The strategy failed in Iraq
and Afghanistan. It will fail in Syria, too.
By now the U.S. foreign-policy
elite should understand that regime change is a bad idea.
The three most recent
cases—Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya—are far from models of success. Afghanistan
is now America’s longest-running war with no end in sight. Iraq is a close
second and yet another example of the folly of trying to impose Western-style
democracy in a tribal society with a Sunni-Shia divide. Moreover, deposing
Saddam Hussein created a vacuum that first gave rise to al Qaeda in Iraq and
then ISIS. Libya has turned out to be a smaller-scale version of Iraq. Another
dictator deposed, but even President Obama had to admit regime change “didn’t
work.”
Which brings us to Syria, an
ongoing military mission that is still a work in progress. Clearly, the Obama
administration—via a combination of arming anti-Assad rebel factions and air
strikes—was unable to topple the regime in Damascus. One view amongst the
foreign-policy elite is that we must work with local partners in Syria but “we
must choose the right partners.” Exactly who those right partners are is not
entirely clear and our track record picking the right partners in Afghanistan
and Iraq gives rational thinkers cause for pause. Indeed, there may not be any
right partners and it is incredulous to think that it’s possible to create
them, as some have suggested.
The problem with regime change
is not whether we can use military force to topple a regime. We certainly did
that in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya—in different ways and at varying costs.
But regime change is not about just getting rid of a regime. It’s about
replacing it with a new government crafted in our image.
It’s not a question of
tactics—it’s a question of strategy. Regime change is a failed strategy.
The criticism often leveled
against regime change is that we do not commit enough resources—usually the
U.S. military—or time for post-conflict stabilization and rebuilding a new
government where democracy will flourish. The real problem is Washington
policymakers’ hubris in believing that type of change can come from outside
forces, namely our U.S. armed forces.
What Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Libya teach us is that getting rid of dictators doesn’t mean that liberty and
freedom will automatically replace them and flourish.
If anything, the most
immediate outcome is a power vacuum with various factions—with
impossible-to-determine motives—vying for power. And if they get to vote, we
shouldn’t be surprised when those upon whom we bestow democracy tend to make
choices very different than what we expected. Not only are the costs
significantly more than what regime change proponents predict (remember when
then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz predicted that the
Iraq War would be self-financing?), but the outcomes also rarely match
predictions.
It’s also worth remembering
that ISIS is a product of regime change—a fact often lost on proponents of
intervention. Deposing Saddam Hussein in Iraq created the conditions that gave
rise to al-Qaeda in Iraq which, in turn, morphed into ISIS. Toppling the regime
in Damascus is just as likely to result in a vacuum of instability to be filled
by ISIS or the rise of another Islamic group with a radical ideology—using
foreign military occupation as a rallying call to radical elements in Islam,
with the occupier as the target.
All these are reasons why
polls conducted pre-election, post-election, and post-inauguration show the
majority of Americans do not believe U.S. foreign policy over the past 15
years—when it embraced regime change—has made them safer.
Which brings us back to Syria.
Yes, Bashar Assad is a thug and a brutal dictator. But he is not a direct
military or terrorist threat to the U.S. The sole criteria for risking American
military lives on foreign soil should be U.S. national security—when the U.S.
homeland or American way of life is directly threatened.
So instead of conjuring up new
and creative—but unproven—ways to conduct regime change in Syria or anywhere
else, our foreign-policy leaders should acknowledge the folly and hubris of it.
