By Yossef Bodansky -
Jun 17, 2019, 6:00 PM CDT
Russian Pres. Vladimir Putin’s
early June 2019 summit in Moscow with People’s Republic of China (PRC) Pres. Xi
Jinping seems likely to have a disproportionate influence on the next phases of
the crises unfolding in the greater Middle East, and therefore on the future of
the region.
The escalating confrontation between
Iran and the US is both influencing and influenced by the mega-trends set by
Russia and the PRC.
Although the key meetings took
place on June 5, 2019, the seeds of the new joint strategy were already planted
during the May 13, 2019, summit in Sochi between Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov and Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. They
went over all the key topics in preparation for the Putin-Xi summit.
On June 5, 2019, Presidents
Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping met in Moscow and decided to not only markedly
upgrade the bilateral relations and alliance of their countries, but to use the
new relations in order to shape the long-term posture of the entire Eastern
Hemisphere in their favor. Emphasis was to be put on the Eurasian Sphere (the
Kremlin’s high priority) and the New Silk Road (the Forbidden City’s high
priority), as well as the Korean Peninsula which is most important for both.
One of the first major
confrontations with the US by Russia and the PRC was to be over the greater
Middle East. The main reason was the advance negotiations with all key oil
producers — including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran — on substituting the
petrodollar with a basket of currencies where the yuan, the euro and
the ruble dominate. Using the currency basket would enable the
sellers and buyers to go around the US-imposed sanctions and quotas. Indeed,
Beijing and Moscow were now enticing the oil producers with huge, long-term
export deals which were both financially lucrative and politically tempting by
offering guarantees for the well-being of the participating governments.
The crux of the proposal is
regional and includes flagrant disregard of the US sanctions on Iran.
However, the key to the extent
of the commitment of both Beijing and Moscow lies in the growing importance and
centrality of the New Silk Road via Central Asia.
Persia had a crucial rôle in
the ancient Silk Road, and both the PRC and Russia now expect Iran to have a
comparable key rôle in the New Silk Road.
The growing dominance of
heritage-based dynamics throughout the developing world, including the greater
Central Asia and the greater Middle East, makes it imperative for the PRC to
rely on historic Persia/Iran as a western pole of the New Silk Road. It is this
realization which led both Beijing and Moscow to give Tehran, in mid-May 2019,
the original guarantees that Washington would be prevented from conducting a
“regime change”.
Therefore, even though both
Russia and the PRC were not satisfied with the Iranian and Iran-proxy
activities and policies in the Iraq-Syria-Lebanon area, it was far more
important for them to support Iran, and also Turkey, in their confrontations
with the US in order to expedite the consolidation of the New Silk Road.
Tehran and its key allies in
“the Middle Eastern Entente” — Turkey and Qatar — are cognizant of the core
positions of Russia and the PRC. Since mid-May, Tehran and, to a lesser extent,
Ankara and Doha, were appraised by Moscow and Beijing of their overall
direction of political decisions. Hence, since early June 2019, Tehran has felt
confident to start building momentum of Iranian assertiveness
and audacity.
Tehran has been raising its
profile in the region.
Tehran insists that it is now
impossible to make decisions, or do anything else, in the greater Middle East
without Iran’s approval. On June 2, 2019, the Chief of Staff of the Iranian
Armed Forces, Maj.-Gen. Mohammad Bagheri, touted the new strategic posture of
Iran. “The Islamic movement has affected the entire world and on top of that,
it has succeeded in intimidating the American hegemony and Zionism,” he said.
Bagheri attributed the new influence of Iran to the acquisition of regional
strategic depth; that is, reaching the shores of the Mediterranean.
“At the advent of the fifth
decade of Revolution, it should be noted that the expansion of the strategic
depth of Iran has brought about new and undisputed conditions that today no
issue in West Asia can be solved without Iran’s participation.” No outside
pressure, particularly US pressure, could, he said, compel an Iranian
withdrawal and a reversal of its surge. “The Iranian nation will not retreat in
the slightest from its position on the country’s defensive capabilities and
will turn enemy’s threats to golden opportunities to develop core achievements
of the Revolution, especially in the defensive and missile sectors.”
Senior IRGC commanders with
political affiliations repeated the message over the coming days. On June 7,
2019, Brig.-Gen. Morteza Ghorbani, an adviser to the Chief of the IRGC, called
on the region’s Muslim countries to join Iran. Instead of “seeking the wishes
and objectives of the global arrogance and the Zionists”, all Muslim countries
should back Iran, Ghorbani explained, because “together, we can establish an
Islamic superpower”.
On June 10, 2019, Mohsen
Rezaei, the Secretary of Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council and a former
Chief of the IRGC, stressed Iran’s regional prowess. The Americans “are aware
that Iran’s military strength is at a point where if they take the smallest
action, the whole region will be set on fire. ... We are moving towards
becoming a regional power and that is costly for America.” On June 12, 2019,
Maj.-Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, the senior Military Aide to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamene‘i, stressed that with Iraq and Syria, Iran has created an unassailable bloc. “The pivot of Iran, Iraq, Syria and
the Mediterranean [region] is an economic, political, security and defensive
axis against the Zionist regime and the US,” Safavi explained.
“Iraq and Syria strategically
play a complementary rôle to Iran.”
Little wonder that Tehran has
also made clear that Iran intends to stay in Syria long after the war is over
despite the misgivings of the Kremlin.
Damascus accepts Tehran’s
position, and should now be expected to reject all US-Israeli pressure to
compel Iran to withdraw or even reduce the size of its forces. “Damascus has no
intention of turning away Iran’s military assistance or demanding an Iranian
troop withdrawal,” Syrian senior officials told their Russian counterparts in
early June 2019.
At the same time, although he
is wary of confronting Iran directly, Syrian Pres. Bashar al-Assad demonstrated
his displeasure with the Iranian presence. In early June 2019, for example, he
rejected flagrantly Tehran’s initiative for HAMAS and Syria to reconcile on
account of the HAMAS cooperation with Iran and the HizbAllah against
Israel. Assad justified the refusal by arguing that the HAMAS remained part of
the Muslim Brothers’ networks which had been fighting Damascus since the
late-1970s and which continued to sponsor jihadist forces.
Meanwhile, the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force continued to expand the
Iranian strategic deployment in Syria. Most important was the completion, in
the first week of June 2019, of the forward emplacement of ballistic missiles
in addition to the deployments in southern-western Iraq and nearby in Iran. The
Iranians maintained Qods Force missile sites (as distinct from
storage sites for the HizbAllah) — mainly Fatah-110 and Zulfiqar SSMs
— at the T-4 airbase in Homs province, in Jubb el-Jarah east of Homs, in
al-Safira near Aleppo, and in the Al-Kiswah area south of Damascus. In early
June 2019, the Qods Force brought Toophan-1 anti-tank missiles
to the T-4 airbase. These are all areas and installations that Israel has
bombed repeatedly. Yet, the Qods Force keeps repairing the damage and
redeploying new weapons and missiles; an expression of their growing importance
to the forthcoming regional war.
Russia has accepted the
Iranian presence up to a point.
In early 2019, the Kremlin
formulated a worst-case scenario focusing on maintaining a Russian presence
along the eastern shores of the Mediterranean (beyond the Aleppo-Damascus
highway) while blocking US/Western encroachment. Moscow is cognizant that such
an area of influence along the shores of the Mediterranean also means blocking
the vital arteries of transportation which both Iran and Turkey are determined
to establish.
In early June 2019, the
Russians demonstrated the point that the western zones are Russia’s, and only
Russia’s. Toward this end, the Russians compelled the Syrian military to force
the Pasdaran, HizbAllah and Afghan Fatemiyoun units
out of the Syrian base in Latakia.
Meanwhile, the cooperation
between Iran and Turkey has expanded as agreed, but faster than expected.
Starting late May 2019, senior
officials of both countries increased the number of bilateral visits in a
concentrated effort “to find common ground in which Turkey helps Iran overcome
the consequences of US sanctions”. By June 1, 2019, Iran and Turkey established
a “new anti-sanction financial mechanism” with priority given to increasing the
imports of natural gas and oil from Iran (with some of the oil laundered as
Iraq-origin from Kirkuk). Iran and Turkey also agreed to protect mutual trade
and economic ties, including the establishment of a joint bank, in the face of
US sanctions. As well, both countries finalized an agreement to restart direct
cargo train and passenger/tourist train services between Tehran and Ankara.
On June 8, 2019, Iranian Pres.
Hassan Rouhani had a lengthy phone conversation with his Turkish counterpart,
Reçep Tayyip Erdogan. They finalized and formulated the new era in bilateral
relations, ranging from economic cooperation to effecting regional dynamics.
Rouhani opened by emphasizing
the importance of the expansion of relations between Iran and Turkey in the
global and all-Islamic spheres. “Development of relations and cooperation
between Iran and Turkey, as two powerful effective countries in the world of
Islam, is important for stability and security of the region.” He pointed to
the instability and bloodshed in countries such as Sudan, Libya, Yemen, and
Afghanistan, and invited Erdogan to work with Iran to resolve conflicts
throughout the Muslim world. “Together, Iran and Turkey can cooperate with
other friendly, brotherly countries to put an end to this regretful process and
resolve the issues of the region and the world of Islam as well.” Rouhani said
that Iran was most interested in markedly expanding bilateral economic
cooperation, including providing highly-subsidized oil and gas to Turkey, while
using national currencies in trade transactions to avoid the US sanctions.
In his response, Erdogan
largely agreed with Rouhani and reiterated Turkey’s commitment to confronting
the US. Closer bilateral cooperation was a must. “As two brotherly, friendly
countries, cementing of relations between Iran and Turkey can be beneficial for
both nations and the region.”
Erdogan concurred that it was
imperative to “enhance bilateral relations in all fields, especially in economy
and trade”, and agreed with Rouhani on “the importance of using national
currencies in trade”. He termed the US “unilateral sanctions against Iran” as
“tyrannical”. Hence, Turkey “will never accept these cruel sanctions and seek
to increase our friendships and cooperation with Iran”. Erdogan agreed that
both countries must influence the region and “the world of Islam”. Erdogan
concluded: “Iran and Turkey can play a greater rôle by expanding their
engagement and cooperation in the development of regional stability and
security and counter-terrorism.”
Both Presidents agreed to
escalate their joint anti-Kurdish campaign, as well as better coordination of
their activities in Iraq and Syria.
By the time of the
Rouhani-Erdogan conversation, Turkish and Iranian forces were already engaged
in a comprehensive anti-Kurdish offensive for more than a week.
The raids and bombings were
conducted both in northern Iraq and along their mutual border. At first, the
heaviest fighting took place in Turkey’s Igdir province, close to the borders
with Armenia and Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan Autonomous Region. The Turkish forces
then moved to the Aralik district, close to the Turkish-Iranian border. At that
point, the IRGC conducted a parallel operation in Chaldoran County bordering
Igdir-Aralik. The Turkish and Iranian forces continued to move southward along
the border, destroying the Kurdish pockets between them.
Meanwhile, Turkey launched a
major offensive, Operation Claw, into Iraqi Kurdistan. As a separate
element of the operation, the Turkish forces conducted deep raids closely
coordinated with the Iranian forces. Most important were the attacks against
PKK positions in the Hakurk mountainous region near the Iraqi border with Iran.
The Iranian forces have been preventing the Kurds from escaping across the
Iranian border as in previous Turkish raids. IRGC forces also clashed with
Kurdish groups; both the Iranian-Kurdish PJAK and the Turkish-Kurdish PKK forces
usually based in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Iranian raids, which include crossing of
the Iraqi border, were coordinated with heavy air-strikes by the Turkish Air
Force of the nearby regions of Zap and Qandil.
Concurrently, Qatar, on behalf
of the bloc, challenged and effectively neutered the Mecca summits from
within. The Qatari Prime Minister Abdallah bin Nasser bin Khalifa Al Thani
participated in all three summits on May 30-31, 2019.
Despite the Saudi-led GCC
boycott on Qatar, he had a most courteous exchange with Saudi Arabia’s King
Salman bin ‘Abd al-’Aziz al Sa’ud. The main reason for Qatar’s presence in
Mecca was to obtain and relay messages from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin
Salman bin ‘Abd al-’Aziz al Sa’ud (aka MBS) and his close partner the Crown
Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan (aka MBZ) to Tehran.
The key message was that Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf States did not want war with Iran, and would do whatever
they could to prevent the US from launching one. Both MBS and MBZ noted that the
US was stopping short of direct confrontation, with the USS Abraham
Lincoln aircraft carrier strike group remaining out in the Arabian Sea rather
than venturing across the Strait of Hormuz and into the Persian Gulf as US
carriers had done in the past.
Tehran, however, would not
legitimize any stand of either MBS or MBZ even though Tehran welcomed their
message as transferred by Doha. Therefore, within days after the end of the
summits, Qatar started to openly criticize and contradict the Mecca Summits’ resolutions
and communiqués. Doha thus flagrantly shattered the delicate consensus which
Riyadh had worked so hard to create, including the Saudi statement that
“reconciliation with Qatar [is] possible” given the right circumstances.
On June 2, 2019, Doha asserted
that the Mecca communiqués reflected “America’s policies on Iran” and not the
self-interests of the region’s states. Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed
bin Abdulrahman al-Thani, who also attended the Mecca summits, criticized the
declaratory refusal to negotiate with Iran even though Doha passed secret
messages to Iran throughout the summits. “The statements condemned Iran but did
not refer to a moderate policy to speak with Tehran,” he said on Al
Jazeera TV. “They adopted Washington policy towards Iran, rather than a
policy that puts neighborhood with Iran into consideration.” Al-Thani argued
that any cooperation with Tehran should be based on “non-interference in other
countries”.
On June 5, 2019, Iranian Pres.
Hasan Fereidun Rouhani coordinated policies in a phone conversation with the
Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani. Rouhani reiterated that Iran
was not interested in a war with the US or anybody else. However, should “any
foolish anti-Iranian act start in the region”, Iran would deliver “a firm
response” which would harm the Arabian Peninsula more than anybody else. War
would be futile, he noted. “Regional problems don’t have a military solution
and we believe that threat, pressure, blockade, and economic sanction are wrong
approaches in relations between governments.” Rouhani hailed Qatar’s stance
because it contributed to easing regional tensions. “Certainly, any meeting
will be ineffective, unproductive and even harmful, if it doesn’t draw regional
countries to each other,” Rouhani affirmed Doha’s policy.
Sheikh Tamim responded by
emphasizing that the policies and stances of Tehran and Doha were “close to
each other” on most issues. He reiterated that Doha believed that “dialogue is
the only way to ease tensions,” and that Doha wanted “to expand ties with Iran
in all areas”. Sheikh Tamim concluded that all Qataris are
“appreciating Tehran for supporting [Qatar] during the blockade”.
Apprehensive of the specter of
a US escalation, Foreign Minister Mohammed al-Thani traveled to London on June
9, 2019, to try and get “a friendly message” across to Washington. He warned
the US not to fall into the trap set by MBS and MBZ. He explained that the
“Saudi and Emirati plan to impose stability on the region by supporting
authoritarian governments and military councils in Africa, Egypt, Libya, and
throughout the Arab world was a recipe for chaos”. These “policies are [only]
creating more terrorism, conflict and chaos in the Middle East and Africa”.
For its own good, the US must
not be part of the scheme. Discussing the situation in the Persian Gulf,
Foreign Minister Mohammed al-Thani noted that “while Qatar respects US policy
towards Iran, it cannot fully support it because Qatar views the matter from a
regional perspective”. He criticized Washington’s stance. “The current US
position on Iran lacks any indication of a way forward, or any type of positive
or constructive message.” Doha did “not want to see any confrontation between
the two powers, US and Iran, because we are stuck in the middle,” he concluded.
But the US kept escalating its
covert war with Iran, both in the Persian Gulf and in Syria. The extent of the
escalation and the focusing on objectives of great importance for Iran could
not but lead to Iranian harsh reaction.
First came escalation of the campaign
against the transfer of oil along the long desert road stretch between Deir
ez-Zor and Damascus. Since the beginning of the war, Damascus had been
purchasing oil from whomever controlled the oilfields east of the Euphrates, be
it DI’ISH or the US-sponsored Kurdish PKK/YPG/SDF forces. As well, with the
opening of the road from Iran via Iraq, the Iranians increased the shipment of
oil in tanker-trucks. Since the Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) would not strike
and shut down the lucrative oil trade, the US chose to rely heavily on the
jihadist forces being trained and equipped in the al-Tanf area.
According to tribal leaders in
the Deir ez-Zor area, the US launched at first “a campaign ... to prevent
smuggling [oil] from areas under SDF control in Deir ez-Zor to the Syrian
regime by way of ferries across the river”. The first major escalation took
place in the early morning hours of May 31, 2019. Jihadist forces
near al-Shuhayl opened heavy machinegun fire on four tanker-barges ferrying oil
across the Euphrates. When the ambush failed to cause any tangible damage, US
combat helicopters and strike aircraft showed up and strafed the barges,
blowing up three of them and causing at least four fatalities.
Although the US denied that
the May 31, 2019, attack took place, the mere involvement of US forces
compelled the US to change tactics. The emphasis moved to on-land raids and
ambushes along the desert stretch north of al-Tanf, the vast Badiyah al-Sham (eastern
desert) area. There, properly trained and equipped light forces could, on their
own, strike and burn the tanker trucks moving in small convoys. As well, there
was no question of conflict of interests with the US-proxy Kurdish forces.
According to Syrian military officials, “the ISIL’s movements have taken place
in line with US’ objectives to exert pressure on the Syrian Army and its allies
in Syria”. The officials stressed that “the US is trying to help the ISIL block
roads leading to Badiyah due to Badiyah’s strategically important oil and gas
reserves”.
The main jihadist operations
were taking place between Eastern al-Sukhnah and Deir ez-Zor, including the
important T-3 Pumping Station and the Palmyra area. Some of these jihadist
forces were using HUMMER-type vehicles in addition to the ubiquitous Japanese-made
light trucks. Starting June 3, 2019, the jihadists used US-made TOW
anti-tank missiles to strike Syrian armored combat vehicles escorting the
tankers. The first such strike took place in the Jabal Bishri area.
By June 7, 2019, the jihadists had
escalated their concentrated attacks on the traffic in the main desert route,
hitting both Syrian and Iranian vehicles, and not just oil tankers and their
escorts. The jihadists deployed several hundred fighters from the
camps in the al-Tanf area, compelling the Syrian military to divert forces from
their anti-DI’ISH operations in the Baqouz region in Eastern Euphrates
province. The jihadist forces were operating over wider areas
including the area of Jabal al-Bashri in south-eastern Raqqa, al-Dafinah in
southern Deir ez-Zor, between Palmyra and al-Sukhnah, and the surrounding areas
of al-Tanf in Eastern Homs. On June 11, 2019, the jihadists launched
their first attack on the western axis of the T-3 Pumping Station near Palmyra.
The jihadists also
stormed army positions near the desert road east of Palmyra, causing heavy
damage and numerous casualties.
By mid-June 2019, the
intensity and frequency of jihadist ambushes had increased still
further. These ambushes, Syrian defense officials explained, “are well-coordinated
and [a] proof that the terrorist group possesses the ability to wreak havoc
inside the country”. By now, according to these officials, there were some
2,000 to 3,000 jihadist fighters in the entire Badiyah al-Sham region
who were living off the main US-sponsored bases in the al-Tanf area. The
escalation has strategic impact because the Syrian military has had to divert
reinforcements earmarked for the major offensive in Idlib (the last major
pocket of the US-sponsored al-Qaida affiliated jihadists, both
Syrian and foreign) to secure the desert roads.
Then, as promised to the jihadist fighters
by the US recruiters in March 2019, on June 2, 2019, the US-proxy Kurdish
authorities running the al-Hawl camp released more than 800 women and children
— all families of DI’ISH fighters — and handed them to their families who
happened to live in the al-Tanf area. This was the first such transfer of
non-combatants and more were expected soon.
Meanwhile, a “mysterious”
escalation took place in the northern part of the Persian Gulf.
On June 5, 2019, huge fire
consumed a storage facility for oil products at the Shahid Rajaee port in
southern Hormozgan Province. Located west of Bandar Abbas, the Shahid Rajaee
port is Iran’s largest container shipping port. Reportedly, a vehicle used for
transporting shipping containers exploded and caught fire. Since there were oil
products near the site of the explosion, the blaze spread quickly to several
tanks and storage sites and caused heavy damage to the port. The spreading fire
set off huge explosions which shot fireballs and heavy smoke high into the air.
On June 7, 2019, six Iranian
merchant ships were set ablaze almost simultaneously in two Persian Gulf ports.
First, five ships “caught
fire” in the port of Nakhl Taghi in the Asaluyeh region of Bushehr Province.
Three of these ships were completely burned and the two others suffered major
damage. Several port workers and sailors were injured. As well, at least one
cargo ship burst into flames and burned completely at the port of Bualhir, near
Delvar. The fire was attributed to “incendiary devices” of “unknown origin”.
The local authorities in Bushehr Province called the fires a “suspicious event”
and went no further.
In Tehran, senior Iranian
officials first attributed the incident to “fires caused by high temperatures”.
Subsequently, they pointed out to statements by Iranian opposition activists in
Europe (NOT the MEK) who “made the connection between the mysterious fires that
hit the Iranian ships and the sabotage” of the tankers in Fujairah. Several
diplomats in Tehran reported that the local grapevines were attributing the
fires to “expert mercenaries” of “unknown origin”. “Knowledgeable Iranians”
opined, the diplomats reported, that “ferocious revenge” was only a question of
time.
Indeed, in the early morning
hours of June 13, 2019, two large tankers were repeatedly attacked and set
aflame in the middle of the Gulf of Oman. Both tankers were subsequently
abandoned by their crews and left to drift, burn and sink. By end of the day,
there were conflicting reports whether they already sank. The tankers did not
sink and most of the flames died down on June 15, 2019. Hence, efforts started
tow the tankers to UAE ports.
A few hours before the attack,
a US MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) observed IRGC fast
attack boats, most likely from the nearby Bandar-e-Jask naval base, gather and
advance toward the area where the tankers would be struck. When the Iranians noticed
the UAV, they launched a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile. The missile
overshot, narrowly missed the MQ-9, and crashed into the water. However, the
UAV was pulled away from the scene so that there would be no evidence of the
attack that unfolded shortly afterwards.
Both tankers were subjected to
repeated attacks over three hours in order to ascertain their destruction. The
Norwegian owned MT Front Altair was first hit by a torpedo attack
which stopped it and started a small fire. The Front Altair was then
subjected to two cycles limpet-mine attacks which caused at least three major
explosions and set the tanker aflame. The Japanese owned Kokuka Courageous was
also subjected first to a torpedo attack which breached the hull above the
water line. Over the next three hours, the Kokuka Courageous was
subjected twice to limpet-mine attacks, as well as a couple of 107mm rockets
(most likely launched from an IRGC Seraj-1-class fast attack boat), which
also set the tanker aflame. Both tankers were first hit in the engine-room area
so that they stopped. The main tanks were then repeatedly bombed until they
burned out of control.
The predominantly Russian crew
of the Front Altair was rescued by an Iranian vessel and brought to a
nearby port in Iran. The predominantly Filipino crew of the Kokuka
Courageous was rescued by local tugboats and then moved to the US
destroyer Bainbridge. Tehran continued to insist that all 44 crew members
of both tankers were rescued by the Iranian Navy and safety authorities.
The initial expert analysis of
the attacks strongly suggested a professional operation.
“These appear to be well
planned and coordinated attacks,” wrote shipping experts in the Gulf States.
They noted that the two tankers were first hit in close proximity to the engine
room and thus were stopped. They were then subjected to strong explosions at or
below the waterline. Such explosions were most likely caused by limpet-mines
similar to those used in Fujairah on May 12, 2019. The USS Bainbridge reported
that it saw “an unexploded limpet mine on the side of one of the ships attacked
in the Gulf of Oman”. The next day, a US UAV spotted an IRGC Zulfiqar-class
fast attack boat approaching the tanker where the crew removed the unexploded
mine. The experts concluded that “a state actor is responsible” for the attack.
In all likelihood, the strike
was carried out by members of the Sepah Navy Special Force, an
independent Takavar unit of the IRGC Navy, and/or foreign
Shi’ite jihadists trained by them. The attackers operated from the
military port in Bandar-e-Jask in the Southern Hormozgan Province of Iran. The
mother ship of the Fujairah attackers was believed to have sailed from
Bandar-e-Jask. The IRGC Navy base was established there in 2008. Several years
later, it was expanded to include the headquarters of the Iran Navy’s 2nd Naval
District. Bandar-e-Jask is the home base of a unit of the IRGC’s Ghadir midget
submarines, a wide variety of IRGC fast attack boats, (including the Seraj-1
and Zulfiqar classes), and long-range UAVs used for operations over
the Persian Gulf. The Ghadir midget submarines are equipped with
the Jask-2 anti-ship missiles and Valfajr torpedoes (which might
have been used to attack the two tankers).
The initial media coverage of
the incident was of significance.
The first reports came rather
quickly on the Iranian Al-Alam News Network which broadcasts in
Arabic and covers the entire Arabian Peninsula. Al-Alam reported that
two “giant oil tankers” had come under “attack”, that “two explosions” took
place, and that the tankers were aflame. These reports were then picked up by
the Persian-language Iranian media; first the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News
and then the propaganda channel, Press TV, which broadcasts in several
languages worldwide. Only then the media in the Middle East and the global
media started to pay attention to the strike.
Subsequently, official Tehran
began addressing the issue; warning Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States against
hastily attributing the attack to Iran. “All regional states should be careful
not to be entrapped by deception of those who benefit from instability in the
region,” Iranian Government Spokesman Ali Rabie said. “The Iranian Government
is ready for security and regional cooperation to guarantee security, including
in the strategic waterways.”
The attack on the tankers in
the Gulf of Oman cannot be seen in isolation.
They were part of a
comprehensive policy against Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, but timed in the
aftermath of the attacks on the Iranian ports. In early April, a three-phase
escalating war plan was drawn under Maj.-Gen. Qassem Soleimani in order to
deprive the West of access to the Arabian Peninsula’s oil if US sanctions
persisted and Iran could no longer sell oil.
The first phase was to signal
Iran’s resolve and might; the second, sinking tankers transferring oil from
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, as well as blocking the Strait of Hormuz; and
the third was to destroy the entire oil and gas infrastructure throughout the
Arabian Peninsula. In late-April 2019, Maj.-Gen. Mohammed Hossein Bagheri
alluded to the Iranian resolve. “If our oil fails to go through the Strait,
others’ crude will not either,” Bagheri warned. The Fujairah attack and the
Gulf of Oman attack corresponded with the first two phases of Soleimani’s plan.
The third was also to come.
The attack on the Japanese
owned Kokuka Courageous was fortuitous because it happened just as
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was visiting Tehran in effort to convince
Tehran that US Pres. Donald Trump was serious about comprehensive negotiations
with Iran. On June 13, 2019, Abe met with Ayatollah Seyyed Ali
Khamene‘i who set the tone for Iran’s harsh policies.
After pleasantries, Abe told
Khamene‘i that the primary objective of his visit was to convey a special message
from Pres. Trump. “I would like to give you a message from the President of the
United States,” Abe told Khamene‘i. Khamene‘i exploded and told Abe his mission
was doomed and futile from the very beginning. “We have no doubts about your
goodwill and seriousness, but with regard to what you relayed from the US
President, I see no merit in Trump as a person to deserve the exchange of any
messages, and I do not have any answer for him and will not give him any
either,” Khamene‘i replied.
Khamene‘i then addressed the
nuclear issue, repeating the falsehood of his own fatwa forbidding nuclear
weapons. However, Khamene‘i stressed that the US or the EU had no say in
whether Iran would or would not have nuclear weapons. “We are against nuclear
weapons and my fatwa bans their development. However, you should know
that if we decide to develop nuclear weapons, the United States will be unable
to do anything,” Khamene‘i told Abe.
According to the Mehr News
Agency, Abe delivered five specific requests from Trump to Khamene‘i. Mehr cited
“Trumps’ five requests and the Leader’s direct answers to them:
“Trump: The US is not intended
to change the regime in Iran.
“Leader: This is a lie for if
the US could do that it would but this is what US is not capable of doing.
“Trump: We want to
re-negotiate nuclear issues.
“Leader: Iran held talks with
the US for five to six years over nuclear issues and reached a conclusion but
the US withdrew from the deal. This is not reasonable to re-negotiate things
with a country who has ruined all the agreements.
“Trump: The US seeks to
prevent Iran from achieving nuclear weapons.
“Leader: We disagree with
nuclear weapons and I have announced it Haram in a Fatwa but
you should know that if we wanted to make nuclear weapons the US could not
prevent us.
“Trump: The US is ready to
start honest negotiations with Iran.
“Leader: We do not believe in
that, since honest negotiations are far from a person like Trump. Honesty is
rare among American officials.
“Trump: Holding talks with the
US will make Iran improve.
“Leader: Under the mercy of
God, we will improve without having negotiations with the US and despite the
imposed sanctions.”
The other important meeting
Prime Minister Abe had was with Pres. Rouhani. According to Rouhani, they
discussed “stability and security of the region”. Most important was Abe’s
reiteration that Japan remained interested in purchasing Iranian oil despite
the sanctions. “Japan’s willingness to continue purchase of oil from Iran and
to boost financial, scientific and cultural cooperation will be a guarantee for
development of ties,” Rouhani stated.
Ultimately, Russia and the PRC
were the prime, long-term beneficiaries of the brewing crisis in the Persian
Gulf.
Both Vladimir Putin and Xi
Jinping were in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic, on June 14, 2019, for the summit of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Rouhani was also participating.
After the attack on the tankers, the US attention again focused on the Persian
Gulf and away from the escalation of the confrontation with the PRC and Russia.
Meanwhile, both Putin and Xi
were, in Bishkek, leading the dramatic strengthening of both the Eurasian
Sphere and the New Silk Road. The US handling of both the trade/tariff war with
the PRC, and the Persian Gulf crisis, as explained by Rouhani, had convinced
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Central Asian leaders in attendance
to seek closer ties with Russia and the PRC. The SCO was further enthused by
the decision, announced by Xi Jinping, to divert major PRC investment funds
from the US to Central Asia and the New Silk Road. Indeed, Russian and PRC
officials defined the Xi-Putin-Modi meeting in Bishkek as being “vital for
re-shaping the world order” and as a major setback to the US attempt to
dominate the forthcoming G20 summit in Osaka, Japan.
Meanwhile, Tehran continued to
prepare for an escalation to come. On June 14, 2019, Iranian Intelligence
Minister Mahmoud Alavi led a senior delegation to Damascus where it met with
leaders of Palestinian terrorist organizations, HizbAllah and other
Shi’ite jihadist factions. In the meeting, the Palestinian leaders
emphasized the “interconnected rôle of the resistance axis’ forces and
countries in the region in confronting schemes and threats that target Iran,
Syria, Palestine and Lebanon”. Indeed, Egyptian senior intelligence officials
now claim that the recent launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip was
conducted by “regional elements” tied with “the attacks on oil tankers in the
Persian Gulf.”
Concurrently, Qods commander
Qassem Soleimani continued traveling clandestinely throughout the Middle East,
preparing his extensive and growing forces, both Iranian and Iran-proxy, for a
direct clash with the US and its allies should Khamene‘i give the order.
By Yossef Bodansky via Defense
& Foreign Affairs
