Interview with Yanis
Varoufakis
As harsh austerity and
xenophobic nationalism fester in Europe, Yanis Varoufakis discusses his
antidote with Tellus Senior Fellow Allen White.
Interviewer: What inspired
your career trajectory from academic economist to prominent supranational
activist?
Varoufakis: I went into politics
because of the financial crisis of 2008. Had financial capitalism not imploded,
I would have happily continued my quite obscure academic work at some
university. The chain reaction of economic crises, financial bailouts, and the
rise of what I call the Nationalist International that almost broke financial
capitalism, and brought Greece severe hardship, had a profound impact on me.
In the early to mid-2000s, I
was beginning to feel that a crash was approaching. I could see that global
financial imbalances were growing exponentially and that our generation or the
next would be hampered by a systemic crisis.
I left my cocoon writing about
mathematical economics and moved from Sydney to Athens at the time Greece was
becoming insolvent. I began writing about the current situation and appearing
on TV, warning against covering up insolvency with bailouts. Through these
appearances as well as writing about government’s role in averting the
impending crisis, I drifted into politics.
The second transition, from government
to activism, was much simpler. Restructuring Greece’s debt was my top priority
as Minister of Finance. The moment the Prime Minister surrendered to the
austerity demands of the European Commission and accepted another loan without
debt restructuring, resignation became the easiest decision of my life. Once I
resigned, I was back in the streets, theaters, and town hall meetings setting
up the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25). I saw activism as the best
way to confront the political and banking establishment. Four years later, in
July 2019, our Greek branch, entitled MeRA25, entered Parliament with nine MPs.
The fight continues.
Interviewer: You are one of
the sharpest critics of neoliberalism today. How would you define
“neoliberalism”?
Varoufakis: To begin, let me
challenge the term “neoliberal.” The use of the term in relation to West-Soviet
relations was just a cloak under which to hide libertarian industrial
feudalism, but neoliberalism has as much to do with financialized capital
post-1970s as it does with Cold War geopolitical relations. Similarly—and I
know this is a controversial statement—there’s nothing neoliberal about the
world we live in today. It is neither new in the sense of “neo” nor liberal in
the sense of fostering democratic values. Look at what has been happening in
Europe over the last decade. Gigantic bank bailouts are funded through
taxation. There is nothing really “neoliberal” about the use of such vast
subsidies from the public to finance capitalists.
Even under the government of
Margaret Thatcher in the UK from 1979 to 1990, the height of so-called
neoliberalism in the UK, the British state grew rapidly, becoming bigger, more
powerful, and more authoritarian than ever. We witnessed a state that was
weaponized on behalf of the City of London to the benefit of a very small
segment of the population. I don’t think we should concede the term
“neoliberalism” to the brutish establishment using state power to redistribute
wealth from the haves to the have-nots.
Interviewer: How has this
“brutish establishment” become so dominant in shaping the global order?
Varoufakis: The first two
decades after World War II were the Golden Era of capitalism for a very simple
reason: Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal was projected onto the rest of the West
under the Bretton Woods system. It was a remarkable, though imperfect, system,
a kind of enlightenment without socialism. Structures to restrain financial
capital were put into place. Banks could not do as they pleased; that’s why
bankers hated the Bretton Woods system. Recall that Roosevelt banned bankers
from attending the Bretton Woods conference and subjected them to reserve
controls and rules against shifting money across international borders.
The result of the Bretton
Woods system was a remarkable reduction in inequality concurrent with steady
growth, low unemployment, and next to zero inflation. The system was predicated
upon the US’s status as a surplus country, recycling wealth through Europe and
Japan in a variety of ways. By the end of the 1960s, however, the Bretton Woods
system proved unsustainable. The US began to incur trade deficits with Europe,
Japan, and later China at the same time Wall Street, unrestrained by regulatory
boundaries, attracted most of the profits from the rest of the world.
Unshackled financial
institutions began creating what amounted to private money. Holding an inflow
of $5 billion daily for a mere five minutes was enough to divvy it up into
derivatives, opaque investment instruments that contributed to the 2008
financial crisis. This and other forms of financial engineering produced huge
volumes of private money, the value of which, as in the 1929 crash, eventually
collapsed in domino-like fashion. Authorities in Washington, Brussels, Paris,
and Athens immediately transferred the resulting losses onto the shoulders of
taxpayers, a form of socialism for bankers. I described this colossal
mishandling of our financial system in my 2009 book The Global Minotaur,
six years before I became the Greek Minister of Finance.
When I became Minister, I
believed that a global crisis of capitalism was underway. Imagine, then, my
walking into a meeting of the Eurogroup with all the European finance ministers
in the room who knew I held this view. I was the red flag in the eyes of the
establishment. In the same vein, the German ambassador to Greece and one of the
most powerful (and most corrupt) Greek bankers had warned the future,
democratically elected Prime Minster that my appointment as Finance Minister
would cause them to close ATMs across the country and lead to collapse of the
Greek banking system.
Interviewer: Given your
experience inside and outside government, do you believe that there is a
fundamental tension between capitalism and democracy?
Varoufakis: Yes. Compare the
character of a democratic election with a general meeting of shareholders of a
private corporation. Both are elections, but in the democratic process, the one
person-one vote rule applies, whereas in the corporate process, you have one
share-one vote, essentially a wealth-based voting structure. My fellow
economists, especially the true believers in free markets, love to portray the
market as a voting mechanism. It is true that every time you buy a tub of
yogurt, you are voting in favor of that brand. The same applies when you buy a
Ford as opposed to a Volkswagen. The more money one has, the more votes one
casts.
So, if you think of capitalism
as a voting mechanism, it is anti-democratic in the sense that money determines
power. The evolution of capitalism over the last few centuries is a history of
the constant transfer of power to the wealthy, including the power to make
decisions that affect the distribution of income.
Over time, power has been
redistributed from the political sphere to the economic sphere. Until the early
eighteenth century, there was no difference between these spheres. If you were
the king or the baron, you also were rich. And if you were rich, you belonged
to the nobility. With the rise of capitalism, a lowly merchant could become
economically powerful. As the separation of the political and the economic
evolved, power gradually transferred to the latter. What we now call democracy
is not real democracy given the growing influence of economic power. To be
sure, the voting franchise has been extended to all males (from only
landowners), to women, and to blacks. A parallel democratization process has
not occurred in the economic sphere, where power has become less inclusive and
increasingly concentrated.
From the 1870s to the 1920s,
democracy gradually became disempowered as the corporate world—a democracy-free
zone—emerged. Since the end of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s, power has
migrated to finance. Goldman Sachs suddenly became more important than Ford,
General Motors, or General Electric. Even corporations like Apple and Google
are increasingly becoming financialized. Apple, for example, is sitting on
hundreds of billions of dollars, and it is operating more like a financier than
an iPhone producer.
This dynamic guarantees that
when we vote, an act of celebrating democracy, we increasingly are
participating in a sphere that has become totally disempowered. Capitalism is
predicated on defeating democracy, even as the democratic cloak continues to
legitimize the prevailing system.
Interviewer: Given this
fundamental tension between capitalism and democracy, do you believe the
European Union can be reformed? And if so, how?
Varoufakis: We must aim for
something much closer to a democratic federated Europe than what we have now.
The tragedy is that the moment you start making such a case as the only
antidote to disintegration, you serve the cause of nationalists, xenophobes,
racists, and fascists. In ten years, either we’re going to have a democratic
federated European Union, or the political monsters will be victorious.
How do we achieve a future
democratic federation? The most urgent and difficult task is to go out into the
streets of Athens, Rome, Berlin, Paris, and Lisbon and have a discussion with
people about the crisis the EU faces. Many don’t want to hear about Europe’s
future anymore. What used to be a very attractive vision of a unified Europe as
a larger homeland for all its citizens has become toxic in the minds and the
hearts of many Europeans. For them, the democratic European Union has become
synonymous with an anti-humanist, even totalitarian, vision. We need to
construct a new vision to counteract this kind of thinking.
Interviewer: You have been at
the forefront of the recently formed Democracy in Europe Movement 2025
(DiEM25). Tell us about DiEM25’s pan-European mission and strategy.
Varoufakis: DiEM25 seeks to
put forward proposals that stimulate cooperation that is truly democratic. This
will take time and will require recreating European institutions and a
political economy that includes a massive Green New Deal or similar strategy.
We must spend immediately at least 500 billion Euros annually on green energy,
green transport, and a green transition in industry and agriculture. We can do
this by creatively harnessing the power of existing institutions. The European
Investment Bank, for example, could issue bonds worth half a trillion Euros
every year, with that money going toward good-quality green jobs and
technologies. The European Central Bank, sitting on the sidelines, could be
ready to buy these bonds if needed to keep inflation in check. At the same
time, we must engage with a broad spectrum of groups to stabilize Europe and so
to bring back hope. With that movement underway, we can then have a discussion
about democratic governance of the EU.
I’m an old-fashioned lefty. I
don’t believe in destroying institutions. I believe in taking them over and
transforming them into true public servants.
Interviewer: What does DiEM25
offer beyond the proposals of parties like Die Linke in Germany, Podemos in
Spain, or other Green or Left parties throughout Europe?
Varoufakis: Most members of
these groups are our friends and comrades. We share a humanist attitude towards
life and capitalism. The reason we created DiEM25 is that the major crises in
Europe require local and national action as well as pan-European, if not
global, action. It makes no sense to prioritize the local and national over the
transnational, or vice versa. We must operate simultaneously at all levels.
For example, the design of
urban transportation systems must consider the planetary, or systemic, impacts
of alternative choices. The problem with national political parties is that they
are not very good at such systemic thinking. What we need in Europe is a
pan-European movement, which is more than a confederacy of autonomously
operating states that make promises to local and national electorates
independently of one another and then get together in Brussels to discuss the
promises that each has committed to. This model is doomed to fail.
When DiEM25 was inaugurated in
February of 2016, we sought to bring together Podemos, Die Linke, and allies
from the UK to develop a Green New Deal for Europe. We hoped to unify such
movements around a common pan-European program. It didn’t work out that way.
Why? Die Linke comprises two distinct groups: one faction believes that the
European Union is beyond redemption and should be dismantled; the other
believes that the EU is salvageable through democratic activism and social
transformation, a view shared by DiEM. This division between supporters of
“exit” and “remain” stood in the way of an alliance.
Another impediment to unity
was that Podemos and others opposed a European voice in national and local
policies and decision-making. What is Podemos going to say, for example, about
the level and allocation of investment funds among member states? If a Podemos
candidate is elected to the European Parliament, what financial policies will
she support? We need clarity and unity on such issues—to have a voice not of a
Greek, a German, or a Spaniard, but of a European internationalist. We will
continue to struggle to create a unified, coherent agenda for all of Europe.
Unity without cohesion is the curse of the left.
Let’s not forget that the
historical call was not for workers of each nation to organize within their
borders. It was for workers of the world to unite.
Interviewer: Are there lessons
to be learned from previous episodes of leftist internationalism, such as the
Internationals, for our current time of global mobilization?
Varoufakis: There are many
lessons. Anybody who doesn’t learn from history is a dangerous fanatic. Lesson
number one is that socialist nationalism is the worst antidote to national
socialism. Remember what happened in World War I when the German Social
Democrats were co-opted into a nationalist agenda and supported the war effort
of Germany against the much of Europe. That kind of socialist nationalism will always
be gobbled up by Nazism. Anyone who supports a left-wing agenda and at the same
time supports a nationalist, populist workers agenda is going to be devoured by
fascists. They will end up effectively blowing wind into the fascists’ sails,
intentionally or not.
Lesson number two is that
Internationals fail if they are just a confederacy of national parties. The
moment agendas and organizations are nationally based, as was the case in
postwar Communist parties, the international movement will inevitably fragment
and collapse. This is why DiEM25 places all its energies into not becoming a
confederacy of a Greek DiEM25, a German DiEM25, and an Italian DiEM25. This is
not a theoretical matter, but a practical one: transnationality as opposed to
confederacy is critical to building a new, progressive political enterprise.
Studying the failures of earlier Internationals is fundamental in shaping this
strategy.
To be clear, when we created
DiEM25, we envisioned a movement, not a party. And it remains a movement, but
we decided about a year ago to create our own “electoral wings” in each
country. In Germany, DiEM25 created Democratie Europa (“Democracy in Europe”);
in Denmark, Alternativet (“The Alternative”). In short, if you are a member of
a DiEM25–created party, you also are a member of the larger movement. But you
also can be a member of the larger movement without membership in a
DiEM25-created party.
Interviewer: In a forthcoming
book, you imagine “another world” in 2035 in which global financial capital is
essentially demolished. What would this world look like? What would it take to
get there?
Varoufakis: I begin with the
view that the present system is, simply stated, both awful and unsustainable.
My story is told from the perspective of 2035, when my characters discover
that, back in 2008, at the height of our crisis, the timeline split into two:
one that you and I inhabit and another one that yielded a post-capitalist
society. It is my narrative strategy for sketching out how post-capitalism
could work and feel today had our response to the 2008 been different.
My forthcoming book,
entitled Another Now: Dispatches from an Alternative Present, asks
the following questions: Could the world be non-capitalist or post-capitalist?
Could we see humanism in action? What would it look like? What would socialist
corporations look like? How would they function? How would democracy function?
What would happen to borders, migration, and defense? I try to create a vision
of a liberal, socialist society that is not based on private property but does
use money as a vehicle for exchange and markets as coordinating devices. I
preserve money and markets because the alternative would be to fall to some
fearsome hierarchical control, which, for me, is a nightmare scenario.
Interviewer: A deep
transformation of values and institutions is essential to building a world of
solidarity, well-being, and ecological resilience—what we call a Great
Transition—is more urgent than ever. In a dark time, what basis for hope and
advice can you offer fellow internationalists at this critical, historic
moment?
Varoufakis: We have the tools
necessary in order to spend at least five percent of the global GDP on a Great
Transition that saves the planet. Technically, we know how to create a new
Bretton Woods, a progressive Green New Deal that diverts resources to saving
the planet and creating quality green jobs across the globe.
To achieve such a future, we
must offer a cautionary note regarding the role of borders. Some on the left
are unfortunately moving toward the belief that migrants are a threat to
domestic workers. That is a right-wing narrative that is factually untrue. We
need to emancipate progressives from the notion that strong borders protect the
working class. They do not. They are a scar on the face of the Earth, and they
harm labor across the world.
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