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EFE. January 7, 2020
QUITO – The prefect of Ecuador’s Azuay province, Yaku Perez, filed on Tuesday a
request with the Constitutional Court calling for a referendum on banning
mining for metals within his jurisdiction.
Perez and several mayors from Azuay participated in a march to the
Constitutional Court, where they presented the request for the referendum.
In September 2019, the Constitutional Court denied another referendum request,
citing “errors of form.”
Perez said he was convinced that “sooner or later” there would be a referendum
on mining in the southern Ecuadorian province.
The referendum questions “are not generic, they have a purpose, neutrality,
constitutionality,” Perez said in a press conference.
The provincial official said the Constitutional Court would not have any
“pretext” now to deny the request.
The new proposed referendum would have two questions – the original one calling
for a ban on the mining of metals of all kinds near the province’s water
sources and an additional question asking whether mining rights granted prior
to the referendum should eventually expire.
“Many of these concessions were made during an administration that was much
more corrupt and one of the most extraction-oriented in the history of the
Republic of Ecuador,” Perez said.
The provincial official said that “as a result, you have to apply what the
constitution prescribes – the right of repetition. If the multinationals want
to sue the state, perfect, sue, but there is the right of repetition, under
which former President (Rafael) Correa will have to be first in line.”
Perez said the administration of Correa, a democratic socialist who was in
office from 2007 to 2017, engaged “in a clear irregularity,” granting “mining
(concessions) in the territories of indigenous peoples,” without apparently
consulting residents prior to awarding mining rights.
Prosecutors have accused Correa, who leads the opposition to President Lenin
Moreno’s administration from exile in Belgium, of corruption while in office.
“Ecuador, sooner or later, will be declared a territory free of metallic
mining,” Perez said.
A total of 815 mining concessions have been granted in Azuay and Perez said
this meant that “one-quarter of the territory” is committed to mining for
metals.
The Ecuadorian government expects $3.8 billion in investment in the mining
industry, which is projected to account for 4 percent of the gross domestic
product (GDP) by 2021.
The Constitutional Court has 30 days to respond to the request submitted by
Perez, who said he was optimistic about the way things would turn out and hoped
the referendum would be held before the 2021 presidential election.
The provincial official said that if the request was once again denied, he
would organize a national referendum on mining.
Metallic mining, according to the Mining Ministry, is an extractive activity
designed to obtain metals ranging from basic (copper, lead, zinc), to ferrous
(iron, cobalt, titanium) and precious (gold, silver, platinum), as well as
radioactive (plutonium, uranium, radium).
Brett Heinz. CEPR.
January 7, 2020
Since 1986, US budget bills have included a provision - commonly identified as
section 7008 - that expressly prohibits providing financial aid to governments
that have taken power via a military coup. In its most recent form, the
provision reads:
None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available … shall be obligated
or expended to finance directly any assistance to the government of any country
whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d’état or
decree or … a coup d’état or decree in which the military plays a decisive
role: Provided, That assistance may be resumed to such government if the
Secretary of State certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional
committees that subsequent to the termination of assistance a democratically
elected government has taken office: Provided further, That the provisions of
this section shall not apply to assistance to promote democratic elections or
public participation in democratic processes….
The language of this provision is clear, yet the State Department often fails
to act when coups take place. It would appear that the US government has a
selective approach to dealing with military coups, depending on whether they
are seen as favorable or detrimental to US interests. In cases in which a coup
is seen as a positive development, the Secretary of State often avoids
complying with section 7008 by simply choosing to ignore that a coup has taken
place. The aftermath of the overthrow of Evo Morales’s government in Bolivia
provides the latest example of how US leaders disregard the law in this way,
and indeed how they are growing bolder in doing so.
When Egypt’s elected president Mohamed Morsi was forced from office by the
Egyptian army and replaced by former general Abdel el-Sisi in 2013, State
Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki was faced with questions about whether or not
the event was a military coup, thus calling $1.5 billion in annual US aid to
Egypt into question. Her response was that “[t]he law does not require us to
make a formal determination as to whether a coup took place, and it is not in
our national interest to make such a determination.” Though every major media
outlet in the world identified el-Sisi’s takeover as a coup, the State
Department - to this day - has refused to do so.
Journalist David Francis explained that “[a]ccording to legal experts, the
State Department and the White House have extraordinary leeway in what they do
and do not term an official ‘coup,’ as well as if and how to … cut aid after
formally designating one. Congress can disagree, but there’s not much lawmakers
can do in response.” While the Congressional Research Service finds at least
eight instances of the coup provision taking effect in the last decade, it also
finds five additional examples over the same period in which the US decided it
did not need to worry about the law. An article in the Harvard Law Review examined
the provision’s history and found that the government often follows the law,
but even then, it does so “as a matter of discretionary policymaking, while
avoiding an admission that it is actually bound by the coup provision.”
The restrictions were first included in US law over concerns about a possible
military coup in El Salvador during the Salvadoran Civil War. Since then, the
US government has skirted section 7008 several times when coups have taken
place in Latin America. This issue was brought into headlines during the early
Obama administration over Honduras. In 2009, the left-leaning Honduran
president Manuel Zelaya was deposed in a military coup following controversy
over a constitutional referendum. The United Nations passed a resolution, with
US support, condemning the coup and calling for Zelaya to be returned to
office. However, the Honduran coup government had powerful allies in Washington
and the US administration made it clear that it wasn’t eager to see Zelaya
restored to the presidency.
The State Department briefly tried to argue that, though Honduras did
experience a coup, it would not be cutting off all aid because it wasn’t
technically a military coup (the two terms - “military” and “coup” - were in
juxtaposition in the original coup provision). Some aid was temporarily
suspended until the November 2009 elections that were organized under the coup
government and that the US was nearly alone in recognizing. This caused
significant controversy among policy-makers, including House Foreign Affairs
Committee Chairman Howard Berman who publicly called on then-Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton to “make it official” and call what happened a military coup.
In order to prevent the State Department from attempting to skirt the law in
this way again, Congress acted in 2011 to broaden the provision’s language to
also include “a coup d’état or decree in which the military plays a decisive
role.” [Emphasis added.]
This makes what is happening in Bolivia right now particularly worthy of note.
After the Organization of American States made questionable claims about the
integrity of the first round of Bolivia’s 2019 elections, President Evo Morales
agreed to hold a new election if the OAS’s audit suggested it was warranted.
When the audit’s preliminary results concluded that a new election was needed,
Morales followed through on his promise and called for new elections. But, as a
recent Congressional Research Service report politely puts it, “his offer did
not satisfy the opposition.”
Protests against Morales that had begun before the election started to escalate
into violence, and Morales faced a loss of control over the nation’s police
force. Then, shortly after Morales agreed to new elections, the head of the
Bolivian army asked Morales to resign. Morales obliged, leaving office and
fleeing the country along with a number of other allied officials. This forced
departure led Jeanine Añez, a Christian conservative and opposition senator who
claimed to be next in line of succession, to swear herself in as president
after being elected head of the country’s senate without the required quorum, a
move that Bolivia’s top court later appeared to justify. The next day, Bolivian
police prevented former and current members of Morales’s MAS party (which holds
a supermajority in the legislature) from entering the building. Añez has
promised new elections, but whether they can be truly fair given present
circumstances is an open question.
What has happened in Bolivia seems to easily meet the definition of a coup under
section 7008: the sitting president, democratically elected multiple times, was
removed from power in a process in which the “military play[ed] a decisive
role.” He was replaced with an unelected leader whose party won only 4.2
percent of the vote in the last election but who has already started changing
policy despite claiming to serve as an interim “caretaker” president until the
next elections. However, President Trump quickly Tweeted that the US was
supporting Añez, while Secretary of State Pompeo praised her “for stepping up …
to lead her nation through this democratic transition…”
Evo Morales was famously a critic of American foreign policy, and during his
tenure he expelled the US ambassador who had been meeting with opposition
figures amid a 2008 destabilization effort against the Morales government. He
also rejected most forms of US-backed financial support in order to seek an
independent economic development strategy, which ended up yielding positive
results. So, if the US government were to acknowledge that a coup occurred
there would be little in the way of foreign aid to cancel.
But in a flouting of the spirit of the law, the USAID administrator for Latin
America met with Government Minister Arturo Murillo of the coup government in
December and expressed an “interest in supporting our country,” as Murillo put
it. Karen Longaric, Bolivia’s new Chancellor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
under the coup government (which lacks a proper mandate to serve in an interim
capacity, not to mention to make policy changes) said that Añez hopes to
reverse course on US-Bolivian relations and bring the country back into the US
sphere of influence. The US appears to be moving beyond its tradition of
ignoring inconvenient coups in order to maintain foreign aid, and is now
offering new foreign aid to coup governments.
The purpose of the coup provision is to provide real consequences for the
perpetrators of undemocratic coups, putting a concrete financial cost on
attempts to undermine elections and elected governments around the world. When
the State Department ignores the law by continuing to provide aid after a coup,
it is signaling that it values its own set of strategic objectives over
democracy and human rights. The case of Bolivia seems even worse, as USAID’s
interest in beginning new streams of foreign aid is rewarding the overthrow of
elected governments that disagree with the United States government. Lawmakers
should demand this be officially identified as a coup and begin exploring
options to strengthen the coup provision, both through altering the language to
include a greater degree of specificity and by reforming the decision-making
process to make it independent of political conflicts of interest.
TeleSUR. January 7, 2020
The Vice-President of the Confederation of Coca Growers in the Cochabamba
Tropics, Andronico Rodriguez, who is also the possible presidential candidate
of the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS), denounced Wednesday that Bolivia’s
coup-based government tries to discredit him by presenting him as a security
threat.
“This is very unfortunate. The de facto government wants the population to
think that I am looking for war, death, and violence," Rodriguez said,
adding that persecution against the MAS leaders continues.
In this context, former President Evo Morales also denounced that Defense
Minister Fernando Lopez threatened to use "the uniformed men" to
silence Rodriguez who is the farmer that people begin to call "the
successor of Evo." This case of political harassment, however, is not the
only one.
Since the self-proclaimed President Jeanine Añez seized power with the support
of the military in Nov. 2019, she has been trying to remove left-wing
organizations leaders from the national political life.
"I want to tell this coup-based government that, although it can imprison
me or many people who think and express ourselves freely, it cannot imprison
the dignity of the people,” the Province of O'Connor Sub-Governor Walter
Ferrufino, a Socialist militant, denounced on Wednesday.
As part of a systematic campaign against those who could resume the Socialist
militancy leadership, far-right lawmakers requested authorities to investigate
where MAS militants obtain money from.
In that sense, for example, the National Unity lawmaker Enrique Siles asked to
investigate Rodriguez because he has been carrying out political activities in
several regions of the country.
"Does he work? What professional or business activity does he carry out?
From where does he get money to travel? From where does he have money for food
and drinks?" Siles asked as if he did not know that farmers provide
solidarity resources for the support of MAS leaders and militants.
Rodriguez, who is also a 30-year-old political scientist, has developed his
career as a social leader in Cochabamba, one of the areas where the MAS has a
broad and consolidated militancy.
JOSHUA GOODMAN. AP.
January 7, 2020
MIAMI (AP) — The Trump administration is sending an assessment team to Bolivia
this week to discuss possible resumption of foreign aid to the Andean nation
following the ouster of leftist leader Evo Morales, according to two people
with knowledge of the visit.
The team organized by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the
development branch of the State Department, is looking to assist Bolivia’s
interim government run a smooth presidential election May 3 that it hopes will
end months of political turmoil following a vote last year that observers said
was marred by fraud.
The mission will also discuss longer-term areas of cooperation, according to
the two people, who spoke on the condition of anonymity Tuesday because the
mission hasn’t yet been announced.
Morales expelled the USAID from Bolivia in 2013, accusing it of political
interference by support for groups and local governments that that opposed him.
Interim President Jeanine Anez has been driving a conservative backlash against
policies implemented by Morales, the nation’s first indigenous president,
during almost 14 years of leftist rule. She has been looking to improve
relations with the U.S. and take a tougher line on coca farmers.
But critics says she’s overstepping her caretaker mandate and say the U.S.
should be wary of backing an interim government accused of targeting Morales’
allies, who still wield plenty of political power even with their leader living
in exile, in neighboring Argentina.
“The Trump administration has clearly picked sides,” said Kathryn Ledebur of
the nonprofit Andean Information Network in Bolivia. “But it should also
highlight concerns about human rights violations and erosion of democratic
rights.”
The White House on Monday announced that it was lifting a longstanding ban on
foreign aid to Bolivia imposed for its failure to cooperate in U.S.
anti-narcotics efforts.
The U.S. first decertified Bolivia as a partner in the drug war shortly after
Morales — former head of a coca growers’ union — expelled then U.S. Ambassador
Phil Goldberg and the Drug Enforcement Administration in 2008. But it received
wavers for several years after that, permitting aid to continue.
On Monday, the Trump administration reinstated a waiver that would allow aid to
resume flowing to the Andean nation, finding that it is “vital to the national
interests of the United States.”
Before Morales came to power, the country had been receiving more than $150
million in economic and security aid, much of it focused on anti-narcotics
programs.
Aid had dropped to about $100 million in 2008 and to $28 million in 2012.
When Morales expelled the agency a year later, USAID said its programs were
helping tens of thousands of Bolivians, particularly children and new mothers
in rural areas who have benefited from health, nutrition, immunization and
reproductive services.
Marianna Parraga.
Reuters. January 7, 2020
(Reuters) - Venezuela’s oil exports plummeted 32% last year to 1.001 million
barrels per day, according to Refinitiv Eikon data and state-run PDVSA’s
reports, as a lack of staff and capital drove output to its lowest level in
almost 75 years and U.S. sanctions shrank exports markets.
The drop would have been steeper if some of PDVSA’s largest customers had not
bought Venezuelan oil through intermediaries or trans-shipped cargoes off
several ports around the world so the country of origin was blurred, according
to industry sources, vessel trackers and Eikon data.
In terms of customers, Russia’s Rosneft was the largest receiver and
intermediary of Venezuelan oil with 33.5% of total exports, followed by
state-run China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) and its units with 11%, and
Cuba’s state-run Cubametales with 7%, the data showed.
PDVSA did not reply to a request for comment.
China emerged as the first destination for Venezuelan oil in 2019 as sanctions
deprived PDVSA of its primary market, the United States. That was despite CNPC
and its units halting the loading of crude at Venezuelan ports in the second
half.
Venezuela sent an average of 319,507 bpd to China in cargoes covering direct
routes as well as in vessels chartered by intermediaries that ended up reaching
Chinese refiners after trans-shipping the oil off countries like Malaysia, the
Eikon vessel tracking data showed.
U.S. sanctions on Venezuelan and Iranian oil, which along with lower output
affected global supply of heavy crude, contributed to driving oil prices up
more than 20% last year. But prices are expected to remain rangebound this year
as U.S. supplies have swelled.
OPEC-member Venezuela produced 1.01 million bpd of crude from January through
November, according to official numbers. The collapse in output under President
Nicolas Maduro has dragged what was once Latin America’s wealthiest nation into
an economic tailspin.
Analysts monitoring Venezuela forecast a further decline in crude production
this year due to the combination of sanctions and lack of investment and staff.
Market intelligence firm Kpler expects Venezuela’s production to average
600,000-800,000 bpd in 2020, said its global energy economist, Reid I’Anson.
Analysts said it was hard to predict how sharply exports would fall this year.
“Washington wants more sanctions but PDVSA’s customers are looking for formulas
to continue buying,” said Francisco Monaldi, of Rice University’s Baker
Institute, who forecasts output will fall this year at least at the same rate
as the years preceding sanctions.
“The main questions are how much the United States will enforce sanctions on
Venezuela? Is Washington ready to act against PDVSA’s partners and customers?,”
Monaldi added.
ASIA GROWS IN IMPORTANCE
A frozen trade relationship with the United States allowed Asia in 2019 to
strengthen its position as the main destination for PDVSA’s oil with China,
India, Malaysia, Japan and Singapore receiving cargoes, sometimes only for
blending and transferring.
Venezuela’s oil shipments to Asia averaged 647,000 bpd, or 65% of total exports
in 2019.
India was the second-largest receiver of Venezuela oil last year with 217,739
bpd. Refining firm Reliance Industries suspended direct purchases from PDVSA in
the second quarter, but resumed them later in 2019 after reaching a new swap
deal allowing PDVSA to receive fuel cargoes in exchange.
Europe was the third-largest destination for Venezuelan oil, also through swaps
allowed under U.S. sanctions. European refiners, mainly Spain’s Repsol,
received an average of 118,980 bpd last year, according to the data.
Cuba was fourth with 70,359 bpd, a number below the average of recent years,
but high considering that other Caribbean nations stopped receiving Venezuelan
oil even before sanctions hit, due to PDVSA’s declining output.
Former PDVSA executives and union leaders attribute the slump in oil production
to a lack of capital and a recent exodus of about 30,000 workers, around a
quarter of total staff reported in 2016, the last year the firm published its
annual report.
PDVSA and its joint ventures also struggled to export oil that had accumulated
in storage tanks amid a shrinking portfolio of customers due to the sanctions
announced by Washington a year ago to oust Maduro.
The mounting stocks forced the firm to cut output while converting oil
upgraders into blending stations designed for producing the crude grades
demanded by Asian clients.
Venezuela, which has the world’s largest crude reserves, imported an average of
155,674 bpd of fuel and diluent naphtha in 2019, in line with recent years but
too little to cover the gap left by PDVSA’s very low domestic refining,
resulting in intermittent shortages of motor fuel during the year.
Ana Vanessa Herrero and
Julie Turkewitz. New York Times. January 7, 2020
CARACAS, Venezuela — Venezuela’s National Assembly erupted into chaos on
Tuesday as opposition lawmakers took their seats to begin the new year’s
session, but only after forcing their way through a phalanx of government soldiers.
National Guardsmen in body armor initially prevented Juan Guaidó, the leader of
the country’s opposition, from entering the building along with his supporters.
“Here the people rule!” the legislators cried as they pushed through the heavy
wooden doors and installed Mr. Guaidó at the front of the assembly’s main hall.
When it was all over, Mr. Guaidó said he would continue to claim the country’s
presidency and he called for a new round of protests, starting Thursday,
designed to oust the country’s authoritarian leader, Nicolás Maduro.
“I know that we have committed errors, like all human beings,” Mr. Guaidó said
at a news conference, flanked by allied legislators. “But we all deserve a
second chance, and I ask for it not for my sake, but rather to rescue
Venezuela’s freedom.”
It was an exceptionally turbulent morning, even for a nation that is becoming
increasingly accustomed to high-stakes political drama. And it did little to
resolve Venezuela’s political tumult: The country, which is facing a worsening
humanitarian crisis, has two men claiming the presidency and two men claiming
the leadership of the assembly.
On Tuesday, the legislature’s first meeting of the year deteriorated into a
melee in which, according to Mr. Guaidó’s press office, four opposition
legislators were injured. The National Guard also launched tear gas at Mr.
Guaidó and other opposition members as they made their way to the building.
But he fled through the basement, along with some legislators and reporters,
when members of colectivos — the armed civilians that back the government and
are known for violence — were allowed into the building.
It was the second time Tuesday that a self-proclaimed assembly president opened
a legislative session only to flee the building.
In the early morning, Mr. Guaidó’s rival, Luis Parra, opened assembly
proceedings, but left before the opposition lawmakers pushed their way in.
Later in the day, the Maduro government issued a statement saying the
legislature convened by Mr. Parra was the legitimate one, and that it would
create a commission to “rescue” constitutional order.
Several journalists reported being attacked by men they believed were members
of the colectivos during the chaos.
The confrontation on Tuesday followed a weekend in which Venezuela’s opposition
accused forces loyal to Mr. Maduro of staging a takeover of the assembly in a
bid to consolidate Mr. Maduro’s grip on the country.
On Sunday, government forces prevented Mr. Guaidó and some of his allies from
entering the assembly for a vote to decide who would lead the body. That left
pro-government legislators free to elect Mr. Parra, one of their own, to the
post.
Later that day, the opposition held their own vote, electing Mr. Guaidó, and
leaving the country with two leaders of the assembly.
It was a significant blow to those seeking change in Venezuela.
In a nation increasingly controlled by Mr. Maduro, the assembly had been the
last institution run by his critics. And Mr. Guaidó had been the body’s head —
a position that, last year, gave him legal cover to call Mr. Maduro’s most
recent election a fraud and claim for himself the interim presidency of the
country.
Mr. Guaidó received international recognition from dozens of countries, and
rallied many Venezuelans to his side. But a year later, his position as head of
the legislature — and his claim to the presidency — appear to be increasingly
tenuous.
Matt Spetalnick,
Alexandra Alper. Reuters. January 7, 2020
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Trump administration is considering sanctions
against some of the Venezuelan lawmakers who took part in a bid supported by
President Nicolas Maduro to wrest control of the country’s congress from
U.S.-backed opposition leader Juan Guaido, according to two people familiar
with the matter.
Deliberations over the possible sanctions targets, including Maduro-backed
lawmaker Luis Parra and more than a dozen others, are in the early stages, and
a final decision is not imminent, the sources told Reuters on Tuesday.
Venezuelan troops blocked Guaido from entering parliament on Sunday for what
was expected to be his re-election as head of congress, allowing Maduro’s
socialist party to hand the post to Parra. Later in the day, opposition
legislators quickly re-elected Guaido - recognized by dozens of nations as
Venezuela’s rightful interim leader - at the offices of a pro-opposition
newspaper.
“We go after those who undermine the constitution,” said one of the sources, a
high-ranking U.S. government official who declined to be named because details
of the deliberations have not been made public. “This is no different.”
The White House declined comment. The State Department did not immediately
respond to a request for comment.
The measures against the lawmakers could start with bans on their travel to the
United States, a restriction that Washington has already slapped on dozens of
Maduro allies, and might later involve financial sanctions against them,
according to a person familiar with the matter.
Special envoy Elliott Abrams said the United States was looking at additional
sanctions to step up pressure on the Venezuelan government on Monday, but did
not specify potential targets.
Last January, Washington recognized Guaido as the OPEC nation’s legitimate
interim president and began ratcheting up sanctions and diplomatic pressure in
an effort to oust Maduro.
A year later, Maduro remains in power, backed by the military as well as
Russia, China and Cuba. A senior administration official told Reuters in
October that Trump’s frustration over the lack of results had spurred aides to
ready further actions.
