Alenka Zupančič QUOTES

http://www.egs.edu/faculty/alenka-zupancic/quotes/

I would agree that the space of ethics and the space of “evil” meet around the question of the impossible.
Zupančič, Alenka.

The theoretical necessity of rethinking the concept of evil is linked to the more general interest in the question of ethics.
Zupančič, Alenka.

...the “impossible” shouldn't be understood here simply as something that cannot happen (empirically), although we (as ethical subjects) must never give up on it. I believe that one should reformulate this concept of the impossible, which is predominant in Kant, in terms of what Lacan calls the “Real as impossible.” The point of Lacan's identification of the Real is not that the real cannot happen. On the contrary, the whole point of the Lacanian concept of the Real is that the impossible happens. This is what could be so traumatic, disturbing, shattering—but also funny—about the Real.
Zupančič, Alenka.

The Real happens precisely as the impossible. It is not something that happens when we want it, or try to make it happen, or expect it, or are ready for it. It always happens at the wrong time and in the wrong place. It is always something that doesn't fit the (established or the anticipated) picture. The Real as impossible means that there is no right time or place for it, and not that it is impossible for it to happen.
Zupančič, Alenka.

In Lacan's seminar L'angoisse one finds the following, rather peculiar statement: Only love-sublimation makes it possible for jouissance to condescend to desire. What is peculiar about this statement, of course, is the link it establishes between love as sublimation and the movement of condescending or descending.
Zupančič, Alenka. "On love as comedy." in: Lacanian Ink. Vol. 20, 2002, pp. 62-79. (English).

It is well known that Lacan's canonic definition of sublimation from The Ethics of Psychoanalysis implies precisely the opposite movement, that of ascension (that sublimation raises, or elevates, an object to the dignity of the Thing, Freudian das Ding). In this last definition, sublimation is identified with the act of "producing" the Thing in its very transcendence, inaccessibility, as well as in its horrifying and/or inhuman aspect (e.g. the status of the Lady in courtly love, which is, as Lacan puts it, the status of an "inhuman partner"). Yet, as concerns this particular sublimation that is called love - which is thus opposed to courtly love as worshiping of a sublime object - Lacan states that it makes it possible for jouissance to condescend to desire, and that it "humanizes jouissance."
Zupančič, Alenka. "On love as comedy." in: Lacanian Ink. Vol. 20, 2002, pp. 62-79. (English).

The theoretical necessity of rethinking the concept of evil is linked to the more general interest in the question of ethics. To a considerable extent, this interest is polemical: The way the word "ethics" has been used lately in public discourse is bound to provoke some theoretical and conceptual nausea. It is used either to back up some political or legal decision that nobody is willing to assume fully, or else to keep in check certain developments (in science, for instance) that seem to move much more quickly than our "morals" do.
Zupančič, Alenka and Christopher Cox. "On Evil: An Interview with Alenka Zupancic." in: Cabinet. No. 5, Winter 2001. (English).

To put it simply, "ethics" is thought of as something strictly restrictive; something that, in the hustle and bustle of our society, marks a place for our intimate fears.
Zupančič, Alenka and Christopher Cox. "On Evil: An Interview with Alenka Zupancic." in: Cabinet. No. 5, Winter 2001. (English).

The fact that something keeps returning usually means that we are dealing with a conjunction of the impossible and the necessary. Evil seems to be a perfect candidate for such a conjunction. Why is this return happening today?
Zupančič, Alenka and Christopher Cox. "On Evil: An Interview with Alenka Zupancic." in: Cabinet. No. 5, Winter 2001. (English).

Kant identifies three different modes of "evil." The first two refer precisely to the fact that we fail to act "according to the (moral) law and only because of the law." One technical detail that will help us to follow Kant's argument: Kant calls "legal" those actions that are performed in accordance with the law, and "ethical" those which are also performedonly because of the law. Now, if we fail to act "ethically," this can happen either because we yield to motives that drive us away from the "legal" course of action, or because our course of action, "legal" in itself, is motivated by something other than the (moral) law.
Zupančič, Alenka and Christopher Cox. "On Evil: An Interview with Alenka Zupancic." in: Cabinet. No. 5, Winter 2001. (English).

Kant goes on to formulate a third mode of evil, which he calls "radical evil." A simple way of defining this notion is that it refers to the fact that we give up on the very possibility of the good. That is to say, we give up on the very idea that something other than our inclinations and interests could ever dictate our conduct. Here again, the term "radical evil" does not refer to some empirical content of our actions or to the "quantity of bad" caused by them.
Zupančič, Alenka and Christopher Cox. "On Evil: An Interview with Alenka Zupancic." in: Cabinet. No. 5, Winter 2001. (English).

In my view, it is completely wrong to relate this Kantian notion to examples such us the Holocaust, mass murders, massacres, and so on. Radical evil is not some most horrible deed; its "radicalness" is linked to the fact that we renounce the possibility of ever acting out of principle.
Zupančič, Alenka and Christopher Cox. "On Evil: An Interview with Alenka Zupancic." in: Cabinet. No. 5, Winter 2001. (English).

I should, perhaps, point out that there is yet a fourth notion of evil that Kant speaks about: so-called "diabolical evil." Within the architectonic of practical reason, diabolical evil is the conceptual counterpart of the supreme good. Kant claims that diabolical evil is conceptually necessary, but empirically impossible. In my view, one should rather say that this notion is conceptually redundant, since, strictly speaking, it implies nothing other than what is already implied in the notion of the supreme good.
Zupančič, Alenka and Christopher Cox. "On Evil: An Interview with Alenka Zupancic." in: Cabinet. No. 5, Winter 2001. (English).

This notion of the impossible as “the impossible that happens” is the very core of the space of ethics.
Zupančič, Alenka and Christopher Cox. "On Evil: An Interview with Alenka Zupancic." in: Cabinet. No. 5, Winter 2001. (English).

In other words, one cannot attain the realm of the ethical by means of gradual elevation of the will by pursuing more and more refined subtle and noble goals by gradually turning away from one's 'base animal instincts.' Instead, we find that a sharp break, a 'paradigm shift,' is required to move from the pathological to the ethical. Here we must resist the temptation of the standard image of Kantian ethics, according to which its ethics demands a perpetual 'purification' (from everything pathological) and an asymptotic approach to the ethical ideal. Even though this image is not without some support in Kant's texts, it is nevertheless misleading - first because it involves a considerable simplification of the logic of Kant's argument; second because it obscures another very important line of argument; the claim that the Atkus der Freiheit, the 'act of freedom', the genuine ethical act is always subversive; it is never simply the result of an 'improvement' or a 'reform' ...
Zupančič, Alenka. Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan. Verso. 2000. Hardcover, 266 pages, Language English, ISBN: 1859847242.

What kind of monstrous 'inhuman' subject does Kantian ethics presuppose?
Zupančič, Alenka. Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan. Verso. 2000. Hardcover, 266 pages, Language English, ISBN: 1859847242.

The second question that must be dealt with concerns what we might call the 'ethical transubstantiation' required by Kant's view: the question of the possibility of converting a mere form into materially efficacious drive.
Zupančič, Alenka. Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan. Verso. 2000. Hardcover, 266 pages, Language English, ISBN: 1859847242.

The crucial question of Kantian ethics is thus not 'how can we eliminate all the pathological elements of the will, so that only the pure form of duty remains?' ...
Zupančič, Alenka. Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan. Verso. 2000. Hardcover, 266 pages, Language English, ISBN: 1859847242.

One of the main reasons for the irreducibility of the pathological thus resides in the fact that the ultimate point of the subject's pathology 'lodges' in the Other, and that consequently, a successful act is never without consequences for the Other.
Zupančič, Alenka. Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan. Verso. 2000. Hardcover, 266 pages, Language English, ISBN: 1859847242.