Thursday, August 11, 2016

The Sexual Is Political






























Segregated toilet doors are today at the center of a big legal and ideological struggle. On March 29, 2016, a group of 80 predominantly Silicon Valley-based business executives, headlined by Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg and Apple CEO Tim Cook, signed a letter to North Carolina Governor Pat McCrory denouncing a law that prohibits transgender people from using public facilities intended for the opposite sex. “We are disappointed in your decision to sign this discriminatory legislation into law,” the letter says. “The business community, by and large, has consistently communicated to lawmakers at every level that such laws are bad for our employees and bad for business.” So it is clear where big capital stands. Tim Cook can easily forget about hundreds of thousands of Foxconn workers in China assembling Apple products in slave conditions; he made his big gesture of solidarity with the underprivileged, demanding the abolition of gender segregation… As is often the case, big business stands proudly united with politically correct theory.

So what is “transgenderism”? It occurs when an individual experiences discord between his/her biological sex (and the corresponding gender, male or female, assigned to him/her by society at birth) and his/her subjective identity. As such, it does not concern only “men who feel and act like women” and vice versa but a complex structure of additional “genderqueer” positions which are outside the very binary opposition of masculine and feminine: bigender, trigender, pangender, genderfluid, up to agender. The vision of social relations that sustains transgenderism is the so-called postgenderism: a social, political and cultural movement whose adherents advocate a voluntary abolition of gender, rendered possible by recent scientific progress in biotechnology and reproductive technologies. Their proposal not only concerns scientific possibility, but is also ethically grounded. The premise of postgenderism is that the social, emotional and cognitive consequences of fixed gender roles are an obstacle to full human emancipation. A society in which reproduction through sex is eliminated (or in which other versions will be possible: a woman can also “father” her child, etc.) will open unheard-of new possibilities of freedom, social and emotional experimenting. It will eliminate the crucial distinction that sustains all subsequent social hierarchies and exploitations.

One can argue that postgenderism is the truth of transgenderism. The universal fluidification of sexual identities unavoidably reaches its apogee in the cancellation of sex as such. Recall Marx’s brilliant analysis of how, in the French revolution of 1848, the conservative-republican Party of Order functioned as the coalition of the two branches of royalism (orleanists and legitimists) in the “anonymous kingdom of the Republic.” The only way to be a royalist in general was to be a republican, and, in the same sense, the only way to be sexualized in general is to be asexual.

The first thing to note here is that transgenderism goes together with the general tendency in today’s predominant ideology to reject any particular “belonging” and to celebrate the “fluidification” of all forms of identity. Thinkers like Frederic Lordon have recently demonstrated the inconsistency of “cosmopolitan” anti-nationalist intellectuals who advocate “liberation from a belonging” and in extremis tend to dismiss every search for roots and every attachment to a particular ethnic or cultural identity as an almost proto-Fascist stance. Lordon contrasts this hidden belonging of self-proclaimed rootless universalists with the nightmarish reality of refugees and illegal immigrants who, deprived of basic rights, desperately search for some kind of belonging (like a new citizenship). Lordon is quite right here: it is easy to see how the “cosmopolitan” intellectual elites despising local people who cling to their roots belong to their own quite exclusive circles of rootless elites, how their cosmopolitan rootlessness is the marker of a deep and strong belonging. This is why it is an utter obscenity to put together elite “nomads” flying around the world and refugees desperately searching for a safe place where they would belong–the same obscenity as that of putting together a dieting upper-class Western woman and a starving refugee woman.

Furthermore, we encounter here the old paradox: the more marginal and excluded one is, the more one is allowed to assert one’s ethnic identity and exclusive way of life. This is how the politically correct landscape is structured. People far from the Western world are allowed to fully assert their particular ethnic identity without being proclaimed essentialist racist identitarians (native Americans, blacks…). The closer one gets to the notorious white heterosexual males, the more problematic this assertion is: Asians are still OK; Italians and Irish – maybe; with Germans and Scandinavians it is already problematic… However, such a prohibition on asserting the particular identity of white men (as the model of oppression of others), although it presents itself as the admission of their guilt, nonetheless confers on them a central position. This very prohibition makes them into the universal-neutral medium, the place from which the truth about the others’ oppression is accessible. The imbalance weighs also in the opposite direction: impoverished European countries expect the developed West European ones to bear the full burden of multicultural openness, while they can afford patriotism.

And a similar tension is present in transgenderism. Transgender subjects who appear as transgressive, defying all prohibitions, simultaneously behave in a hyper-sensitive way insofar as they feel oppressed by enforced choice (“Why should I decide if I am man or woman?”) and need a place where they could recognize themselves. If they so proudly insist on their “trans-,” beyond all classification, why do they display such an urgent demand for a proper place? Why, when they find themselves in front of gendered toilets, don’t they act with heroic indifference–“I am transgendered, a bit of this and that, a man dressed as a woman, etc., so I can well choose whatever door I want!”? Furthermore, do “normal” heterosexuals not face a similar problem? Do they also not often find it difficult to recognize themselves in prescribed sexual identities? One could even say that “man” (or “woman”) is not a certain identity but more like a certain mode of avoiding an identity… And we can safely predict that new anti-discriminatory demands will emerge: why not marriages among multiple persons? What justifies the limitation to the binary form of marriage? Why not even a marriage with animals? After all we already know about the finesse of animal emotions. Is to exclude marriage with an animal not a clear case of “speciesism,” an unjust privileging of the human species?

Insofar as the other great antagonism is that of classes, could we not also imagine a homologous critical rejection of the class binary? The “binary” class struggle and exploitation should also be supplemented by a “gay” position (exploitation among members of the ruling class itself, e.g., bankers and lawyers exploiting the “honest” productive capitalists), a “lesbian” position (beggars stealing from honest workers, etc.), a “bisexual” position (as a self-employed worker, I act as both capitalist and worker), an “asexual” one (I remain outside capitalist production), and so forth.

This deadlock of classification is clearly discernible in the need to expand the formula: the basic LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender) becomes LGBTQIA (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Questioning, Intersex, Asexual) or even LGBTQQIAAP (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Questioning, Intersex, Asexual, Allies, Pansexual). To resolve the problem, one often simply adds a + which serves to include all other communities associated with the LGBT community, as in LGBT+. This, however, raises the question: is + just a stand-in for missing positions like “and others,” or can one be directly a +? The properly dialectical answer is “yes,” because in a series there is always one exceptional element which clearly does not belong to it and thereby gives body to +. It can be “allies” (“honest” non-LGBT individuals), “asexuals” (negating the entire field of sexuality) or “questioning” (floating around, unable to adopt a determinate position). 

Consequently, there is only one solution to this deadlock, the one we find in another field of disposing waste, that of trash bins. Public trash bins are more and more differentiated today. There are special bins for paper, glass, metal cans, cardboard package, plastic, etc. Here already, things sometimes get complicated. If I have to dispose of a paper bag or a notebook with a tiny plastic band, where does it belong? To paper or to plastic? No wonder that we often get detailed instruction on the bins, right beneath the general designation: PAPER–books, newspapers, etc., but NOT hardcover books or books with plasticized covers, etc. In such cases, proper waste disposal would have taken up to half an hour or more of detailed reading and tough decisions. To make things easier, we then get a supplementary trash bin for GENERAL WASTE where we throw everything that did not meet the specific criteria of other bins, as if, once again, apart from paper trash, plastic trash, and so on, there is trash as such, universal trash.

Should we not do the same with toilets? Since no classification can satisfy all identities, should we not add to the two usual gender slots (MEN, WOMEN) a door for GENERAL GENDER? Is this not the only way to inscribe into an order of symbolic differences its constitutive antagonism? Lacan already pointed out that the “formula” of the sexual relationship as impossible/real is 1+1+a, i.e., the two sexes plus the “bone in the throat” that prevents its translation into a symbolic difference. This third element does not stand for what is excluded from the domain of difference; it stands, instead, for (the real of) difference as such.

The reason for this failure of every classification that tries to be exhaustive is not the empirical wealth of identities that defy classification but, on the contrary, the persistence of sexual difference as real, as “impossible” (defying every categorization) and simultaneously unavoidable. The multiplicity of gender positions (male, female, gay, lesbian, bigender, transgender…) circulates around an antagonism that forever eludes it. Gays are male, lesbians female; transsexuals enforce a passage from one to another; cross-dressing combines the two; bigender floats between the two… Whichever way we turn, the two lurks beneath.

This brings us back to what one could call the primal scene of anxiety that defines transgenderism. I stand in front of standard bi-gender toilets with two doors, LADIES and GENTLEMEN, and I am caught up in anxiety, not recognizing myself in any of the two choices. Again, do “normal” heterosexuals not have a similar problem? Do they also not often find it difficult to recognize themselves in prescribed sexual identities? Which man has not caught himself in momentary doubt: “Do I really have the right to enter GENTLEMEN? Am I really a man?”

We can now see clearly what the anxiety of this confrontation really amounts to. Namely, it is the anxiety of (symbolic) castration. Whatever choice I make, I will lose something, and this something is NOT what the other sex has. Both sexes together do not form a whole since something is irretrievably lost in the very division of sexes. We can even say that, in making the choice, I assume the loss of what the other sex doesn’t have, i.e., I have to renounce the illusion that the Other has that X which would fill in my lack. And one can well guess that transgenderism is ultimately an attempt to avoid (the anxiety of) castration: thanks to it, a flat space is created in which the multiple choices that I can make do not bear the mark of castration. As Alenka Zupančič expressed it in a piece of personal communication: “One is usually timid in asserting the existence of two genders, but when passing to the multitude this timidity disappears, and their existence is firmly asserted. If sexual difference is considered in terms of gender, it is made — at least in principle — compatible with mechanisms of its full ontologization.”

Therein resides the crux of the matter. The LGBT trend is right in “deconstructing” the standard normative sexual opposition, in de-ontologizing it, in recognizing in it a contingent historical construct full of tensions and inconsistencies. However, this trend reduces this tension to the fact that the plurality of sexual positions are forcefully narrowed down to the normative straightjacket of the binary opposition of masculine and feminine, with the idea that, if we get away from this straightjacket, we will get a full blossoming multiplicity of sexual positions (LGBT, etc.), each of them with its complete ontological consistency. It assumes that once we get rid of the binary straightjacket, I can fully recognize myself as gay, bisexual, or whatever. From the Lacanian standpoint, nonetheless, the antagonistic tension is irreducible, as it is constitutive of the sexual as such, and no amount of classificatory diversification and multiplication can save us from it.  

The same goes for class antagonism. The division introduced and sustained by the emancipatory (“class”) struggle is not between the two particular classes of the whole, but between the whole-in-its-parts and its remainder which, within the particulars, stands for the universal, for the whole “as such,” opposed to its parts. Or, to put it in yet another way, one should bear in mind here the two aspects of the notion of remnant: the rest as what remains after the subtraction of all particular content (elements, specific parts of the whole), and the rest as the ultimate result of the subdivision of the whole into its parts, when, in the final act of subdivision, we no longer get two particular parts or elements, two somethings, but a something (the rest) and a nothing.

In Lacan’s precise sense of the term, the third element (the Kierkegaardian chimney sweeper) effectively stands for the phallic element. How so? Insofar as it stands for pure difference: the officer, the maid, and the chimney sweeper are the male, the female, plus their difference as such, as a particular contingent object. Again, why? Because not only is difference differential, but, in an antagonistic (non)relationship, it precedes the terms it differentiates. Not only is woman not-man and vice versa, but woman is what prevents man from being fully man and vice versa. It is like the difference between the Left and the Right in the political space: their difference is the difference in the very way difference is perceived. The whole political space appears differently structured if we look at it from the Left or from the Right; there is no third “objective” way (for a Leftist, the political divide cuts across the entire social body, while for a Rightist, society is a hierarchic whole disturbed by marginal intruders).

Difference “in itself” is thus not symbolic-differential, but real-impossible — something that eludes and resists the symbolic grasp. This difference is the universal as such, that is, the universal not as a neutral frame elevated above its two species, but as their constitutive antagonism. And the third element (the chimney sweeper, the Jew, object a) stands for difference as such, for the “pure” difference/antagonism which precedes the differentiated terms. If the division of the social body into two classes were complete, without the excessive element (Jew, rabble…), there would have been no class struggle, just two clearly divided classes. This third element is not the mark of an empirical remainder that escapes class classification (the pure division of society into two classes), but the materialization of their antagonistic difference itself, insofar as this difference precedes the differentiated terms. In the space of anti-Semitism, the “Jew” stands for social antagonism as such: without the Jewish intruder, the two classes would live in harmony… Thus, we can observe how the third intruding element is evental: it is not just another positive entity, but it stands for what is forever unsettling the harmony of the two, opening it up to an incessant process of re-accommodation.

A supreme example of this third element, objet a, which supplements the couple, is provided by a weird incident that occurred in Kemalist Turkey in 1926. Part of the Kemalist modernization was to enforce new “European” models for women, for how they should dress, talk and act, in order to get rid of the oppressive Oriental traditions. As is well known, there indeed was a Hat Law prescribing how men and women, at least in big cities, should cover their heads. Then,

“in Erzurum in 1926 there was a woman among the people who were executed under the pretext of ‘opposing the Hat Law.’ She was a very tall (almost 2 m.) and very masculine-looking woman who peddled shawls for a living (hence her name ‘Şalcı Bacı’ [Shawl Sister]). Reporter Nimet Arzık described her as, ‘two meters tall, with a sooty face and snakelike thin dreadlocks […] and with manlike steps.’ Of course as a woman she was not supposed to wear the fedora, so she could not have been ‘guilty’ of anything, but probably in their haste the gendarmes mistook her for a man and hurried her to the scaffold. Şalcı Bacı was the first woman to be executed by hanging in Turkish history. She was definitely not ‘normal’ since the description by Arzık does not fit in any framework of feminine normalcy at that particular time, and she probably belonged to the old tradition of tolerated and culturally included ‘special people’ with some kind of genetic ‘disorder.’ The coerced and hasty transition to ‘modernity,’ however, did not allow for such an inclusion to exist, and therefore she had to be eliminated, crossed out of the equation. ‘Would a woman wear a hat that she be hanged?’ were the last words she was reported to have muttered on the way to the scaffold. Apart from making no sense at all, these words represented a semantic void and only indicated that this was definitely a scene from the Real, subverting the rules of semiotics: she was first emasculated (in its primary etymological sense of ‘making masculine’), so that she could be ‘emasculated.’”[1]

How are we to interpret this weird and ridiculously excessive act of killing? The obvious reading would have been a Butlerian one: through her provocative trans-sexual appearance and acting, Şalcı Bacı rendered visible the contingent character of sexual difference, of how it is symbolically constructed. In this way, she was a threat to normatively established sexual identities… My reading is slightly (or not so slightly) different. Rather than undermine sexual difference, Şalcı Bacı stood for this difference as such, in all its traumatic Real, irreducible to any clear symbolic opposition. Her disturbing appearance transforms clear symbolic difference into the impossible-Real of antagonism. So, again, in the same way as class struggle is not just “complicated” when other classes that do not enter the clear division of the ruling class and the oppressed class appear (this excess is, on the contrary, the very element which makes class antagonism real and not just a symbolic opposition), the formula of sexual antagonism is not M/F (the clear opposition between male and female) but MF+, where + stands for the excessive element which transforms the symbolic opposition into the Real of antagonism.

This brings us back to our topic, the big opposition that is emerging today between, on the one hand, the violent imposition of a fixed symbolic form of sexual difference as the basic gesture of counteracting social disintegration and, on the other hand, the total transgender “fluidification” of gender, the dispersal of sexual difference into multiple configurations. While in one part of the world, abortion and gay marriages are endorsed as a clear sign of moral progress, in other parts, homophobia and anti-abortion campaigns are exploding. In June 2016, al-Jazeera reported that a 22-year-old Dutch woman complained to the police that she had been raped after being drugged in an upmarket nightclub in Doha.  And the result was that she was convicted of having illicit sex by a Qatari court and given a one-year suspended sentence. On the opposite end, what counts as harassment in the PC environs is also getting extended. The following case comes to mind. A woman walked on a street with a bag in her hand, and a black man was walking 15 yards behind her. Becoming aware of it, the woman (unconsciously, automatically?) tightened her grip on the bag, and the black man reported that he experienced the woman’s gesture as a case of racist harassment…

What goes on is also the result of neglecting the class and race dimension by the PC proponents of women’s and gay rights:

“In ‘10 Hours of Walking in NYC as a Woman’ created by a video marketing company in 2014, an actress dressed in jeans, black t-shirt, and tennis shoes walked through various Manhattan neighborhoods, recording the actions and comments of men she encountered with a hidden camera and microphone. Throughout the walk the camera recorded over 100 instances coded as verbal harassment, ranging from friendly greetings to sexualized remarks about her body, including threats of rape. While the video was hailed as a document of street harassment and the fear of violence that are a daily part of women’s lives, it ignored race and class. The largest proportion of the men presented in the video were minorities, and, in a number of instances, the men commenting on the actress were standing against buildings, resting on fire hydrants, or sitting on folding chairs on the sidewalk, postures used to characterize lower class and unemployed men, or, as a reader commented on it: ‘The video was meant to generate outrage… and it used crypto-racism to do it.’”[2]

The great mistake in dealing with this opposition is to search for a proper measure between two extremes. What one should do instead is to bring out what both extremes share: the fantasy of a peaceful world where the agonistic tension of sexual difference disappears, either in a clear and stable hierarchic distinction of sexes or in the happy fluidity of a desexualized universe. And it is not difficult to discern in this fantasy of a peaceful world the fantasy of a society without social antagonisms, in short, without class struggle.


[1] Bulent Somay, »L’Orient n’existe pas,« doctoral thesis defended at Birkbeck College, University of London, on November 29 2013.
[2] See https://thesocietypages.org/sociologylens/2014/11/18/nice-bag-discussing-race-class-and-sexuality-in-examining-street-harassment/.






















The Difference Between The Republicans & Democrats






























The Shell Game of the Economic Elite’s Hamilton Project





















Posted on Aug 9, 2016











Beneath the marionette theater of American electoral and parliamentary democracy, policy is made by a “deep state” oligarchy of corporate and financial elites. The political actors atop the great quadrennial campaign carnivals speak in progressive-sounding terms of their commitment to equality, justice, peace, popular self-rule and the common good. Behind stage and screen, however, the contenders on both sides of the nation’s party duopoly—“two wings of the same bird of prey” (Upton Sinclair, 1904)—are captive to the nation’s unelected and interrelated dictatorships of money and empire.

After candidates who masqueraded as champions of the people get into office, voters and pundits who believed the politicians’ election season rhetoric and imagery express surprise and disappointment at the citizenry’s betrayal by those in whom they placed hope for change. But before the election, these disillusioned citizens had failed to notice numerous clues to the candidates’ plutocratic, imperial and authoritarian essences.

Take Barack Obama, who hopes to burnish his legacy by securing final congressional passage of the arch-global-corporatist Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). If achieved, this measure will be a fitting capstone to what Robert Reich calls “one of the most pro-business administrations in America history.” Obama has continued the cringing, Wall Street-directed corporatism of Bill Clinton, helping bring the United States to a new Gilded Age in which (as Bernie Sanders said repeatedly during his presidential campaign) the top 1/10th of the United States’ top 1 percent has nearly as much wealth as the nation’s bottom 90 percent—this while more than a fifth of the nation’s children (including nearly four of every 10 black children) are growing up beneath the federal government’s notoriously inadequate poverty level. Thanks in no small part to Obama’s chillingly fake-progressive presidency, fully 95 percent of new national income generated during his first term went to the nation’s top 0.1 percent. Corporate profits (primarily now financial sector profits) have risen to their greatest state in the U.S. economy since 1929.

The Man Behind the Curtain

Numerous liberals and progressives (including Sanders) have at various times expressed surprise and disappointment over Obama’s stealthy service to business rule as usual. But cautionary omens were widely available to those willing to look for them well before he ascended to the White House. I collected dozens of these unheeded alarms in my early 2008 book, “Barack Obama and the Future of American Politics.”

One of the many early clues to the coming neoliberal nature of Obama’s presidency came when he affiliated himself from the start with The Hamilton Project (THP), a key neoliberal Washington, D.C., think tank. THP was founded with Goldman Sachs funding inside the venerable centrist and Democratic-leaning Brookings Institution in spring 2006. Its creator was no less august a figure in the country’s ruling class than Robert Rubin, the former Goldman Sachs CEO who served as Bill Clinton’s top senior economic policy adviser and treasury secretary. A legendary Democratic Party “kingmaker” who is often half-jokingly called “the wizard behind the curtain” of Democratic economic policy, Rubin is the veritable godfather of late 20th century and current U.S. neoliberalism. He is co-chair of “Wall Street’s Think Tank,” the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), which formulates America’s grand imperial strategy in accord with the globalist “open door” ambitions of the nation’s leading finance-led multinational investment firms and corporations. Under Rubin’s influence, and in accord with the “Rubinomics” trilogy of balanced budgets, free trade and financial deregulation, Clinton joined with corporate Democrats and Republicans to: enact the great job-killing and anti-labor North American Free Trade Agreement, slash government spending, eliminate restrictions on interstate banking, repeal the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act (which had separated commercial from investment banking), and prevent the regulation of toxic “over-the-counter” financial derivatives with the so-called Commodity Futures Modernization Act. All this helped distribute wealth and power upward and prepare the ground for the financial collapse of 2008.

Rubin left the Clinton administration in 1999, with Clinton hailing him as “the greatest Secretary of the Treasury since Alexander Hamilton.” Rubin exited to join Citigroup, the primary benefactor of the Glass-Steagall repeal, making him what American Banker calls “Exhibit A when progressives talk about the ‘revolving door’ between banks and Washington.” His formal return to the private sector hardly meant a full retreat from national politics and policy, however. Along with top positions at the CFR and Brookings, Rubin helped organize financial backing for Obama’s presidential campaign. As Greg Palast notes, “Rubin opened the doors to finance industry vaults for Obama. Extraordinarily for a Democrat, Obama in 2008 raised three times as much from bankers as his Republican opponent.”

Rubin also served as a top informal Obama adviser and placed a number of his protégés in high-ranking positions in the Obama administration. Rubin’s Obama appointees included Timothy Geithner (Obama’s first treasury secretary), Peter Orszag (Obama’s first Office of Management and Budget director), and Larry Summers (first chief economic adviser).

Following in his mentor’s revolving-door footsteps, Geithner has since moved on to the presidency of Warburg Pincus, a leading Wall Street equity firm. Orszag went on to become a Citigroup executive and a merger-and-acquisitions director at Lazard, an investment bank once used by the legendary junk-bond-wielding corporate raider Carl Icahn. Summers became director of the National Economic Council for President Obama and now is Charles W. Eliot professor and president emeritus at Harvard University.

‘A New Kind of Third-Way Neoliberalism’

THP’s post-ideological founding document (smart neoliberals have long claimed to have transcended ideology in the name of technocratic pragmatism) was crafted by Rubin and Orszag. Beneath standard boilerplate on its commitment to “broad-based economic growth,” “individual opportunity” and “an effective role for government in making needed investments,” THP has remained steadfastly devoted—in the words of the left political economist Jamie Peck—“to fiscal discipline and free trade, to market-oriented approaches, and to strategies for attacking inequality that are attached from new [social-democratic] entitlement commitments.”

Rubin’s THP has spent the last decade advocating what leading international relations scholars Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Nana de Graaf call “a new kind of Third Way neoliberalism (reviving that of Bill Clinton) in the context of an economy characterized by growing inequality.” “The latter,” Apeldoorn and de Graaff note, “worried a part of America’s (corporate) elite because of how it might harm social and political stability and because of the protectionist backlash it might create.” These ruling-class fears had some real basis in the wake of the populist and left-led Occupy Wall Street movement, the nominally socialist Sanders campaign, and the right-wing Donald Trump phenomenon.

Since its formation, THP has been directed by a succession of elite neoliberal economists who have been groomed by Rubin and served in top federal policy positions. The list includes Orszag, Jason Furman (chair of Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers [CEA] since 2013), Doug Elmendorf (a former Clinton treasury staffer who headed the Congressional Budget Office from 2009 to 2015), and Michael Greenstone (chief economist for Obama’s CEA and currently the Milton Friedman professor of economics at the University of Chicago). Goldman Sachs personnel and veterans are prominent across THP’s Advisory Council.

Pre-emptively Pacifying Wall Street

As an Illinois U.S. senator, Obama was the keynote speaker at THP’s opening event in April 2006. Beginning with a special nod of thanks to “the wizard” (who sat two chairs to his right), Obama offered curious praise to Rubin, Orszag and other Clinton administration veterans in the room. He lauded them for having “taken on entrenched interests” to “put us on the pathway to a prosperity we are still enjoying.” Obama called the new body a “breath of fresh air,” a welcome nonpartisan and non-ideological agent of economic “modernization.” He hailed THP for seeking “21st century solutions” and a practical handle on “what actually works” in a national capital plagued by “tired ideologies” of right and left. It was a classic triangulating “Third Way” speech. Obama’s carefully clipped words functioned to “preemptively pacify Wall Street before declaring his presidential ambitions” (per Peck)—ambitions Obama had been harboring from the start of his U.S. Senate career—indeed, long before that.

Obama’s deference to Rubin made perfect Machiavellian sense. As Harold Myerson noted in a Washington Post column on THP’s rollout, “Rubin has … become a seal of good housekeeping for Democratic candidates seeking money from Wall Street. When Bob Rubin talks, Democratic pols don’t just listen; they scramble for front-row seats and make a show of taking notes.” The junior senator from Illinois went on to set new presidential campaign fundraising records with help from Rubin and other Wall Street-connected kingmakers.

‘Warm-Hearted but Cool-Headed’

Over the last decade, THP has helped define “the philosophical core of Obamanomics” (Peck) by producing a small library of issue briefs and policy papers. These documents have matched Obama’s political persona by striving to be, in Orszag’s words, “warm-hearted but cool-headed.” There’s a useful translation for Orszag’s phrase: outwardly progressive and socially concerned but substantively neoliberal and Wall Street friendly.

A consistent neoliberal formula holds across THP’s policy literature. Analysts tackle topics of concern to “warm-hearted” progressives—poverty, household expenditures, joblessness, automation, inequality, health care access, barriers to employment, declining social safety nets, over-incarceration, environmental hazards and more. These subjects are often examined with sophisticated empirical rigor but always in “cool-headed” (wealth- and power-serving) ways that stop short of any serious confrontation with underlying causes of unequal growth and regressive distribution rooted in the rule of the nation’s corporate and financial elite and the profit system that the reigning stratum sits atop.

A typical THP brief from last June is titled “Where Does All the Money Go: Shifts in Household Spending Over the Past 30 Years” It shows that real consumption fell in lower-income households and that a rising share of those households’ expenditures shifted to meeting basic needs between 1984 and 2014. The study says nothing about the rising percentage of ordinary Americans’ budgets spent to meet the escalating costs of debt service payments to the nation’s leading financial institutions—to the creditor class headquartered on Wall Street. It does not mention how U.S. households’ outstanding debt rose from 83 percent of their disposable income in 1991 to a remarkable 130 percent on the eve of the Great Recession—this courtesy of the nation’s oversized financial sector. The authors conclude with milquetoast recommendations for the maintenance of minimal safety-net protections.

The same basic moral and political shortfall is evident in another recent THP policy paper that reflects on data showing that the life expectancy of “low-income whites” has fallen dramatically in the U.S. in recent years. The paper makes mild calls for improved educational opportunities and “increased access to health care—including mental health care.” It makes no reference to how the U.S. working class has been subjected to a relentless top-down and Wall Street-led class war on its livelihoods, unions, job and workplace protections, and living standards. The authors do not mention how American workers in the long neoliberal era (1973-present) have been subjected to unprecedented (for U.S. workers) labor market competition with the global proletariat, including immigrant workers and workers across the low-wage global periphery, to which U.S. capital has relocated much of its manufacturing in pursuit of cheap labor. They don’t reflect seriously on how the neoliberal and global policies advanced by Wall Street and corporate America have turned millions upon millions of once “productively employed” white and nonwhite working-class people into “surplus Americans.”

The same modus operandi—strong empirical work on matters related to rising American inequality and poverty combined with mildly ameliorative policy recommendations that sidestep the finance-led capitalist elephant in the national room—is evident in the rest of
THP’s voluminous output. The topics range in subject matter, but the basic banker-pleasing blueprint holds. Outwardly, concerned- and liberal-sounding policy researchers are careful not to ruffle ruling-class feathers. They make no calls for genuinely progressive taxation, serious regulation of the financial sector, major public jobs programs, a rollback of the gigantic Pentagon budget to fund expanded public welfare, or the passage of legislation to re-legalize union organizing to help spark a re-expansion of what the disgraced former presidential candidate John Edwards once rightly called “the greatest anti-poverty program in American history—the labor movement.”

The Skills Gap Trope

A recurrent theme in THP’s impressive corpus of work is the “skills gap” explanation of American workers’ economic insecurity and inequality (see this study for one among many examples). According to this thesis, the national plagues of unemployment, underemployment and inadequate wages are mainly about American workers’ lack of adequate training for the supposed plethora of high-skills jobs that would be available to them if only they were properly instructed and certified. The skills gap thesis is invalidated by numerous facts its many establishment champions ignore (see this useful critique). It continues nonetheless to hold a prominent place in elite corporate, financial, academic and policy circles for a simple reason. As University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee urban policy researcher Marc Levine notes: “There’s a strong ideological component behind the skills gap trope: it diverts attention (and policies) from the deep inequalities and market fundamentalism” that have undermined U.S. working and living standards. As the political economist Gordon Lafer noted in his book “The Job Training Charade”: “Workers are encouraged not to blame corporate profits, the export of jobs abroad, or eroding wage standards—that is, anything that they can fight—but rather to look inward for the source of their misfortune and the seeds of their resurrection.”

The Real (Alexander) Hamilton Program versus Rubin-Era ‘Hamiltonism’

Mention “the Hamilton Project” (or any other elite U.S. or global think tank) to most Americans and you will receive blank stares. You might hear a reference or two to the recent, spectacularly successful Broadway musical “Hamilton”—an Obama-lauded, multicultural paean to leading U.S. founder Alexander Hamilton’s purported embodiment of the American dreams of immigrant striving and upward mobility.

Americans who paid attention in well-taught U.S. history surveys may recall Mr. Hamilton (after whom Rubin’s Brookings project is named) as the nation’s first treasury secretary and a major proponent (along with James Madison and John Jay) of the U.S. Constitution. Some might recall the essence of Hamilton’s policy agenda under U.S. Presidents George Washington and John Adams: to make the United States a major commercial and military power ruled by and for an opulent mercantile, financial and, he hoped, industrial elite. Hamilton was the early republic’s “captain of the one percent,” notes distinguished U.S. historian Gerald Horne. “A leader of finance capital … he represented the interests of big finance at the beginning of the United States.”

Hamilton pursued his wealth-concentrating agenda in a spirit of open aristocratic disdain for the egalitarian tendencies of the revolutionary times in which he lived. Like other top U.S. founders and constitutional framers, Hamilton was revolted by the democratic “leveling” sentiments of the new nation’s artisans, small farmers and laboring classes. For Hamilton and others of his “rich and well born” ilk in the Federalist Party of the 1790s (the “Hamiltonian” party), “freedom rested on deference to authority. … The Federalists,” notes distinguished U.S. historian Eric Foner, “may have been the only major party in American history forthrightly to proclaim that democracy and freedom were dangerous in the hands of ordinary Americans.”

The “Obamanomics”-defining Hamilton Project of the last decade is a continuation of the original Alexander Hamilton program in its commitment to capitalism and the free market merged with the limited use of state power to promote and protect private accumulation. Still, there are two key differences between the nation’s founding treasury secretary and the neoliberal think tank that bears his name today.

The first and most obvious contrast is that contemporary neoliberals naturally eschew openly anti-democratic and aristocratic language even while they advance the interests and agenda of the wealthy few. Reflecting subsequent centuries of popular struggle for political and social rights and the United States’ doctrinal sense of itself as a global beacon of democracy, THP wraps its “cool-headed” findings and recommendations in the “warm-hearted” rhetoric of progressive concern for the many and the poor.

[…]
For all Hamilton’s authoritarian disdain for the people and commitment to the upward concentration of wealth, he sought to advance an accumulation of capital designed to make the United States into a broadly developing and industrialized state. Today’s financial elite and financialized “casino capitalism” is all about Wall Street “killing the host”: de-industrializing and dismantling productive enterprise in service to a ruling and largely globalist financial “superclass” that sees no particularly strong relationship between its bottom line and the strength of the U.S. productive base and the health of American society.

We can certainly expect the long shadow of Robert Rubin and the fake-progressive neoliberal vision of his Hamilton Project and other, bigger “corporate elite networks” to loom over the expected Clinton 45 administration. The coming heavily Wall Street- and Pentagon-backed presidency of the arch-neoliberal Hillary Clinton will be no less staffed than Obama’s presidency was with neo-“Hamiltonian” elites linked to the multinational and financial sectors and to the usual top policy-planning institutions.



Paul Street holds a doctorate in U.S. history from Binghamton University. He is former vice president for research and planning of the Chicago Urban League. Street is also the author of numerous books, including “Racial Oppression in the Global Metropolis” (2007), “The Empire’s New Clothes: Barack Obama in the Real World of Power” (2010), and “They Rule: The 1% v. Democracy” (2014), and is a regular contributor to Counterpunch, Z Magazine/ZNet, Black Agenda Report and teleSUR English. He has taught American history at several Chicago-area colleges and universities and currently lives in Iowa City, Iowa.

















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