Saturday, July 13, 2019

What Revolutionary Socialism Means to Me










BY


The revolutionary socialist vision is a vital one. Today’s rising socialist movement shouldn’t discard it.





Many years after having vanished, socialism is back in the US political arena. This is because of the election of Donald Trump as president in 2016 as well as Bernie Sanders’s campaign for the Democratic Party nomination. Even the more forbidden term “revolution” has made a comeback recently, with Sanders’s call for a political revolution to implement a progressive agenda of job creation, wage increases, protection of the environment, and universal health care.

The popularization of socialism and Sanders’s call for a political revolution has raised the question of how to respond for the Marxist left. To do so, it would be useful to outline the fundamental characteristics of the Marxist revolutionary tradition, a tradition that helps provide some guidelines to an appropriate response to the new political situation in the US.

For Marxists, Sanders’s progressive agenda is worth fighting for, in as much as it represents a stand against the neoliberal social agenda implemented by Democrats and Republicans alike since the 1970s. Their participation, however, is informed by the distinctive view that, in order to win those struggles, it is necessary to go far beyond the ballot box and take them into the workplaces and neighborhoods of America, to “socialize” those struggles and turn them into a movement from below, independent of the two parties. Marxist socialism seeks to articulate these and other progressive struggles — against racism and imperialism and for immigrants and refugees — into a long-term view of systemic change: a social revolution that brings down the economic and political system founded on the profit motive, capitalism, and replaces it with a politically and economically democratic one.

Marxist Views of Revolution

For many people, the term “social revolution” conjures the image of a sudden explosion of armed insurrection. An analog of this view exists within the revolutionary tradition, best exemplified by Che Guevara, for whom revolution only meant insurrection. So it did for the whole revolutionary Cuban leadership in the 1960s, which insisted that “the duty of the revolutionary was to make the revolution.” Che Guevara took this notion to its extreme by rooting revolution on sheer voluntarism, the sheer will for armed insurrection and relegating the objective circumstances, the concrete situation on the ground, to a marginal role.

But revolution involves much more than armed insurrection. It involves fighting political battles for reforms to advance the interests of working people, mobilizing and organizing them to open up revolutionary possibilities. In further contrast to Guevara (and other voluntarists like Mao Zedong), the objective situation plays a central role in the process leading to insurrection.

This view is best articulated by V.I. Lenin:

To the Marxist it is indisputable that a revolution is impossible without a revolutionary situation; furthermore, it is not every revolutionary situation that leads to revolution. What, generally speaking, are the symptoms of a revolutionary situation? We shall certainly not be mistaken if we indicate the following three major symptoms: (1) when it is impossible for the ruling classes to maintain their rule without any major change; when there is a crisis, in one form or another, among the “upper classes,” a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, leading to a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst forth. For a revolution to take place, it is usually insufficient for “the lower classes not to want” to live in the old way, it is also necessary that “the upper classes should be unable,” to live in the old way; (2) when the suffering and want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual’ (3) when, as a consequence of the above causes, there is considerable increase in the activity of the masses, who uncomplainingly allow themselves to be robbed in “peace time,” but in turbulent times, are drawn both by all the circumstances of the crisis and by the “upper classes” themselves into independent historical action.

In contrast to the Guevara-Mao view of revolution at the voluntaristic end of the Marxist spectrum stands the determinist view of Karl Kautsky, who in his The Road to Power (1909) wrote: “The Socialist party is a revolutionary party, but not a revolution-making party. We know that our goal can be attained only through a revolution. We also know that it is just a little in our power to create this revolution as it is in the power of our opponents to prevent it. It is no part of our work to instigate a revolution or prepare the way for it.”

For Kautsky, a prominent theoretician of the German Social Democratic Party, revolution was the automatic result of objective conditions that inevitably led to it (although in other occasions he wrote about it with a different tone). History, however, has contradicted Kautsky’s passive evolutionary view. Although revolutions have been preceded by deep social and political crisis, it was not inevitable or predetermined which side would end up winning; their outcome depended not only on the depth of the crisis and the social support for each of the clashing sides, but also on how effectively the contending forces were led, organized, and conducted themselves. Contrary to Kautsky’s unilinear evolutionism, social, economic, and political conditions may make revolutions more likely, but they do not guarantee their victory over historical reaction.

Applied to the present conditions, Kautsky’s passive perspective, which in the classic German case placed an exaggerated emphasis on the growing parliamentary representation of the SPD, would downplay the response of the ruling classes to the movement, ranging from lies and propaganda against it in order to weaken it by sowing division and confusion, to government surveillance, provocation, and repression — such as the Palmer Raids which deported large number of radicals in the US after World War I, or McCarthyism after World War II — which might force the movement into a clandestine existence with far more limiting conditions for political life.

Political conditions in democratic capitalism are certainly more favorable for political organization, but they cannot be taken for granted, and their prospects might well decline, as is now happening in this era of right-wing governments such as those existing in Hungary, Poland, Turkey, and in the Western capitalist democracies, including the US.

In contrast to Guevara and Kautsky’s thought, revolutionary socialist politics requires strategic and tactical thinking and action long before a revolutionary situation arises, in order to strengthen the working class and the socialist movement to respond appropriately to the revolutionary situations that otherwise could be resolved in favor of the forces of reaction.

A tragic example of the lack of preparation to respond to such critical situations was General Augusto Pinochet’s coup in Santiago, Chile, on September 11, 1973, when President Salvador Allende’s unconditional commitment to parliamentarism led to the crushing of democracy and the Chilean left. As Kautsky recognized in his writings but never integrated into his perspective, the ruling classes will do everything and anything to prevent the success of a revolution, even after they have been initially defeated.

Revolutionary Socialism in a Nonrevolutionary Situation

The United States is very far from being in a revolutionary situation of any kind. However, there are serious problems affecting vast sectors of the population. In contrast with the “thirty glorious years” that followed the end of WWII, the majority of the US population has been experiencing a progressive deterioration in their living circumstances. As author Ben Fountain put it recently, Americans are working harder than ever for a steadily shrinking share of the rewards as shown by the data on wages, income inequality, household wealth, and class mobility, a reality that is also confirmed by the metrics of life expectancy, maternal and infant mortality, and in deaths from “the diseases of despair” like opioids and suicide. Add to this other sources of oppression like police brutality and massive incarceration, among other forms of racial discrimination. These changes open the road for substantial radicalization on the Left even if these do not result in a revolutionary situation.

In response, popular movements have been taking shape like the Black Lives Matter movement. The #MeToo movement has brought to the surface the long-standing problem of gender inequality and oppression. The numerous and inspiring teachers’ strikes, especially in the most politically conservative states in the union, constitute another promising response that points to the possible rebirth of a labor movement that never recovered from the employer and government offensive since the late 1970s. (One front where, unfortunately, there has been no popular engagement since the massive protests against the mounting efforts of the Bush government to invade Iraq on February 2003, is the foreign front, desperately needed particularly at a time when the Trump administration is beating the drums for war with Iran.)

For revolutionary socialists, it is crucial to actively participate in those and other progressive movements, even if limited to the terms of what those movements seek to achieve. And to do so by highlighting the connections of one social grievance to other social grievances and to the social system — capitalism — as a whole, underlining the systemic nature of the different kinds of oppression against which each of those movements are fighting.

Along the lines of Marx and Engels 170 years ago, the socialist movement must “fight for the attainment of the immediate aims, for the enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class, but in the movement of the present they also represent and take care of the future of that movement.”

In that process, along with other socialists, socialist revolutionaries oppose as divisive and distracting any attempt to blame other workers, at home and abroad, or poor people like welfare recipients who are victims of capitalism, pointing instead to the profit system as the fundamental source of their problems. And they insist on measures to remedy present and past racial discrimination, including reparations. The same political spirit and logic applies to gender and other forms of discrimination.

But what distinguishes the politics of revolutionary socialism in terms of their participation in today’s struggles is its refusal to compromise the organizational and political independence not only of working-class organizations, but more generally of the social movements of the oppressed, a method and approach that is applicable to a wide variety of political situations ranging from the workers struggle with employers to electoral politics. This is paramount to preserve those organizations and movements as independent agents and to prevent them from being co-opted and diverted into supporting the politics and priorities of their opponents.

What follows are examples of how this method applies in the arenas of 1) the labor movement, specifically regarding labor-cooperation schemes, and 2) political activity, specifically regarding elections and participation in Democratic Party politics.

Independence of the Labor Movement

The starting assumption of an approach putting the independence of the working class at the center is that unions cannot concern themselves, and much less attempt to guarantee, the profitability of the enterprises for which their members work. That includes participating in co-management schemes with employers, which, in practice, involves accepting responsibility without getting any real power in decision-making, and compromising in the process the union’s organizational independence.

The paradigmatic case of labor-management cooperation is the United Auto Workers (UAW) collective bargaining agreement with Chrysler in October 1979. This new contract included a supposed concession by Chrysler Corporation accepting the appointment of UAW president Doug Fraser as member of the company’s board of directors. As described by Labor Notes at the time, the international union, along with Lee Iacocca, the head of Chrysler, issued a joint statement to the press warning that the company would go bankrupt and that the workers would lose their jobs if they did not partake in the pain and contributed with their own share of sacrifice.

Besides new contract language making it easier for the company to discipline workers with poor attendance records or for “abusing” sick leave, this sacrifice amounted to a $203 million donation (or $2,000 per worker) by Chrysler employees. This was a small amount compared to what Chrysler was going to receive from government-backed loans, sale of preferred stock, state and local tax relief, and joint ventures. But neither Democratic president Jimmy Carter nor the Democratic-controlled two houses of Congress would agree to a bailout without the workers accepting significant sacrifices. Sixty nine percent of the workers accepted the concessionary agreement based on the notion that “half a loaf was better than none,” although in the end that meant that they ended up paying to avoid a capitalist bankruptcy for which they were not responsible.

Meanwhile, by joining the board of directors, the union leadership ended up accepting political responsibility for that denouement. In the decades to come, that 1979 concessionary agreement would come to look relatively mild as the union continued to accept ever worsening agreements with features such as two-tier wages for new hires. And it initiated a concessionary wave that spread throughout the whole economy, in many cases involving corporations that did not have a credible claim of economic hardship but that used that false claim to extract concessions from their employees.

One could say that the 1979 UAW agreement that co-opted the union into its board as the policeman of its own members in the name of cooperation was the result of the defensive position in which the union was put by the likely bankruptcy of the enterprise and the loss of thousands of jobs of its members. (Although the union, could have, for example, attempted to organize a national campaign for a political solution forcing the government to intervene to protect the contractual rights of the workers — which it did not do.)

But there are labor-capital cooperation proposals in contexts more favorable to labor that are coming from the Left itself. This is the case for example, with the British Labour Party’s Jeremy Corbyn, whose government program, if he were elected to office — an undoubtedly big victory for the Left and the working class — would ask every company with 250 or more employees to create an “inclusive ownership fund” (IOF) involving shares for the workers in each firm into which the company would transfer at least 1 percent of their ownership each year, up to a maximum of 10 percent. As a result, almost 11 million workers would end up receiving up to 500 pounds in dividends every year. The Labour Party estimates that 10.7 million people — or 40 percent of the private sector labor force — would initially be covered by the plan with workers’ fund representatives having voting rights in their company’s decision-making processes similar to that of other shareholders.

Yet far from representing a 10 percent advance on the road to socialism, this legislation would do the opposite. It would further incorporate the working class into capitalism, since the unions, in exchange for a rather small income increment for its members, would end up assuming corporate responsibilities as members of the boards of directors, of which they would in any case constitute a small minority. In political and social-psychological terms, this proposal would also significantly increase the workers’ identification with “their” company in exchange for minimal influence, at best, in corporate decision-making.

Instead of investing major political capital in this legislation, the new Labour leadership, if victorious, could use its newfound clout to increase independent working-class power by beginning to reverse the drubbing that unions took under the Thatcher and Blair governments by restoring at least some of their lost institutional power, without compromising, as Corbyn’s proposal does, the political and organizational independence of the working class.

The Issue of Compromise

The negative consequences of Corbyn’s plan would have been the same even if it had proposed, as a compromise, a 40 percent instead of the 10 percent increase in their company’s shares (Elizabeth Warren has proposed a similar plan, which will be emulated by Bernie Sanders’s coming proposals.) But this does not mean that Marxist socialism is in principle opposed to compromise.

Revolutionaries do not reject compromise as such, but instead focus on what the specific compromise entails, in this case as it regards union independence. In a collective-bargaining situation or in a strike, a union might be forced to agree to accept less than it originally demanded for its members, given that the balance of power at that point in time has tilted in favor of the boss. That is one kind of compromise.

Another, qualitatively different, compromise involves the union’s agreement to the employer’s proposal to establish labor-management productivity committees, reduce the union’s ability to communicate with its members inside the plant, or to participate in advertising campaigns against the firm’s competitors. The first compromise would not jeopardize the union’s organizational independence and preserve its ability to continue fighting for a better contract in the next round (or for fighting to enforce the new contract in the best interests of its members). The second type of compromise would jeopardize the independence of the union and its class alignment.

Independent Political Activity, Elections, and the Democratic Party

For some 150 years, the Left has been divided with respect to elections in liberal capitalist democracies.

At one end, anarchists and various kinds of leftists have refused to participate in elections for fear of legitimating and furthering illusions on the willingness of the capitalist state to allow fundamental structural reforms, and on a parliamentary road to socialism. At the other end is the far more influential tendency on the Left to consider the parliamentary system all powerful and parliamentary politics as the main if not only form of political struggle.

Since the late nineteenth century, German Social Democracy has classically embodied this attitude, which in conjunction with the extreme adventurism and sectarianism of the Stalinized German Communist Party opened the road for Hitler’s rise to power. Karl Marx captured the essence of this political phenomenon in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte under the term “parliamentary cretinism” that he coined to describe “that peculiar malady which since 1848 has raged all over the Continent … which holds those infected in it in an imaginary world and robs them of all sense, all memory, all understanding of the rude external world.”

Although revolutionary socialists have no illusions about the parliamentary road to socialism, it is important for them to participate in elections supporting independent and socialist candidates because during the electoral period, people are more likely to pay attention to political issues and even participate in political organizations, thereby compensating for the political apathy and atomization typical of capitalist democracies in economically developed countries. Access to the mass media during electoral campaigns adds the further advantage of allowing left-wing candidates to argue for their policy proposals to far wider audiences.

We are now witnessing the growth of progressive and left movements that have led to the election of their representatives to those offices. The opportunities for those elected officials to use their positions as public platforms to propose and mobilize for left-wing legislation are obvious, as we’ve seen with the impact of Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortezon the media and public opinion with her proposals like the Green New Deal.

But the electoral history of the Left is fraught with examples of elected officials being unable to resist the blandishments and wheeling and dealing of “normal” politics and to remain faithful to the politics with which they ran for office. As Seth Ackerman put it in an interview with Jacobin: “any politicians that we managed to elect are going to find themselves under a lot of pressure to find alternative sources of support and therefore to pursue alternative policies to the ones that we want them to pursue.” This is the sort of situation that compelled the New York chapter of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) to criticize Alexandria Ocasio Cortez’s endorsement of neoliberal Andrew Cuomo for governor of New York in the 2018 elections.

The newly elected socialist politicians will also be subject to other, subtler, pressures: used to the very austere, if not disheveled, world of the left movements, or even to the mostly clean, efficient, but not necessarily luxurious world of independent nonprofit organizations and NGOs, they begin to operate in a world of power over assistants, office staff, budgets, and office paraphernalia often located in impressive, even august, government buildings. In the normal course of legislative and government work, they begin to meet important people, who in turn are the source of invitations to high-level social functions and parties, opening the door to an often-glamorous social milieu previously barely discernible if not entirely unimaginable.

The newly minted socialist officeholder will find common ground with decent legislators and government functionaries who, like themselves, are displeased by the corruption ongoing in the legislative and executive bodies but who don’t have a single radical political bone in their bodies. And they will also come to realize that many liberal and even conservative legislators they meet are not so personally repelling as they had imagined.

In the end, all of this may well end up co-opting the socialist officeholders. The possibility of that happening is magnified when the elected socialist representatives are not directly responsible to the people who elected them and to the socialist organizations that selected or supported them as candidates. That is why revolutionary socialism insists on the importance of remaining alert to the political behavior of their elected officials by the mobilized base of those who voted for them, and to the need for some sort of democratic discipline that holds the elected candidate responsible to the organizations’ political guidelines.

Ideally, the candidate must be nothing more and nothing less than an expression of the politics of the organization that democratically selected her to run for office. It is in that vein that parties in the socialist tradition have taken organizational measures such as insisting that the elected officeholders turn over their government salaries to the party’s coffers, and to compensate them with a salary comparable with that of a skilled worker, an efficient way to reduce the social distance between the representatives and their electors.

The Democratic Party

The Democratic Party has long been called the “graveyard” of progressive and radical movements in the labor, civil rights, and peace arenas. The classic example is what happened to the militant and radical Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) of the 1930s, which was gradually domesticated by its wholesale entry into Democratic Party politics. The Democratic Party’s deadening impact is primarily due to the fact that it is a party that fundamentally reflects the interests of capital.

As Lance Selfa shows in his book The Democrats: A Critical History, important sectors of capital contributed similar, if not higher, sums to the Democratic than to the Republican Party in the 2008 elections. Contributions to the Democratic Party included 45 percent of all the funds contributed to the election by agribusiness, 68 percent of all the election contributions from the communications and electronics sectors, 52 percent from defense, 55 percent from finance, insurance, and real estate, 54 percent from health, 74 percent from lawyers and lobbyists, and 55 percent from miscellaneous businesses.

In the 2016 presidential election, while total spending on behalf of Trump’s election from all sources totaled a little more than $861 million, Hillary Clinton’s campaign raised $1.4 billion. With the possible exception of 1964, the Clinton campaign surpassed any other campaign since the New Deal and obtained financial support from sectors and firms that have rarely supported any Democrat. Undoubtedly, Hillary Clinton, not Trump, was the presidential candidate supported by the majority of the capitalist class.

Moreover, it cannot be claimed that the Democratic Party chiefly represents the liberal wing of the capitalist class. Only a wing of the Democratic Party’s elected representatives can be called liberal; a few conservatives and a very large number of neoliberals account for an ample majority of its officeholders, although the liberal wing — with the addition of a number of socialists — has grown substantially as a result of the 2008 recession, Bernie Sanders’s campaign, and the Trump presidency.

Insofar as its internal organization is concerned, the Democratic Party is led by the Democratic National Committee, which as Selfa explained, is “composed of hundreds of elected politicians, union leaders, lobbyists, and campaign donors, [which] exists mainly to raise money for Democratic candidates. Its role in policy making or determining the direction of the party is fairly minimal. In essence, the Democratic Party is a loose federation of candidate-based local and state electoral machines.”

Thus, in reality, the Democratic Party is not a party in the usual sense of the term involving a membership that decides the party’s policy through internal deliberations and decision-making. The only thing resembling a Democratic Party program is the platform it adopts before every presidential election. Even then, Democratic candidates at the federal, state, or local level are free to ignore, and for the most part do ignore, their party’s platform when they are running for office.

Another important characteristic is that those who register as Democrats at election time do not elect their own party leaders. That is why, in spite of having won twenty-three state primaries in the period leading to the 2016 elections, Bernie Sanders did not end up representing and leading the Democratic Party in any of those states.

These characteristics of the Democratic Party make it totally impervious to any attempt by many American leftist leaders in the past to “take it over.” Unlike the British Labour Party where its members directly elect their leaders, as they recently elected left-wing Jeremy Corbyn, it is impossible to do so in the Democratic Party, which is not a membership-based party.

Despite agreeing with the previous arguments, many would still argue that Democrats should be supported because they represent a lesser evil. But this argument, brandished for quite a few decades, presents several problems. Historically, the supposedly “lesser evil” has sometimes turned out to be the larger one, as was the case of the 1964 election in which Lyndon Johnson, the Democratic Party “lesser evil” winner over really evil Barry Goldwater, significantly escalated the war in Vietnam with the number of US troops surpassing half a million. It is unlikely that Barry Goldwater could have outdone Johnson’s massive deployment of US troops, use of Agent Orange and strategic hamlets, by unleashing massive nuclear warfare in Vietnam, if for no other reason that such an act might have very likely provoked a war with the USSR and/or China.

In terms of domestic policy, it was the explosive black protests in the streets of America, and not Johnson’s politics, that brought about big gains, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In the midst of the incendiary situation prevailing in the country in 1964, Senate Republican minority leader Everett Dirksen and his caucus felt obliged to respond to black demands by joining Johnson in preventing the white racist Southern Democrats from filibustering the Civil Rights Act.

“Lesser evil” political accounting has always limited itself to a very short-run perspective — and has ended up contributing to the very conditions leading to the success of a “worse evil.” Hillary Clinton represented the “lesser evil” alternative to “evil evil” Trump, but it was Clinton’s own neoliberal economic policies that played a definitive role in engendering the white popular support for Trump. Supporting the “lesser evil” Democrats on the basis of short run considerations — winning the election — ignores the evil that they create in the medium and long run, as in the case of Clintonian neoliberalism.

The “Dirty Break”

Several Jacobin and Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) writers such as Seth Ackerman have proposed that socialists consider the use of the Democratic Party ballot line, not necessarily as matter of political commitment to the party but as a way to use their ballot status to reach out to vast sections of the population to which it would otherwise have no access, particularly when it may be difficult to run as independents. Advocates of this view justify this “dirty break” strategy by arguing that the chances for creating a third party that reflects their left politics are minimal given the legal obstacles for the creation of such parties in the US.

The main problem with this tactic is that it might end up unintentionally misleading voters who might feel manipulated unless they are explicitly informed that the “dirty break” candidates do not support, and in fact oppose, the Democratic Party as presently constituted. And the candidates pledge, in advance, that if elected they will not join the Democratic caucus and instead create a separate caucus. And that if they lose, they will not support a mainstream Democratic Party winner (a big problem with Bernie Sanders’s strategy of supporting mainstream Democrats who win the presidential and other primaries.) This approach would also have the virtue of preventing the cementing of illusions about the Democratic Party.

The issue is, however, that the national success of such a transparent dirty break presumes the very same conditions — namely the massive radicalization of the voting population — that would also lead to the formation and success of a third party, rendering the dirty break tactic irrelevant.

Conclusion

The above discussion assumes that neither the US nor other economically developed capitalist democracies are likely to confront revolutionary situations either in the short or even medium term. Yet, these democracies have been undergoing a series of crises — whether economic, the last one being the 2008 recession that that devastated working class and especially minority living standards; and the ongoing ecological degradation — that have created openings for the development of social protest movements. So does the alarming growth of open racism and Islamophobia, and the anti-immigrant campaigns by governments in power.

Liberal capitalist democracy is under attack in countries like Turkey, Poland, and Hungary, and in the United States itself, with its successful efforts to gerrymander electoral districts, and to reduce voting rights, particularly among blacks and Latinos.

While it is true, as some have argued, that the means of state surveillance and consequently, of state control, have increased in the last one hundred years, this has not translated into the unchallenged legitimacy of the state. In fact, state legitimacy has been subject to serious attacks, especially from the Right: just witness the attacks by the current President of the United States and his immediate entourage against the “deep state” in general, and against the heretofore “sacred” institution of the FBI in particular. Similar developments are taking place in Europe with the right-wing calling into question, for its own reasons, the legitimacy of long-respected state institutions such as the independent judiciary.

The notion, often implicit in the defense of reformism, that the existing liberal capitalist democracies will preserve their present character forever, is ahistorical, ignoring the crises affecting them today, which are likely to deepen further down the road. Given these crises, it is important to keep in mind that the capitalist ruling classes have historically jettisoned democracy when their fundamental interests have been threatened.

Historian Eric Hobsbawm described the “short” twentieth century (1914–1991) as the “age of extremes” that ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. His account refutes the optimistic, unilinear views of history expounded by Karl Kautsky and others. In this context, Rosa Luxemburg’s historical projection is far more relevant when she pointed to the stark option of “socialism or barbarism,” an option that speaks far more to what is happening in today’s world. It poses the possibility that revolution may occur not as the crowning advance of the forces of progress, as welcome as these might have been, but rather as a defensive last gasp and decisive fight against brutal regression.






















Revolutionary Socialists in the Democratic-Socialist Moment












BY





Right now, democratic socialism is on the rise in American society. Revolutionary socialists who have kept the torch of socialism burning during the lean years will now have to merge with democratic-socialist demands of the current moment.




Over the course of forty-plus years of neoliberal offensive, revolutionary socialists in groups like the International Socialist Organization, of which I was a member until its recent dissolution, performed the valuable service of helping keep Marxist ideas alive by insisting that class struggle would eventually revive, that the Left should not limit its prospects solely to the confines of the Democratic Party, and that capitalism itself would soon enough force socialism and revolution back onto the popular agenda.

Sam Farber’s contribution, “What Revolutionary Socialism Means to Me,” confirms the value of sticking up for these points. And Farber has consistently done so over the years in a creative and nondogmatic manner. Hailing from the same broad political family, I agree that our tradition can help “provide some guidelines” to today’s new socialist movement and reinvigorated class struggle.

But revolutionary socialists must go a step further. We must identify where our fealty to very decent starting propositions over many reactionary decades may have dulled our sensitivity to new developments we didn’t expect.

Last year I wrote that “democratic socialism and revolutionary socialism share a great deal — and where we differ, we will debate our ideas and test them in practice.” But the reality is that the proponents of democratic socialism have grown proportionally stronger over the last few years because they have answered some key questions correctly; revolutionary socialists, meanwhile, have hesitated. My specific criticism of Farber’s piece is really a criticism of my own mindset, and it pertains to the problem of how to use knowledge of the past in order to make it useful today.

It’s certainly useful to know history that can warn a movement of potential pitfalls. For instance, Farber is exactly right to stress that “what distinguishes the politics of revolutionary socialism in terms of their participation in today’s struggles is its refusal to compromise the organizational and political independence not only of working-class organizations, but more generally of the social movements of the oppressed.”

But how do we do that? Farber stops short of giving the sort of concrete answers that democratic socialists have delivered in order to grow and spread their influence for the benefit of the whole movement. Revolutionary socialists have too often missed the forest for the trees. Here are two examples.

First, Farber reviews the UAW’s capitulation to Chrysler in 1979 and then warns that Jeremy Corbyn’s proposal for an “inclusive ownership fund” providing corporate shares for workers might dull class antagonism. He then suggests this will be “emulated by Bernie’s Sanders’s coming proposals.” Were either Corbyn or Sanders’s plans to come about without first throwing into the air major aspects of the assumed neoliberal order, Farber would be right to suggest that “in political and social-psychological terms, this proposal would also significantly increase the workers’ identification with ‘their’ company.”

Certainly, it is fair to criticize specific proposals put forward by Corbyn and Sanders on any number of grounds. But is the main impetus of Sanders’s campaign to bind workers to their companies more tightly? Quite the opposite: Sanders’s main thrust is to encourage teachers and other workers to strike.

So the concrete question is, if Sanders’s campaign can help build the socialist movement, should we (however critically) support him? Yes or no?

Second, Farber warns that the “newly minted socialist officeholder will find common ground with decent legislators and government functionaries” and then be caught in the web of co-optation. He is absolutely right to point to this potential. One only has to utter the name Alexis Tsipras to know that seemingly radical politicians can become capitalist enforcers.

But does knowing that Cyril Ramaphosa went from union leader to billionaire, or that the European left has hit an impasse, or that the Lenin-Kautsky debate deserves serious study answer the question of whether or not to vote for Sanders? Or whether or not to support Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Rashida Tlaib?

In 2016, I believed that Sanders would be brought to heal by the DNC. Instead, he helped fuel the growth of the Democratic Socialists of America and, remarkably, played a role in giving teachers and others the confidence to strike. And recently AOC tweeted in support of one of the first political strikes in modern US history at Wayfair in solidarity with immigrant families caged in concentration camps.

Does this mean that Farber’s warning about the potential pitfalls of running socialists on the Democratic Party ballot line is irrelevant? Not at all. In fact, at some point, Farber’s call for explicit timelines and guarantees about building a new party will come into play.

And, if in five or ten years from now, we still have not breached this wall, all the dangers that Farber points to may be proven correct. After all, it is one thing for a movement to occupy a few dissident seats in Congress and another to be able to exert some influence (“discipline,” we might say) over hundreds of elected officials all across the country in preparation for launching a “mass party of the working class with a socialist program.”

AOC, Bernie, Chicago’s recently elected six socialist city council members, Rep. Rashida Tlaib, and others are at this point confounding the revolutionary socialist expectation that they will fall prey to what Karl Marx referred to as “parliamentary cretinism” in short order.

Farber is right to champion Rosa Luxemburg’s insight that humanity faces a choice between socialism and barbarism, even in advanced democracies. And this choice “poses the possibility that revolution may occur not as the crowning advance of the forces of progress, as welcome as these might have been, but rather as a defensive last gasp and decisive fight against brutal regression.”

Yet timing and preparedness in politics is everything. History does not repeat itself, but the socialist movement of which Marx was a part needed several generations to mature. If our socialist movement is not prepared to fight on multiple fronts using a variety of tactics over the coming decades, we will be weaker for it. Engels wrote in 1891, “for the time being it is not we who are being destroyed by legality. It is working so well for us that we would be mad to spurn it as long as the situation lasts. . . . . [but] a war would change all that. And war is liable to break out at any moment.”

That seems about right to me. Take all the ground that is open to us for as long as we are able, while keeping in mind that the state is hostile to the working class and will use force, the law, its political instruments, and all the means at its disposal to stop us in the short and medium term, while reserving the Pinochet option in the long run.

In this respect, Farber raises a legitimate criticism of Karl Kautsky, who placed so much emphasis on the first aspect of Engels’s formulations — elaborating a strategy so compelling that it earned him the honorific “the Pope of Marxism” in the years after Engels’s death in 1895 — that he was ill-prepared to respond effectively to the First World War. But that shortcoming should not blind us to what is valuable in Kautsky’s strategy for socialists today.

For decades, revolutionary socialists in the United States had few prospects and were forced to make the best of a bad situation. We did our best to work in labor or social movements where our radical politics could only be put into practice in small ways. We wrote and taught and did our best to pass on what we learned to a new generation. We built small organizations of hundreds that we knew would have to eventually combine with much more powerful forces. Our work was hemmed in and too often made a virtue out of necessity.

Farber is one of the most open-minded and non-sectarian revolutionary socialists I know. His insights and knowledge are a treasure trove for the new socialist movement, and he was rightly more attentive to the problemsof translating the experience of revolutionary organizations from the era of the Russian Revolution to our own time. So Marx’s advice to socialists in 1868 to a situation analogous to that of our own today applies to many of us, myself included, much more so than him.

“The dissolution of the General Association of German Workers [a significant but small organization of working-class socialists] gave you the historic opportunity to accomplish a great step forward and to declare, to prove if necessary, that a new stage of development had now been reached, and that moment was ripe for the sectarian movement to merge into the class movement . . .  Where the true content of the sect was concerned it would, as with all previous working-class sects, be carried on into the general movement as an element which enriched it.”

Rather than revolutionary socialists and democratic socialists defining our “points of honor” that “distinguish” one from the other, it is time to merge the best of our ideas, many of which we share to begin with. Socialists from different traditions will find themselves agreeing and dividing over many of the battles to come, but I suspect that these confluences and arguments will not fall neatly along the theoretical or traditional lines developed in the period of defeat.

Hand to heart, who in 2015 would have expected Sanders to be joined by radicals in Congress like AOC, Ilhan Omar, and Pramila Jayapal to propose the abolition of $1.6 trillion in student debt? That is not only an economic demand, it is a political demand, if we can win it, as it would simultaneously weaken finance capital’s stranglehold on the Treasury Department and lift the fighting spirits of tens of millions of young workers.

Marxists are materialists. We do not base our prospects on what we wish to be true. With his typical bluntness, in the face of high Hitlerism and Stalinism in 1940, Trotsky wrote, “if the world proletariat should actually prove incapable of fulfilling the mission placed upon it by the course of development, nothing else would remain except only to recognize that the socialist program, based on the internal contradictions of capitalist society, ended in Utopia.”

Of course, he rejected that thesis in the months before his assassination, but the power of neoliberalism to remake the world in its image has tested its limits. In the last few years, hundreds of thousands of striking teachers have revived hope that the working class’s “mission” is not a utopia. And millions more, great layers of the two youngest generations, are gravitating towards socialist ideas inherited from the past and redefining socialism for themselves for the future. A new political leadership is arising on both the picket lines and at the ballot boxes and those leaders are picking fights that will be difficult to contain within the bounds of congressional decorum.

I agree with Farber, and many other socialists, that it was a mistake for AOC to endorse Gov. Andrew Cuomo given his “two-term record reveals a critical lack of support for healthcare for all New Yorkers, or ambitious climate and jobs programs, or protection for immigrants from deportation.” Socialists of all stripes should make their opinions known about such decisions, for instance, should he not win, Sanders will in all likelihood support the Democratic nominee in 2020, and he insists socialists should remake the Democratic Party, a utopia if there ever was one. But it will be the sum total of decisions like this over the next five or ten years that will determine the trajectory of the socialist movement. Socialists from revolutionary and democratic traditions must judge the directionality, the timing, and the ethos of the movement, not simply assess individual data points.

As Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor wrote last week, “Sanders is a reflection of the deepening radicalization in this country, but he is also helping fuel it forward by naming the source of misery and rejecting the well-worn habits of blaming American workers for their own despair.” The same can be said of AOC’s inspection of immigrant concentration camps in Texas. She is not only reflecting a mass outcry and the rumblings of mass action — she is fueling it, not only rhetorically, but physically by putting her body on the line.


Engels died in 1895 as a critical, but enthusiastic, friend of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). With all the limitations of exile, he embedded himself in that movement and fought to strengthen it by mobilizing his previous decades of experience and knowledge. Twenty years later, the leftist, anti-war wing of the party proved too weak to overcome its leading bureaucracy, and they lined up behind their rulers in the Great War.

That trajectory was not inevitable. It was determined by 1,001 fights within the SPD over decades, by real people, by social forces, and not a little luck. Our movement’s fate will be settled by the same means, and it will be messy. If we want to play a role in achieving a different outcome, revolutionary socialists will have to prove we are able to merge with the movement of the present. The power of political ideas is not only measured by their logic, but just as much by their social and psychological proximity to the social and class struggles a new generation of fighters adopts as their own.
















The Legacy of Vladimir Lenin













AN INTERVIEW WITH




One hundred years after the Russian Revolution, Vladimir Lenin's ideas on democracy, terrorism, and revolution still matter.




Writer, filmmaker, and journalist Tariq Ali’s new book The Dilemmas of Lenin: Terrorism, War, Empire, Love, Revolution, came out last month, in the centenary year of the Russian Revolution — and in April, exactly one hundred years since Lenin’s April Theses, the call to arms after the successful February Revolution which brought down the czar but didn’t bring the soviets to power.

Tariq’s book brings out an unknown Lenin, one who loved Latin literature and classical music, who was profoundly influenced by the political convulsions of the time that intimately affected his own family.

History sees Lenin as a ruthless dictator, so it may be surprising to hear about his commitment to democracy. In this interview with Jacobin Radio’s Suzi Weissman, Ali unravels the myths and slanders about Lenin’s role in history, helps us assess Lenin’s ideas and actions, and asks what relevance they have for today.

This transcript has been edited; you can listen to the episode here, and subscribe to Jacobin Radio on iTunesStitcher, and Blubrry


SW
In your new book, you give us a Lenin that we haven’t normally seen: his love of literature and Latin, and chess, and the impact of his brother’s death.


TA
These are the things people don’t talk about, and for a variety of reasons. One reason is what the Soviet leadership did to Lenin after he died. This was a decision taken by the Politburo to mummify him, to display his body in public, to transform him into a Byzantine saint. It’s very much a tradition of the Orthodox Church. Even though some people on the Politburo were not in favor of it, they couldn’t fight it because it would have seemed very sectarian.

Lenin’s widow, Nadia Krupskaya, and his two sisters, pleaded with the leadership and said, “He would have hated it. He loathed all this sort of deification. Please bury him underneath the Kremlin walls where other leaders and activists have been buried. Do not do this to him.”

But they did do this to him, and it was a clever move. They could use Lenin, especially in the Stalin years — rebuild him as someone he wasn’t, forge photographs with him.

Stalin in particular did this. He of course met Lenin quite a lot at Politburo meetings, but to show that they were friends, a lot of photography was faked. Fake paintings were done to show that there’s a total continuity between Lenin, his thought, and what existed in the Soviet Union in the thirties.

Two different groups of people believed or believe this. One was the Stalinist leadership in Russia, and the second was the West.

In this, they had an unholy alliance. The Stalinists said, “What we are doing is a continuation of the work of comrade Lenin,” and what the West and its leaders and ideologues said was “Yes, Lenin is the basis of what is going on in the Soviet Union now.” These two giant state and ideological apparatuses combined to make people forget the real Lenin.

Underneath it all, there lay a very different political leader and theoretician.


SW
The first time I went to the Soviet Union, I was surprised to see the long lines to go to the tomb. I thought then that it will take posterity to sort out Lenin. Has enough time passed that we can bring out this unfamiliar Lenin?


TA
There’s a great deal of hostility, of course, within the mainstream, but the viciousness is gone because the Soviet Union doesn’t exist. I was, frankly speaking, very delighted but also quite surprised that the New York Times asked me to do an op-ed on Lenin. I effectively defended my views as written in the book, and it was published without a murmur.

I hope that this indicates that serious attention is going to be paid to his thought and some of his key writings. The “April Theses,” where he dramatically changes his point of view on what is needed; State and Revolution, where he says, “What we need is a version of the Paris Communes.”

One of the key things in the Paris Commune was elections from below on every single level, so much so that the great French painter Gustave Courbet organized the artists in every quarter in Paris, who elected delegates, who were in charge of deciding how Paris was to look. It was a totally democratic process. This is the model Lenin wanted.

Some people after his death said that, “The Civil War was awful, but even during the Civil War, we had certain freedoms which reminded us of the Paris Commune. There was a sense of equality. Anyone could say what they wanted within the ranks of the army and the party. We could argue with the commissars, etc.”

That whole experience was wiped out by the Stalin dictatorship, and it created this opinion that it all originated with Lenin. The old, old debate — was there total continuity between Lenin and what came after, or none at all? You can’t say either. I think there were elements of continuity. We can’t deny that, but usually about decisions taken during emergency situations.

The most moving thing was going through his last writings, when he’s in a rage. He’s been crippled by a stroke. He’s looking suddenly at a distance, because he’s no longer allowed by doctors to attend governmental meetings or party meetings. He looks at what they’ve accomplished, and he says, “Oh my God, this is not going well.”

His big argument in State and Revolution is that a socialist republic has to destroy all the remnants of czarism, its bureaucracy, and the great Russian chauvinism. He says, “It seems to me sometimes that even though we won the revolution, the old czarist bureaucracy is still in power, and infecting Bolshevik apparatchiks and leaders with what it used to be like.”

This shocks him, so he is preparing a set of sharp documents to try and change this, changing the structure of the Politburo, giving more power to the Control Commission, saying that Stalin should be removed as general secretary of the party, saying what has gone wrong and why.

This is what we, many of us, have been saying for years. Socialism, given where it happened and took place, is always an approximation. You can’t say, “This is socialism.” You are striving towards it. Lenin writes this very quickly.


SW
In your book, you describe when the old anarchist, Prince Kropotkin, met Lenin when he returned to the then-Soviet Union. The anarchists were about to be banned, but he came to Moscow and met with him in May 1919 and complained about bureaucracy. Lenin answered, “We’re always against officialdom everywhere.”


TA
He was quite found of Kropotkin, and he was quite fond of some of the anarchist militants and activists. How could he not be? They had dominated Russian politics for the whole of the nineteenth century.

It wasn’t Marxism that was dominant. It was anarchism. This was the ideology the young people liked. These were the ideas of Kropotkin and Bakunin, which they adopted and which led them to a form of anarcho-terrorism because they said, “There’s nothing left for us to do.”

In some of Karl Marx’s correspondence with Russians like Chernyshevsky, and of course in his talks with Bakunin, he says that, “I am of course completely opposed to terrorism in general, because it’s a distraction from building mass movements and parties, winning over the majority of the working class. But in the Russian case,” says Marx, “there is an argument, since everything is blocked. When young people say, ‘The only way to unblock it is to blow up the oppressors,’ I understand that. You can’t build a strategy around it, but I do understand that.”

Quite a lot of the women who became active at that time were middle-class women, very well-educated, or in the case of Sophia Perovskaya — who blew up one of the czars — she was actually the daughter of the governor-general of Petersburg. These senior bureaucrats actually knew where the czar went, when he went, where he walked, so she organized everything. She was the main organizer, and of course she was hanged for it — the first woman to be hanged by the czarist autocracy.

Lenin knew this. He grew up in it. His brother had mistakenly got involved with a tiny anarchist group when anarchism itself was collapsing. He only wrote the leaflets, and the prosecutor in the court said to him, “Aleksandr Ulyanov, we know what you have done.” Lenin’s brother said, “Yes, you know that I have written the leaflets, but I take full responsibility for the entire action.” There was a nobility there. He didn’t need to do that, and had he not done that, he might well have been given the prison sentence.

Lenin, growing up in this milieu, knew it all, and one of the first things he did was go and see a lot of these anarchists and old anarchist militants. Krupskaya writes quite coyly in Memories of Lenin, “We never went through a town when Vladimir Ilyich did not say okay, I now must go and see A, B, C, D, E, because they’re still alive.” These were always old anarchist militants, so this habit remained with him.


SW
The earlier tactics that Lenin later turned against — the tactic of using terror — sparked a conversation worldwide. Eugene Debs and Big Bill Haywood here in the United States weighed in, and talked about how direct action is okay, but it has to be by the workers’ movement.


TA
True.


SW
This is the position that Lenin of course adopted later on as well. Why did the Paris Commune mean so much to him?


TA
The Paris Commune essentially arose out of the defeat suffered by the French ruling class at the hands of the Prussians and the Germans, like many other revolutions in history. Napoleon III made a huge error in provoking a conflict with the Germans, and Bismarck and gang were waiting. After this defeat inflicted on the French army, they fled to Versailles.

The Parisians, the workers especially, and the artisans and the intellectuals, said, “We don’t accept this surrender, and let us liberate Paris, and hold it, and fight the Prussians. We don’t want to be occupied either by Napoleon or the Prussians.”

Here you see echoes of Lenin’s position during World War I: We’re not going to support either side. We first saw glimmers of that in the Paris Commune, and they took over. They defeated the reactionary armies gathered in Versailles, and you had the first big outbreak of what we can only call workers’ and popular democracy.

Not all Commune participants were workers. There were many citizens involved who were small artisans in little workshops, artists, writers. Rimbaud, for example, wrote a poem describing going through the Paris Commune, which is incredibly moving.

Then the Paris Commune electrified everyone by saying, “We’re going to elect our own representatives from below,” because democracy did not exist at that time anywhere. Germany was probably the most advanced, but here too, a powerful emergency law had been put into motion to try and keep the Social Democrats at a distance. This democracy from below excited everyone, and these representatives went to the local assembly and their All-Paris Assembly and made their voices heard.

The Vienna Consensus in 1815was not too dissimilar to the Washington Consensus of the 1990s, where they said, “We must make sure that wherever revolution rises, wherever opposition forces develop, they are crushed immediately. We can’t take these risks.”

Then 1848 erupted with revolutions and demands for national self-determination all over Europe, and then you had the outbreak of the Paris Commune. This was very close to the hearts and the minds of revolutionaries all over the world. The message went out as far as the Philippines: “Look what’s happening in Paris. Look what’s said or what they’re doing.”

From 1871 onwards, you began to see the development of a current which was proto-Marxist. Marx supported the Commune completely, but felt that a huge number of tactical mistakes had been committed due to inexperience which could have been stopped. Those people who try and differentiate Lenin from Marx will find that actually what Marx said on the Paris Commune was very similar to what Lenin was going to say later.

The other thing about Lenin and the state that was created in 1917 is that all the Western alliance — the Entente powers, the United States — consisted of the people who would run American intelligence for years to come. John Foster Dulles and Alan Dulles as twenty-somethings were present at that meeting to decide how to defeat the Russian Revolution. Britain was involved. Other European powers were involved. Twenty-two armies backed by the big powers of the Western alliance were trying to defeat the Russians. That left a very deep mark on that revolution.

You need an understanding of politics. Lenin, his generation, and Marx: these were political people. They understood that without politics, nothing could move forward. Lenin was of course in this sense a genius, as even his enemies acknowledged. Absolutely crystal clear, not painting defeats as victories, but saying that victories were possible if we did A, B, and C.


SW
The February Revolution was spontaneous, with workers pouring into the street. They overthrew the czar, but because there was vacillation, the soviets did not proclaim their power, and instead a weak provisional government came into power. It was a very free time, but on the other hand, the revolution was not yet finished. What happened when Lenin came back from exile and landed at the Finland Station?


TA
When Lenin got there, the soviets were just being assembled. Some existed. Not all over the country, but in all the main centers, this was the model. There was no parliament. The Duma was not respected at all, and because of the experience of 1905 — a dress rehearsal for the revolution, as Lenin called it — when soviets first sprang up spontaneously and none of the parties were strong in them. They were genuinely spontaneous and liberatory. Many people realized that this should be the model of democracy — a soviet democracy — which had a very different meaning to what was later ascribed to it.

When Lenin arrives, he’s greeted by an official delegation from the soviet, led by the liberal and moderate parties, and effectively Chkheidze, a right Menshevik, says, “We welcome you back, comrade Lenin, on behalf of the Petrograd Soviet, but we urge you to understand that this is a very broad revolution and that you must unite with everyone else to take the movement forward.” Lenin shakes hands with him indifferently, and then moves forward to address the workers’ and soldiers’ delegates waiting. He says, “We have to make a revolution, and this revolution has to be a socialist revolution. We have to end the war, and the chance to go after land, peace, and bread.”

This is one of Lenin’s old bitty slogans. Underneath each word, land, peace, and bread, there is an iron pillar, which is Bolshevik tactical and strategic policy. That’s what these pillars encompass, and these are very popular slogans.

The officials moan. They think, “God, nothing changes. The guy is still the same. He hasn’t changed,” because some of the Bolsheviks gave them to understand that we were all together now, and nothing much was going to happen. Lenin understood that if this moment is lost, there will be no revolution, because these jokers who were in power refused to take Russia out of the war, which was a hugely popular demand. They couldn’t or didn’t have the power to transform the social situation.


SW
It’s here that Victor Serge says that Lenin was a revolutionist at the time of revolution, and that defines a leader. He knew the moment, could see what it held, and grasp it and move forward with it.


TA
Exactly. Lenin drafted the “April Theses.” One shouldn’t mystify these too much. He liked writing in the form of theses. They were condensed. They were very clear. There were no extra words in them, just mapping out and pointing what needed to be done. Lenin said that the proletariat has to take power.

Orthodoxy says that all we are permitted to have at this moment is a bourgeois democratic revolution. That means we ourselves shouldn’t participate in it because we’re against the bourgeoisie. Let them do the revolution, and we will wait, and when they’ve accomplished it and developed it, then we will come out and make a different socialist revolution. Lenin said, “This is complete and utter nonsense.”

As the weeks pass, two things are obvious. Lenin’s views are extremely popular in the factories, not just the Putilov factories but quite a large number of other subsidiary factories that surround Petrograd. They are very popular with the women, working-class women and women confined to the home. Making sure that people in his own party understand that, he first wins over the Bolshevik rank and file.

The working class is ahead of the party, then the rank and file is ahead of the party leadership, and then Lenin finally stands up and tells the party leaders, “Okay, what are we going to do?” By this time, most of them have agreed that the April Theses have to be adopted, though when Lenin first came in, they said, “Lenin has gone mad. What’s going on?”

Importantly, the adoption of the “April Theses” opens the door for Trotsky and his small group of extremely gifted intellectuals, who’ve been arguing along these lines themselves for many years, to now come in and join the Bolshevik Party — thus strengthening the intellectual culture of the Bolsheviks, which was not at its highest level.


SW
Let’s talk from April to October and the excitement of the revolution.


TA
There are ups and downs. At one point in July 1917, the workers — or the most militant section of the workers, unorganized by any party but quite a lot of them were Bolshevik sympathizers — decide that, “Enough is enough, and we’ve got to take power now.” Lenin, of course knowing the situation extremely well by now, is convinced that this is premature, because they still don’t have a majority in the key soviets, and tries to stop it. But once the workers come out, the Bolsheviks go out with them. There’s no question of staying at home, no question of passivity, and this is crushed.

Then you have a counterrevolutionary response. Trotsky’s arrested. Other Bolshevik leaders are picked up. Lenin is forced by his own party to go into exile, so disguised as a railwayman and wearing a wig (in which he looks very cool, by the way).

He crosses the border, and from there he carries on pummeling the leadership, saying, “This is a temporary setback. Nothing fundamental has changed.” By September, as the front is totally disintegrating, there are mutinies, there are large-scale desertions, and the peasants in uniform are coming home — and very vulnerable to Bolshevik agitation. It is this Bolshevik agitation politics, that wins them over.

It becomes very difficult for Kornilov and the right-wing generals to rely on their own soldiers to carry out massacres. When Kornilov’s troops are marching towards Petrograd to try and bump off everyone and take power Pinochet-style, Bolshevik agitators go out and say, “Look, do you know why you are being brought into Petrograd? You’re being brought in to crush your fellow workers, to help crush other soldiers.” The army begins to drain away.

By this time, Lenin is back in Moscow, secret meetings of the leadership take place, and they decide, “This is the day, the seventh of November, when we are going to actually take power.”

People say this was a conspiracy, but this was the most openly proclaimed revolution in world history. There was no secret. When Lenin was even in the minority, someone said to him in the Petrograd soviet, “People talk of taking power. Is there any party in this assembly that is prepared to take power now?” This short, bald man raises his hand, is recognized, gets up, and says, “The Bolsheviks are ready to take power now.” There’s laughter and merriment and jokes.

By the end of September, something key happens. The Bolsheviks have a majority in the workers’ and soldiers’ soviets of Moscow and Petrograd. When Lenin learns that this has happened and the situation has changed, then he decides, “Okay, the time is right,” and they plan the takeover, which happens without any violence at all.

One footnote here. The great Menshevik historian N. N. Sukhanov, who has written one of the best histories of the revolution — quite critical of Lenin in some ways but a wonderful history — says that he rang up his wife to tell her he’d be a bit late, and his wife said, “I’d rather you didn’t come home tonight. There are lots of people staying.
Stay in the office tonight.” The next day, Sukhanov finds out that the reason he was chucked out is that the Bolshevik Central Committee was meeting at his house to make the decision to launch the insurrection.


SW
Trotsky once said not just that revolutions are the mad inspiration of history, but that a revolution is a fight for the army, and the side that gets the army wins. Whole garrisons were supporting the Bolsheviks, but the revolution was fairly peaceful.


TA
Completely. There were very few casualties. Eisenstein’s film October exaggerated the affair. He felt he had to make a movie of it, but it was a relatively calm affair. There was great joy in the streets.


SW
What is the legacy of the revolution?


TA
Socialism plus democracy. This was a socialist revolution made before its time, isolated in Europe through massacres in Germany of the German leaders of the working class, Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebnecht, etc. All the Bolsheviks agreed that if they were isolated, there would be trouble. Of course, there was trouble — both internally and with external powers, and the rise of fascism in Germany.

Had the revolution taken place in Germany, in the 1920s, the whole history of Europe would have been different.