Wednesday, March 22, 2017

On Being the “Right Kind of Brown”









March 21, 2017


















A racist man shot Srinivas Kuchibhotla on February 22, 2017.  He wanted to kill a Muslim. He thought Srinivas and his friend Alok Madasani were Iranians. A week later, Harnish Patel was shot and killed in his driveway by another racist man. Sheriff Barry Faile, investigating Patel’s case said, “I don’t have any reason to believe that this was racially motivated.”  Sheriff Faile’s words are not convincing. Instead, the Indian community have concluded that these two brown men were gunned down by two racist Americans who couldn’t care less if these men belonged to the “model minority”class, or were U.S. born citizens or not.  All that mattered to them was that these two men were “brown” or “Muslims” and hence they must be deleted. Permanantly. America First.

For the Indian community, however, these men were not just “brown” men.  One man was an Aviation engineer working for Garmin in Kansas, while the other, an owner of a Speed Mart convenience store in South Carolina.  For one, the Indian community raised $670, 000 for his funeral. There was no such GoFundMe campaign for the other. For one, the Indian Americans mourned in the Silicon Valley and all over America. For the other there was a hand made sign that was stuck on the window of his convenience store: “Store Close for few days because of a family emergency.  Sorry for inconvenience.”

Kochibhotla’s funeral took place in Hyderabad, India.  Patel’s funeral was in Lancaster, South Carolina. Paul Oommen, an India-based journalist with The Associated Press tweeted that Kuchibhotla’s granduncle said that Kuchibhotla and his siblings were all bright students, “but Srinivas was the brightest of the three.” For Patel, there was a post on the guestbook of the funeral home saying, “He will always have a special place in our hearts.”

The funeral for Kochibhotla was a public event in India with hundreds of family and friends and even politicians. Images of his body with flowers, grief stricken relatives, the funeral procession, and even the lit funeral pyre were made public. The heartbreaking photo of his young widowed wife, Sunayana Dumala made the pages of both The Hindu and The New York Times.

Patel did have a funeral too. A more private funeral. A small post by the Burgress Funeral Home read, “The service will be overseen by priest Ashok Trivedi.”  That’s all.

In the wake of Kochibhotla’s murder Sushil Rao, another Indian journalist tweeted that the Indian government should “institute awards for those who protect Indians abroad.”  For the other, no such protections have been announced yet.

Two brown men killed by two racists Americans, yet for the Indian community these brown bodies belong to two very different Americas, two very different kinds of Indians in America.  They belong to the America that still believes in “exceptionalism,” and one that doesn’t.  They belong to a belief of what Kuchibholta’s grieve stricken wife said in her press conference: “he always assured me that ‘only good things happen to good people. Always think good, always be good. And good will happen to you’.

I am finding these articles about the murder of the Indian Kansas man incredible sad, and this growing worry about “our” safety amongst Indians frustrating.  Who exactly is this “our” in this collective call for “our community,” “our safety,” “our protection,” “our dignity?” Who according to the Indians are “the good?”

If anything these two hate crimes have highlighted is that there are two kinds of Indians, two kinds of “browns.”  The “right” kind of brown versus the “wrong” kind of brown, and we urgently need to have a conversation about this divide. And this divide is not new. It has existed long before Trump’s America. Lyndon B. Johnson’s “The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965” put an end to the exclusionary and racist quotas of the 1920’s, and gave birth to the class of people we now call the “model minorities.” While the demographics of the right kind of brown have gradually risen in American since 1965, “the wrong kind of browns” have been playing in their shadows.  Forever.

If the first casualty for the Indian American community in Trump’s America is Srinivas Kuchibhotla, the first casualty in Bush’s America, referred to as “The First 9/11 Backlash Fatality,” was a man named Balbir Singh Sodhi, a Sikh- American the gas station owner in Mesa Arizona.  I do not remember this level of anxiety within the Indian-American community when Sodhi was killed after 9/11. He too was mistaken as an Arab-Muslim and shot and killed by a man called Frank Silva Roque.  Rogue had told his friends that he was “going to go out and shoot some towel-heads.”

Neither did Sodhi nor did Patel have any large fund raising campaigns by their fellow Indians across the country to cover the cost of their respective funerals. What, however, did happen in Sodhi’s case was that many Arizona state representatives and citizens of all backgrounds rallied around the Sodhi family and the Sikh American community in support of this hate crime.  Over 3,000 people attended Mr. Sodhi’s memorial service.

Yet, just a few months before the tenth anniversary of Sodhi’s death and the attack on America, the Arizona legislature decided to remove Mr. Sodhi’s name from the state 9/11 memorial because he was not deemed “a victim of 9/11″. Adding insult to injury, along with stripping the late Mr. Sodhi’s name from the memorial, the legislation even enumerated that the removed plaque to be sold to a scrap metal dealer. Ten years after 9/11, the original sponsor of the bill to remove Sodhi’s name from the memorial John Kavanaugh, a Republican member of the Arizona senate stated, “It’s part of a myth that, following 9/11, Americans went into a xenophobic rage against foreigners. That’s not true. America’s reaction towards foreigners was commendable.”

I cannot recall any outrage by “the right kind of brown folks” against Sodhi’s murder, or the subsequent negation of his “victim” status after 9/11.  While other communities of color repeatedly expressed their anxiety over their safety after 9/11, and Brooklyn New York’s “Little Pakistan” became a ghost town (as 20,000 Pakistanis left Brooklyn out of fear and many landed in detention facilities), I do not recall, then,  any call for safety, or awards for keeping all people “brown” safe?

But Srinivas was the “right kind of brown,” the right kind of foreigner, the “good” immigrant.  Yet his wife was not so sure about their safety, as she said in her press conference, “we’ve read many times in newspapers of some kind of shooting happening everywhere. And we always wondered, how safe, or I especially, I was always concerned: ‘Are we doing the right thing of staying in [the] United States of America?

The night of Kuchibhotla’s murder, hundreds of “the right kind of brown folks” who continue to take their safety for granted have posted on various social media sites. asking, “why did this happen to him?”

I continue to be frustrated that there is still such dismay amongst the “right” kind of the Indian brown community that Srinivas’s killing was one of a mistaken identity. “He was not a Muslim” as hundreds of Tweets have said. Srinivas was “mistaken” to be a Muslim. So, if Srinivas was a Muslim and Adam Purinton killed him, would his death be more justified?

I find it even ironic that these “right” kind of brown folks who are so shocked about the rise of racism against the Indians in this post-Trump’s America, have continued to turn a blind eye to the racism that has plagued Africans/African Americans and Hispanics in this country on a daily basis, much before Trump’s arrival. Mass incarcerations are not a concept that the “right kind of brown” has to witness, let alone imagine.  Such things do not happen to them or “good people.”

Oh well, the “right kind of brown folks” (I forget) are here to advance professionally, to dream, to contribute to America’s exceptionalism and demand safety that “the wrong kind of brown” cannot even fathom.

The “right kind of brown” also never thought that the Muslim ban, or the rise of anti-immigrant xenophobia was going to impact any of them. After all they are the “the right kind of brown,” “the right kind of immigrants,” “good people”  –– well educated Hindu professional. They have conveniently forgotten the “Muslim ban” in India. They have conveniently forgotten that India has her own anti-Muslim “Purinton.”

While it deeply saddens me that both Srinivas and Harnish are dead, (and both were  vicious racist hate crime along with the shooting of Deep Rai in Kent, Washington), I am even more sad that the right kind of brown folks continue to believe that somehow their life is more valuable than the “wrong” kind of brown –– those that are not a part of the group that constitute “the highest per capita income” earners amongst the minority groups.  Are the lives of the right kind of brown folks really more valuable than the Muslims, the refugees, the Speedy Marts and gas station owners, the Hispanics, the Blacks, the Native Americans?  Are the lives of their children more valuable than Michael Brown or Tamir Rice?

Let’s face it. Until the right kind of brown folks can begin to acknowledge their complicity, their willful naiveté and their turning of their blind eyes against the wrong kind of brown –– the Indian community will be forever fragmented and even isolated in their discourse on racism in America. A conversation about “our safety” until then should best remain suspended.

Trump may have given the Indian community an opportunity to grapple with this contradiction both here and in India.

Reshmi Dutt-Ballerstadt a professor at Linfield College in Oregon and also the author of the book The Postcolonial Citizen: The Intellectual Migrant.































Beyond Mandela Without Becoming Mugabe (aka How to Rebel)








https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a5DiZBb8f6A






















Ken Loach films




https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B1bk8ziutmk&list=PLzytL7WQPuMsRPcdT84-2eOmmSZRNEZPk









Andrew Bacevich, Words Not to Die For
















Posted by Andrew Bacevich at 7:26am, March 21, 2017.

Follow TomDispatch on Twitter @TomDispatch








U.S. Marines are, for the first time, deploying to Syria (with more to come). There’s talk of an “enduring” U.S. military presence in Iraq, while additional U.S. troops are being dispatched to neighboring Kuwait with an eye to the wars in both Iraq and Syria.  Yemen has been battered by a veritable blitz of drone strikes and other air attacks.  Afghanistan seems to be in line for an increase in American forces.  The new president has just restored to the CIA the power to use drones to strike more or less anywhere on the “world battlefield,” recently a Pentagon prerogative, and is evidently easing restrictions on the Pentagon’s use of drones as well.  U.S. military commanders are slated to get more leeway to make decisions locally and the very definition of what qualifies as a “battlefield” looks like it’s about to change (which will mean even less attention to “collateral damage” or civilian casualties). President Trump may soon designate various areas outside more or less official American war zones -- since the U.S. Congress no longer declares war, they can’t truly be official -- as “temporary areas of active hostility.” That will grant U.S. commanders greater leeway in launching attacks on terror groups in places like Somalia.  In fact, this already seems to have happened in Yemen, according to the New York Times, opening the way for a disastrous Special Operations Forces raid there that caused the death of a Navy SEAL and possibly nine Yemeni children (the youngest three months old), while evidently accomplishing next to nothing.

In other words, in the early months of the Trump era, U.S. wars and conflicts across the Greater Middle East are being expanded and escalated.  This isn’t exactly a new process, and isn’t yet at the level of either the failed Iraqi Surge of 2007 or the failed Afghan one of 2010.  Still, you might think that the almost instant failure of that Yemen raid would have rung a few familiar warning bells in Washington when it comes to escalating America’s wars in the region.  If so, you would evidently be oh-so-wrong.  The history of the last 15 years tells us that in Washington such setbacks couldn’t matter less. At the moment, the generals who have headed down these very paths before are evidently recommending to an eager new president that it’s the height of wisdom to head down them again.

As TomDispatch regular Andrew Bacevich, author of America’s War for the Greater Middle East, points out today, this is now business as usual in militarized Washington in the twenty-first century.  It’s so much the law of the land that the Pentagon has developed the perfect language for masking, perhaps to itself as much as others, just how dismally familiar this process actually is. Tom



Prepare, Pursue, Prevail!

Onward and Upward with U.S. Central Command


By way of explaining his eight failed marriages, the American bandleader Artie Shaw once remarked,  “I am an incurable optimist.” In reality, Artie was an incurable narcissist. Utterly devoid of self-awareness, he never looked back, only forward.

So, too, with the incurable optimists who manage present-day American wars.  What matters is not past mistakes but future opportunities.  This describes the view of General Joseph Votel, current head of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).  Since its creation in 1983, CENTCOM has emerged as the ne plus ultra of the Pentagon’s several regional commands, the place where the action is always hot and heavy.  Votel is the latest in a long train of four-star generals to preside over that action.

The title of this essay (exclamation point included) captures in a single phrase the “strategic approach” that Votel has devised for CENTCOM.  That approach, according to the command’s website, is “proactive in nature and endeavors to set in motion tangible actions in a purposeful, consistent, and continuous manner.” 

This strategic approach forms but one element in General Votel’s multifaceted (if murky) “command narrative,” which he promulgated last year upon taking the helm at CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida.  Other components include a “culture,” a “vision,” a “mission,” and “priorities.”  CENTCOM’s culture emphasizes “persistent excellence,” as the command “strives to understand and help others to comprehend, with granularity and clarity, the complexities of our region.”  The vision, indistinguishable from the mission except perhaps for those possessing advanced degrees in hermeneutics, seeks to provide “a more stable and prosperous region with increasingly effective governance, improved security, and trans-regional cooperation.”  Toward that estimable end, CENTCOM’s priorities include forging partnerships with other nations “based upon shared values,” “actively counter[ing] the malign influence” of hostile regimes, and “degrading and defeating violent extremist organizations and their networks.”

At present, CENTCOM is busily implementing the several components of Votel’s command narrative across an “area of responsibility” (AOR) consisting of 20 nations, among them Iran, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.  As the CENTCOM website puts it, without batting a digital eyelash, that AOR “spans more than 4 million square miles and is populated by more than 550 million people from 22 ethnic groups, speaking 18 languages with hundreds of dialects and confessing multiple religions which transect national borders.”

According to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, an AOR is the “geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations.” Yet this anodyne definition fails to capture the spirit of the enterprise in which General Votel is engaged. 

One imagines that there must be another Department of Defense Dictionary, kept under lock-and-key in the Pentagon, that dispenses with the bland language and penchant for deceptive euphemisms. That dictionary would define an AOR as “a vast expanse within which the United States seeks to impose order without exercising sovereignty.”  An AOR combines aspects of colony, protectorate, and contested imperial frontier. In that sense, the term represents the latest incarnation of the informal empire that American elites have pursued in various forms ever since U.S. forces “liberated” Cuba in 1898. 

To say that a military officer presiding over an AOR plans and conducts operations is a bit like saying that Jeff Bezos sells books.  It’s a small truth that evades a larger one.  To command CENTCOM is to function as a proconsul, to inhabit as a co-equal the rarified realm of kings, presidents, and prime ministers.  CENTCOM commanders shape the future of their AOR -- or at least fancy that they do.

Sustaining expectations of shaping the future requires a suitably accommodating version of the past.  For CENTCOM, history is a record of events selected and arranged to demonstrate progress.  By testifying to the achievements of previous CENTCOM commanders, history thereby validates Votel’s own efforts to carry on their work.  Not for nothing, therefore, does the command’s website include this highly sanitized account of its recent past:

“In the wake of 9-11, the international community found Saddam Hussein's continued lack of cooperation with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions regarding weapons of mass destruction unacceptable. Hussein's continued recalcitrance led the UNSC to authorize the use of force by a U.S.-led coalition. Operation Iraqi Freedom began 19 March 2003.


“Following the defeat of both the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (9 November 2001) and Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq (8 April 2003), CENTCOM has continued to provide security to the new freely-elected governments in those countries, conducting counterinsurgency operations and assisting host nation security forces to provide for their own defense.”

Setbacks, disappointments, miscalculations, humiliations: you won’t hear about them from CENTCOM.  Like Broadway’s Annie, down at headquarters in Tampa they’re “just thinkin' about tomorrow,” which “clears away the cobwebs, and the sorrow, till there's none!”

(Give the Vietnam War the CENTCOM treatment and you would end up with something like this: “Responding to unprovoked North Vietnamese attacks and acting at the behest of the international community, a U.S.-led coalition arrived to provide security to the freely-elected South Vietnamese government, conducting counterinsurgency operations and assisting host nation security forces to provide for their own defense.”)

In fact, the U.N. Security Council did not authorize the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  Indeed, efforts by George W. Bush’s administration to secure such an authorization failed abysmally, collapsing in a welter of half-truths and outright falsehoods.  What much of the international community found unacceptable, more so even than Saddam’s obstreperousness, was Bush’s insistence that he was going to have his war regardless of what others might think.  As for celebrating the “defeat” of the Taliban and of Saddam, that’s the equivalent of declaring “game over” when the whistle sounds ending the first quarter of a football game.

More to the point, to claim that, in the years since, CENTCOM “has continued to provide security to the new freely-elected governments” of Afghanistan and Iraq whitewashes history in ways that would cause the most shameless purveyor of alt-facts on Fox News to blush.  The incontestable truth is that Afghans and Iraqis have not known security since U.S. forces, under the direction of General Votel’s various predecessors, arrived on the scene.  Rather than providing security, CENTCOM has undermined it.

CENTCOM Headquarters (Where It’s Always Groundhog Day)

Even so, as the current steward of CENTCOM’s culture, vision, mission, strategic approach, and priorities, General Votel remains undaunted.  In his view, everything that happened prior to his assuming ownership of the CENTCOM AOR is irrelevant.  What matters is what will happen from now on -- in Washington-speak, “going forward.”  As with Artie Shaw, serial disappointments leave intact the conviction that persistence will ultimately produce a happy ending.  

Earlier this month, Votel provided a progress report to the Senate Armed Services Committee and outlined his expectations for future success.  In a city that now competes for the title of Comedy Central, few paid serious attention to what the CENTCOM commander had to say.  Yet his presentation was, in its own way, emblematic of how, in the Age of Trump, U.S. national security policy has become fully divorced from reality. 

General Votel began by inventorying the various “drivers of instability” afflicting his AOR.  That list, unsurprisingly enough, turned out to be a long one, including ethnic and sectarian divisions, economic underdevelopment, an absence of opportunity for young people “susceptible to unrest [and] radical ideologies,” civil wars, humanitarian crises, large refugee populations, and “competition among outside actors, including Russia and China, seeking to promote their interests and supplant U.S. influence in the region.”  Not qualifying for mention as destabilizing factors, however, were the presence and activities of U.S. military forces, their footprint dwarfing that of Russia and China.

Indeed, the balance of Votel’s 64-page written statement argued, in effect, that U.S. military activities are the key to fixing all that ails the CENTCOM AOR.  After making a brief but obligatory bow to the fact that “a solely military response is not sufficient” to address the region’s problems, he proceeded to describe at length the military response (and only the military response) that will do just that. 

Unfortunately for General Votel, length does not necessarily correlate with substance.  Once upon a time, American military professionals prized brevity and directness in their writing.  Not so the present generation of generals who are given to logorrhea.  Consider just this bit of cliché-ridden drivel -- I could quote vast passages of it -- that Votel inflicted on members of the United States Senate.  “In a region beset by myriad challenges,” he reported,

“we must always be on the look-out for opportunities to seize the initiative to support our objectives and goals. Pursuing opportunities means that we are proactive -- we don’t wait for problems to be presented; we look for ways to get ahead of them. It also means that we have to become comfortable with transparency and flat communications -- our ability to understand our AOR better than anyone else gives us the advantage of knowing where opportunities exist.  Pursuing opportunities also means we have to take risk -- by delegating authority and responsibility to the right level, by trusting our partners, and being willing to trust our best instincts in order to move faster than our adversaries.”

In third-tier business schools, bromides of this sort might pass for “best practices.”  But my guess is that George C. Marshall or Dwight D. Eisenhower would award the author of that paragraph an F and return him to staff college for further instruction.

Frothy verbiage aside, what exactly does General Votel propose?  The answer -- for those with sufficient patience to wade through the entire 64 pages -- reduces to this: persist.  In concrete terms, that means keeping on killing and enabling our “allies” to do the same until the other side is finally exhausted and gives up.  In other words, it’s the movie Groundhog Day transposed from Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania, to Tampa and then to Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries where the bodies continue to pile up.

True, the document Votel presented to Congress is superficially comprehensive, with sections touting everything from “Building Partner Capacity” (“we must be forward-leaning and empower our partners to meet internal security challenges”) to creating a “Global Engagement Center” (“The best way to defeat an idea is to present a better, more appealing idea”).  Strip away the fluff, however, and what’s left is nothing more than a call to keep doing what CENTCOM has been doing for years now.

To see what all this really means, practically speaking, just check out CENTCOM press releases for the week of March 5th through 10th.  The titles alone suffice to describe a situation where every day is like the one that preceded it:







As the good nuns used to tell me back in parochial school, actions speak louder than words.  What the CENTCOM commander says matters less than what CENTCOM forces do.  What they are doing is waging an endless war of attrition.

Ludendorff Would Have Approved

“Punch a hole and let the rest follow.” 

During the First World War, that aphorism, attributed to General Erich Ludendorff, captured the essence of the German army’s understanding of strategy, rooted in the conviction that violence perpetrated on a sufficient scale over a sufficient period of time will ultimately render a politically purposeless war purposeful.  The formula didn’t work for Germany in Ludendorff’s day and yielded even more disastrous results when Hitler revived it two decades later.

Of course, U.S. military commanders today don’t make crude references to punching holes.  They employ language that suggests discrimination, deliberation, precision, and control as the qualities that define the American way of war.  They steer clear of using terms like attrition.  Yet differences in vocabulary notwithstanding, the U.S. military’s present-day MO bears a considerable resemblance to the approach that Ludendorff took fully a century ago.  And for the last decade and a half, U.S. forces operating in the CENTCOM AOR have been no more successful than were German forces on the Western Front in achieving the purposes that ostensibly made war necessary.

To divert attention from this disturbing fact, General Votel offers Congress and by extension the American people a 64-page piece of propaganda.  Whether he himself is deluded or dishonest is difficult to say, just as it remains difficult to say whether General

William Westmoreland was deluded or dishonest when he assured Congress in November 1967 that victory in Vietnam was in sight.  “With 1968,” Westmoreland promised, “a new phase is now starting.  We have reached an important point when the end begins now to come into view.”

Westmoreland was dead wrong, as the enemy’s 1968 Tet Offensive soon demonstrated.  That a comparable disaster, no doubt different in form, will expose Votel’s own light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel assessment as equally fraudulent is a possibility, even if one to which American political and military leaders appear to be oblivious.  This much is certain: in the CENTCOM AOR the end is not even remotely in view.

What are we to make of this charade of proconsuls parading through Washington to render false or misleading reports on the status of the American empire’s outer precincts?

Perhaps the time has come to look elsewhere for advice and counsel.  Whether generals like Votel are deluded or dishonest is ultimately beside the point.  More relevant is the fact that the views they express -- and that inexplicably continue to carry weight in Washington -- are essentially of no value.  So many years later, no reason exists to believe that they know what they are doing.

To reground U.S. national security policy in something that approximates reality would require listening to new voices, offering views long deemed heretical. 

Let me nonetheless offer you an example:

“Fifteen years after launching a worldwide effort to defeat and destroy terrorist organizations, the United States finds itself locked in a pathologically recursive loop; we fight to prevent attacks and defend our values, only to incite further violence against ourselves and allies while destabilizing already chaotic regions..."

That is not the judgment of some lefty from Cambridge or San Francisco, but of Major John Q. Bolton, a veteran of both the Iraq and Afghan Wars.  Within that brief passage is more wisdom than in all of General Votel’s 64 pages of blather.

I submit that Bolton’s grasp of our predicament is infinitely superior to Votel’s.  The contrast between the two is striking.  The officer who wears no stars dares to say what is true; the officer wearing four stars obfuscates.  If the four-stars abandon obfuscation for truth, then and only then will they deserve our respectful attention.  In the meantime, it’s like looking to Artie Shaw for marriage counseling. 

Andrew J. Bacevich, a TomDispatch regular, is the author most recently of America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History.