceanic blooms of this algae probably occur due to iron deposited by volcanic eruptions, dust storms and other airborne sources, Silver said.

"It is a natural phenomenon and likely has been for millions of years," Silver said. "But those are sporadic occurrences. To do iron enrichment on a large scale could be dangerous, because, if it causes blooms of Pseudo-nitschia, the toxin might get into the food chain, as it does in the coastal zone."

"We should have viable strategies to remove carbon from the atmosphere," Coale told LiveScience. "Iron fertilization is still one option in our toolbox, but now the label on the box must read, 'Caution, may produce harmful algal blooms.'"

The scientists detailed their findings online Nov. 8 in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.