Wednesday, September 2, 2009

Žižek is Correct: Obama's a Conservative President

Article from SOCIALISTWORKER.ORG
http://socialistworker.org/2009/08/25/surrendering-to-the-status-quo

Surrendering to the status quo

August 25, 2009

REPUBLICANS AND conservative Democrats are set to wreck health care reform--and Barack Obama is letting them get away with it.

Now the question is this: Will liberals in Congress refuse to let Obama off the hook and fight back? Or will health care--like the trillions of dollars in giveaways to the banks, the escalation of the U.S. war on Afghanistan, and the maintenance of George W. Bush's police-state powers--become another Obama White House capitulation to the wealthy and powerful?

Certainly it was expected that the health insurance and drug companies would use their clout to try to block real health care reform. On the campaign trail last year, Obama explicitly promised to keep them in line. "I'll have the insurance and drug companies at the table," he said. "They just won't be able to buy every chair...And I'll be at the table. I'll have the biggest chair, because I'm president." Obama even promised to televise negotiations on C-SPAN.

Yet it was President Obama who empowered Senate Finance Committee Chair Max Baucus to frame health care legislation in a closed-door session with six senators from both parties--and it was Baucus who gave Republican Sen. Charles Grassley of Iowa veto power over any deal.

Now Obama is poised to junk the so-called "public option"--a government-run insurer that was supposed to compete with private companies. Obama once championed the public option as an essential way to force private insurers and the industry generally to control runaway health care costs--now he calls it a "tiny sliver" of health care reform.

Instead of a program run nationwide by the federal government, the "compromise" position is for multiple health insurance co-ops to fill in the gaps left by private companies. The co-ops would be powerless to negotiate better arrangements with drug and medical companies--they'll end up as a pale imitation of the private system.

Meanwhile, Baucus and Grassley--who are among the top recipients of campaign donations from health insurance companies--have piled on items from the corporate wish list.

Crucially, their proposal would require the uninsured to buy coverage. With the "public option" eliminated or neutralized, this will give private companies a virtually captive market of nearly 50 million people. Government subsidies would pay part of the premiums for low-income people--that is, private insurers would be subsidized with government money.

Moreover, under the Baucus plan, the insurance companies would only have to pay 65 percent of the cost of health care expenses for people enrolled in the mandatory plans. By comparison, today's group plans typically pay between 80 and 90 percent of costs.

For health insurance companies, this proposal is "a bonanza," Robert Laszewski, a former health insurance executive, told the Los Angeles Times. He said the insurance companies' reaction to the plan can be summed up in a single word: "Hallelujah!"

Meanwhile, the White House has apparently agreed to continue to bar the federal government from negotiating discounts from drug companies for government programs--the same multibillion-dollar giveaway that liberals denounced when George W. Bush imposed similar rules on the Medicare prescription drug program.

In return, Big Pharma promised to cut prices by $80 billion over 10 years. As former Labor Secretary Robert Reich pointed out, that's nothing for an industry that makes about $300 billion in sales each year.

And, warns Reich, "when an industry gets secret concessions out of the White House in return for a promise to lend the industry's support to a key piece of legislation, we're in big trouble. That's called extortion: An industry is using its capacity to threaten or prevent legislation as a means of altering that legislation for its own benefit. And it's doing so at the highest reaches of our government, in the office of the president."

New York Times columnist Bob Herbert summed up the situation this way: "If the oldest and sickest are on Medicare, and the poorest are on Medicaid, and the young and the healthy are required to purchase private insurance without the option of a competing government-run plan--well, that's reform the insurance companies can believe in."

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

THUS, A president who came into office hyped as the second coming of Franklin Delano Roosevelt seems to be conceding to the right on every question.

As a result, it can sometimes seem like the right wing has the initiative on the health care issue, thanks to outsized cable news network coverage of organized right-wingers who packed town hall meetings with members of Congress.

In reality, there has been a substantial majority for years in favor of genuine health care reform. If Obama really took on the unpopular insurance companies and pharmaceutical industry, he could have used his political momentum coming into office to rally support not only for a public option in health care, but for a Medicare-for-all single-payer system that would provide the most equitable and effective solution.

Instead, Obama has tended to the needs of big capital--and not only on health care policy. The administration began by expanding George W. Bush's unprecedented multi-trillion-dollar giveaway to the banks. Its $787 billion economic stimulus plan hasn't made much of a dent in rising unemployment--if those involuntarily working short hours or dropped out of the workforce are counted, the jobless rate is around 16.3 percent, rather than the official 9.4 percent. And homeowners have been stiffed by the Obama administration, which has no cure for the foreclosure pandemic.

Now, as Obama prepares to surrender his central campaign promise--health care reform--to Republicans and Corporate America, some liberals have had it.

"I don't know if administration officials realize just how much damage they've done themselves with their kid-gloves treatment of the financial industry, just how badly the spectacle of government supported institutions paying giant bonuses is playing," wrote New York Timescolumnist Paul Krugman, adding, "It's hard to avoid the sense that Mr. Obama has wasted months trying to appease people who can't be appeased, and who take every concession as a sign that he can be rolled."

Krugman is correct. But the fact is that Obama is a conventional Democratic Party politician--which means he instinctively puts the interests of big business first. If there's no pressure from below, the corporations will have their way.

Fortunately, some activists are taking the initiative to put forward a progressive alternative. Advocates of a single-payer system upstaged several of Baucus' committee hearings on Capitol Hill to try to force open the corporate-controlled debate.

Physicians for a National Health Program are, along with allies in the single-payer health care movement, organizing meetings around the U.S. to try to shift the terms of the discussion. And five Portland physicians, calling themselves the Mad as Hell Doctors, will travel across the U.S. to Washington, D.C., to push for a single-payer solution.

These actions, though modest, have been important in both countering the myth of a grassroots right-wing rebellion against "government-run health care" and in putting forward a vision of genuine reform--the single-payer solution--that will be needed in the future. Without the activism, the liberal lawmakers who are now speaking out about the shortcomings of the Baucus plan and the White House's strategy might have stayed silent.

Similar action is needed on other issues--from demanding a halt to cuts in social spending or fighting for a new, more effective stimulus plan to create jobs.

Obama has shown where his priorities lie--on health care and many other issues. The task for the left is to organize to fight for our agenda.

"Christian Materialism" and the Problem of Evil

From WITH OR WITHOUT PASSION •
.........What's Wrong with Fundamentalism? - Part I
.........Slavoj Zizek




[....]
When theologians try to reconcile the existence of God with the fact of shoah, their answers build a strange succession of Hegelian triads. First, those who want to leave divine sovereignty unimpaired and thus have to attribute to God full responsibility for shoah, first offer (1) the "legalistic" sin-and-punishment theory (shoah has to be a punishment for the past sins of humanity-or Jews themselves); then, they pass (2) to the "moralistic" character-education theory (shoah is to be understood along the lines of the story of Job, as the most radical test of our faith in God - if we survive this ordeal, our character will stand firm...); and, finally, they take refuge in a kind of "infinite judgement" which should save the day after all common measure between shoah and its meaning breaks down, and (3) the divine mystery theory (facts like shoahbear witness to the unfathomable abyss of divine will). In accordance with the Hegelian motto of a redoubled mystery (the mystery God is for us has to be also a mystery for God Himself), the truth of this "infinite judgement" can only be to deny God's full sovereignty and omnipotence.

The next triad is thus composed of those who, unable to combine
shoah with God's omnipotence (how could He have allowed it to happen?), opt for some form of divine limitation: (1) first, God is directly posited as finite (not all-encompassing, overwhelmed by the dense inertia of his own creation); (2) then, this limitation is reflected back into God himself as his free act - God is self-limited (He voluntarily constrained his power in order to leave the space open for human freedom); (3) finally, the self-limitation is externalized, the two moments are posited as autonomous - God is embattled (the dualistic solution: there is a counter-force or principle of demoniac Evil active in the world). However, it is only here that we encounter the core of the problem of the origin of Evil.

The standard metaphysical-religious notion of Evil is that of doubling, gaining a distance, abandoning the reference to the big Other, our Origin and Goal, turning away from the original divine One, getting caught into the self-referential egotistic loop, thus introducing a gap into the global balance and harmony of the One-All. The easy, all too slick, postmodern solution to this is to retort that the way out of this self-incurred impasse consists in abandoning the very presupposition of the primordial One from which one turned away, i.e., to accept that our primordial situation is that of finding oneself in a complex situation, one within a multitude of foreign elements-only the theologico-metaphysical presupposition of the original One compels us to perceive the alien as the outcome of (our) alienation. From this perspective, the Evil is not the redoubling of the primordial One, turning away from it, but the very imposition of an all-encompassing One onto the primordial dispersal. However, what if the true task of thought is to think the self-division of the One, to think the One itself as split within itself, as involving an inherent gap?

The very gap between gnosticism and monotheism can thus be accounted for in the terms of the origin of evil: while gnosticism locates the primordial duality of Good and Evil into God himself (the material universe into which we are fallen is the creation of an evil and/or stupid divinity, and what gives us hope is the good divinity which keeps alive the promise of another reality, our true home), monotheism saves unity (one-ness) of a good God by locating the origin of evil into our freedom (evil is either finitude as such, the inertia of material reality, or the spiritual act of willfully turning away from God). It is easy to bring the two together by claiming that the Gnostic duality of God is merely a "reflexive determination" of our own changed attitude towards God: what we perceive as two Gods is effectively the split in our nature, in our relating to God. However, the true task is to locate the source of the split between good and evil into God himself while remaining within the field of monotheism - the task which tried to accomplish German mystics (Jakob Boehme) and later philosophers who took over their problematic (Schelling, Hegel). In other words, the task is to transpose the human "external reflection" which enacts the split between good and evil back into the One God himself.

Back to the topic of
shoah, this brings us to the third position above and beyond the first two (the sovereign God, the finite God), that of a suffering God: not a triumphalist God who always wins at the end, although "his ways are mysterious," since he secretly pulls all the strings; not a God who exerts cold justice, since he is by definition always right; but a God who - like the suffering Christ on the Cross - is agonized, assumes the burden of suffering, in solidarity with the human misery. It was already Schelling who wrote: "God is a life, not merely a being. But all life has a fate and is subject to suffering and becoming. /.../ Without the concept of a humanly suffering God /.../ all of history remains incomprehensible." Why? Because God's suffering implies that He is involved in history, affected by it, not just a transcendent Master pulling the strings from above: God's suffering means that human history is not just a theater of shadows, but the place of the real struggle, the struggle in which the Absolute itself is involved and its fate is decided. This is the philosophical background of Dietrich Bonhoffer's deep insight that, after shoah, "only a suffering God can help us now" - a proper supplement to Heidegger's "Only a God can still save us!" from his last interview. One should therefore take the statement that "the unspeakable suffering of the six millions is also the voice of the suffering of God" quite literally: the very excess of this suffering over any "normal" human measure makes it divine. Recently, this paradox was succinctly formulated by Juergen Habermas: "Secular languages which only eliminate the substance once intended leave irritations. When sin was converted to culpability, and the breaking of divine commands to an offense against human laws, something was lost." Which is why the secular-humanist reactions to phenomena like shoah or gulag (AND others) is experienced as insufficient: in order to be at the level of such phenomena, something much stronger is needed, something akin to the old religious topic of a cosmic perversion or catastrophe in which the world itself is "out of joint." Therein resides the paradox of the theological significance of shoah: although it is usually conceived as the ultimate challenge to theology (if there is a God and if he is good, how could he have allowed such a horror to take place?), it is at the same time only theology which can provide the frame enabling us to somehow approach the scope of this catastrophe - the fiasco of God is still the fiasco of GOD.
[....]

Sunday, August 30, 2009

On the Term "Žižekian"

From “Žižek and Cinema” (editor Srecko Horvat) in: Tvrda Journal for Theory, Culture and Visual Media, 1-2, editor in chief Žarko Paic, Croatian Writers Society, Zagreb, 2007.

Questioner - Srecko Horvat (SR), Interviewee - Paul A. Taylor (PT)

See the Interview online at

Since Žižek is perhaps most characterized by his constant striving to question and interrogate, his work does not lend itself well to the static quality implied by the term Žižekian. The uncategorizable aspect of Žižek is indicated by the geographical and disciplinary spread of Žižek's readership in general and the IJŽS Editorial Board in particular.

But so far as people may be very loosely called Žižekian or Žižekian fellow-travellers, I would suggest that they are identified by such common features as:

An eclectic range of interests - Žižek combines a huge breadth of references - from US television programmes to Shakespeare to international differences in toilet design - with a depth of analysis that contains rewarding insights into the complex intricacies of philosophy and psychoanalysis. The ease with which he cuts across almost tribal disciplinary boundaries and vested interests is another important reason why, if there is such as thing as an identifiably Žižekian approach, it is unlikely to ossify any time soon!

A good (or maybe wicked?) sense of humour - Žižek's work is profoundly rewarding to sustained and diligent reading (an increasingly rare luxury in today's stressed world) and highly entertaining - there are not many philosophers who can make you laugh out loud the way Žižek regularly does. This is a much under-rated quality of his work - the pure jouissance of his theorising. Why should intellectual work be disproportionately staid and po-faced? But more than this, Robert Pfaller's article in Issue 1 of IJŽS explains how beyond the value of the humour itself, Žižek's jokes and stories serve an important theoretical purpose - they keep the practice of philosophy alive and well and not just the distant, hard-to-approach content of dusty tomes.

A parallax view - Žižek illustrates theory's power to go beneath the surface of our everyday reality. After reading Žižek, you may continue as you did before, but you can no longer claim you don't know any better. An under-acknowledged feature of his work is this ethical quality - his exposure of hypocrisy and lazy thinking that dominates the public sphere.

Faith in speculation - a particular appeal of Žižek's theorizing is its practical usefulness. Ironically, his unashamedly speculative approach in such recent works as Welcome to the Desert of the Real (about the events and aftermath of 9-11) and Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle, nevertheless serves to uncover the underlying issues behind very real events better than most self-styled "realistic" or "pragmatic" writings. If you want to understand better the dynamics of denial involved in a Western society that does not even go to the bother of accurately documenting the numbers it kills - Žižekian speculation helps you realize such victims' status as the West's little Others.

Monday, August 24, 2009

Žižek and the Logics of the Political

From "The Materialism of Spirit - Žižek and the Logics of the Political"
by Glyn Daly, University of Northampton, UK.
in IJŽS Vol 1.4

[....]
The Spirit of the Political (and the Political in the Spirit)

Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (2000) can be seen as a kind of philosophical equivalent of Yalta in which each of the protagonists - Butler, Laclau and Žižek – debate the destinies and materialist prospects for the political. Butler and Laclau are directly opposed. Butler embraces a radical contextualism against which every attempt to establish transcendental categories and argument is seen to founder. One cannot, for example, speak of hegemony (as a universal logic) without paying attention to the place of enunciation; without putting ‘one’s body on the line’ (Butler in Butler et al, 2000: 178). There is consequently no universality as such, only a politics of competing universalities; one in which the very sense of the universal is ‘wrought from the work of translation’ (Butler in Butler et al, 2000: 179). For Laclau, by contrast, contextuality is something that already implies its Other: the universal conditions of possibility that enable contexts to emerge in the first place. In a kind of inversion of Kant, what we have is a ‘noumenalism’ of empty universals: antagonism, dislocation, empty signifier that can be added to the Derridean order of dark metaphysics (trace, differánce, undecidability etc.).

Žižek certainly agrees with Laclau as regards the persistence of a negative form of transcendentality. Against Butler’s criticism that Lacanians insist on a transcendental sexual difference ‘even when sexed bodies emerge that do not fit squarely within ideal gender dimorphism’, Žižek subverts this by substituting the ‘even when’ with ‘because’: i.e. ‘sexual difference has a transcendental status because sexed bodies emerge that do not fit squarely within gender dimorphism’ (Žižek in Butler et al, 2000: 309). On the other hand, Žižek also agrees with Butler and her argument that the structuring of the social space and intersubjective recognition is retroactively constitutive of its very sense(s) of the universal.

This does not mean that we can infer Žižek’s position as comprising any kind of ‘third way’. On the contrary, I think that what Žižek is critiquing in both Butler and Laclau is an underdeveloped perspectivism. In the case of Butler this refers to her implicit Foucauldianism where emphasis is placed on the emancipatory potential of marginal groups to challenge/subvert the power bloc. For Žižek what this misses is the way in which a power bloc is already split in terms of an ‘official’ identity and an obscene underside that already takes into account its own transgressions – they are both part of the perspectival totality.

With Laclau the problem arises from the opposite (transcendental) end of matters. That is to say, the generalisation of the hegemonic form of politics does not provide a perspectival account of the historical conditions of that generalisation – Laclau’s own historicism appears to fall back on an implicit, even teleological, developmentalism. More than this, Žižek argues that Laclau’s argument commits him to a self-hampering view of politics:

I am tempted to argue that the main ‘Kantian’
dimension of Laclau lies in his acceptance of
the unbridgeable gap between the enthusiasm
for the impossible Goal of a political
engagement and its more realizable content…
My claim is that if we accept such a gap as the
ultimate horizon of political engagement, does
it not leave us with a choice apropos of such an
engagement: either we must blind ourselves to
the necessary ultimate failure of our endeavour
– regress to naivety, and let ourselves be caught
up in the enthusiasm – or we must adopt a stance
of cynical distance, participating in the game
while being fully aware that the result will be
disappointing?
(Žižek in Butler et al, 2000: 316-317).
[....]

Petition: Free the Tarnac 9

From http://tarnac9.wordpress.com/2008/11/24/free-the-tarnac9/

The following petition was originally published under the title “No to the New Order” in the November 27th edition of Le Monde.

A recent operation by the French police, intensively covered by the media, ended in the arrest and indictment of nine people under anti-terrorist laws. The nature of this operation has already undergone a change: after the revelation of inconsistency in the accusation of sabotaging French railway lines, the affair took a manifestly political turn. According to the public prosecutor: “the goal of their activity is to attack the institutions of the state, and to upset by violence – I emphasize violence, and not contestation which is permitted – the political, economic and social order.”

The target of this operation is larger than the group of people who have been charged, against which there exists no material evidence, nor anything precise which they can be accused of. The charge of “criminal association for the purposes of terrorist activity” is exceptionally vague: what exactly is an association, and how are we to understand the reference to “purposes” other than as a criminalization of intention? As for the qualification “terrorist”, the definition in force is so broad that it could apply to practically anything – and to possess such and such a text or to go to such and such demonstration is enough to fall under this exceptional legislation.

The individuals who have been charged were not chosen at random, but because they lead a political existence. They have participated in demonstrations, most recently against the less than honorable European summit on immigration in Vichy. They think, they read books, they live together in a remote village. There has been talk of clandestinity: they have opened a grocery store, everyone knows them in the region, where a support committee has been organized against their arrest. What they are looking for is neither anonymity nor refuge, but rather the contrary: another relation than the anonymous one of the metropolis. In the end, the absence of evidence itself becomes evidence against them: the refusal of those who have been charged to give evidence against one another during their detention is presented as a new indication of their terrorism.

In reality, this whole affair is a test for us. To what degree are we going to accept that anti-terrorism permits anyone to be arrested at any time? Where are we to place the limit of freedom of expression? Are emergency laws adopted under the pretext of terrorism and security compatible with democracy in the long term? Are we ready to let the police and the courts negotiate this turn to a new order? It is for us to respond to these questions, and first by demanding the end of these investigations and the immediate release of these nine people whose indictment is meant as an example for us all.


Giorgio Agamben, philosopher;
Alain Badiou, philosopher;
Jean-Christophe Bailly, writer;
Anne-Sophie Barthez, professor of law;
Miguel Benasayag, writer;
Daniel Bensaïd, philosopher;
Luc Boltanski, sociologist;
Judith Butler, philosopher;
Pascale Casanova, literary critic;
François Cusset, philosopher;
Christine Delphy, sociologist;
Isabelle Garo, philosopher;
François Gèze,
La Découverte publishers;
Jean-Marie Gleize, professor of literature;
Eric Hazan,
La Fabrique publishers;
Rémy Hernu, professor of law;
Hugues Jallon,
La Découverte publishers;
Stathis Kouvelakis, philosopher;
Nicolas Klotz, film director;
Frédéric Lordon, economist;
Jean-Luc Nancy, philosopher;
Bernard Noël, poet;
Dominique Noguez, writer;
Yves Pagès,
Verticales publishers;
Karine Parrot, professor of law;
Jacques Rancière, philosopher;
Jean-Jacques Rosat, philosopher;
Carlo Santulli, professor of law;
Rémy Toulouse,
Les Prairies ordinaires publishers;
Enzo Traverso, historian;
Jérôme Vidal,
Amsterdam publishers;

Slavoj Žižek, philosopher.

Sunday, August 23, 2009

Revolution at the Gates

From Revolution at the Gates: Žižek on Lenin, the 1917 Writings (Verso, 2002), pages 310-311

Today, a lot of ongoing phenomena have to be explained through some kind of conspiracy theory (acts of semi-clandestine government agencies; the strategies of large companies). And, in order to fight them, we are more and more in need of our own half-clandestine organizations. Perhaps Lenin's formula of the Party from his much-vilified What is to Be Done? has acquired new relevance today.

John Berger recently made a salient point apropos of a French poster for the Internet investment brokers Selftrade: under the image of a hammer and sickle cast in solid gold and embedded with diamonds, the caption reads: "And what if everybody profited from the stock market?" The strategy of this poster is obvious: today, the stock market fulfils egalitarian Communist criteria: everybody can participate in it. Berger indulges in a simple mental experiment: "Imagine a communications campaign today using an image of a swastika cast in solid gold and embedded with diamonds! It would of course not work. Why? The swastika addressed potential victors not the defeated. It invoked domination not justice." The hammer and sickle, in contrast, invoked the hope that "history would eventually be on the side of those struggling for fraternal justice". The irony is thus that, at the very moment when this hope is officially proclaimed dead by the hegemonic ideology of the "end of ideologies", a paradigmatically "post-industrial" enterprise (is there anything more "post-industrial" than dealing with stocks on the Internet?) has to mobilize this dormant hope in order to get its message through. "Repeating Lenin" means giving new life to this hope, which still continues to haunt us.

As a result, repeating Lenin does not mean a return to Lenin--to repeat Lenin is to accept that "Lenin is dead", that his particular solution failed, even failed monstrously, but that there was a utopian spark in it worth saving. Repeating Lenin means that we have to distinguish between what Lenin actually did and the field of possibilities he opened up, the tension in Lenin between what he actually did and another dimension: what was "in Lenin more than Lenin himself". To repeat Lenin is to repeat not what Lenin did but what he failed to do, his missed opportunities. Today, Lenin looks like a figure from a different time zone: it is not that his notions of the centralized Party, and so on, seem to pose a "totalitarian threat"--it is rather that they seem to belong to a different epoch to which we can no longer properly relate.

Instead of reading this fact as proof that Lenin is outdated, however, we should, perhaps, risk the opposite conjecture: what if this impenetrability of Lenin is a sign that there is something wrong with our epoch? What if the fact that we experience Lenin as irrelevant, "out of synch" with our postmodern times, imparts the much more unsettling message that our time itself is "out of synch", that a certain historical dimension is disappearing from it?

Thursday, August 20, 2009

Truth, Universality, the Real

From “Repeating Lenin,” by Slavoj Zizek

Lenin’s Choice

Original source: lacan.com; Mark-up: Styled and linked to Zizek's sources for www.marxists.org by Andy Blunden.

[....]

So when Lenin says “The theory of Marx is all-powerful, because it is true,” everything depends on how we understand “truth” here: is it a neutral “objective knowledge,” or the truth of an engaged subject? Lenin’s wager — today, in our era of postmodern relativism, more actual than ever — is that universal truth and partisanship, the gesture of taking sides, are not only not mutually exclusive, but condition each other: in a concrete situation, its UNIVERSAL truth can only be articulated from a thoroughly PARTISAN position — truth is by definition one-sided. (This, of course, goes against the predominant doxa of compromise, of finding a middle path among the multitude of conflicting interests.) Why not, then, shamelessly and courageously ENDORSE the boring standard reproach according to which, Marxism is a “secularized religion,” with Lenin as the Messiah, etc.? Yes, assuming the proletarian standpoint IS EXACTLY like making a leap of faith and assuming a full subjective engagement for its Cause; yes, the “truth” of Marxism is perceptible only to those who accomplish this leap, NOT to any neutral observers. What the EXTERNALITY means here is that this truth is nonetheless UNIVERSAL, not just the “point-of-view” of a particular historical subject: “external” intellectuals are needed because the working class cannot immediately perceive ITS OWN PLACE within the social totality which enables it to accomplish its “mission” — this insight has to be mediated through an external element.

And why not link these two externalities (that of the traumatic experience of the divine Real, and that of the Party) to the third one, that of the ANALYST in the psychoanalytic cure? In all three cases, we are dealing with the same impossibility which bears witness to a materialist obstacle: it is not possible for the believer to “discover God in himself,” through self-immersion, by spontaneously realizing its own Self — God must intervene from outside, disturbing our balance; it is not possible for the working class to actualize spontaneously its historical mission — the Party must intervene from outside, shaking it out of its self-indulgent spontaneity; it is not possible for the patient/analyst to analyze himself — in contrast to the Gnostic self-immersion, in psychoanalysis, there is no self-analysis proper, analysis is only possible if a foreign kernel which gives body to the object-cause of the subject’s desire. Why, then, this impossibility? Precisely because neither of the three subjects (believer, proletarian, analyst) is a self-centered agent of self-mediation, but a decentered agent struggling with a foreign kernel. God, Analyst, Party — the three forms of the “subject supposed to know,” of the transferential object, which is why, in all three cases, one hears the claim “God/Analyst/ the Party is always right”; and, as it was clear already to Kierkegaard, the truth of this statement is always its negative — MAN is always wrong. This external element does not stand for objective knowledge, i.e. its externality is strictly INTERNAL: the need for the Party stems from the fact that the working class is never “fully itself.”

In his Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx already deploys something like the logic of hegemony: the emergence of a “universal class,” a particular class which imposes itself as universal, engendering global enthusiasm, standing for society AS SUCH against the ancien regime, anti-social crime AS SUCH (like bourgeoisie in the French revolution). After follows the disillusion so sarcastically described by Marx: the day after, the gap between universal and particular becomes visible again, capitalist vulgar profit as the actuality of universal freedom, etc. — For Marx, of course, the only universal class whose singularity (exclusion from society of property) guarantees its ACTUAL universality, is the proletariat. This is what Ernesto Laclau rejects in his logic of hegemony: for Laclau, the short-circuit between the Universal and the Particular is ALWAYS illusory, temporary, a kind of “transcendental paralogism.”12 However, is Marx’s proletariat really the negative of positive full essential humanity, or “only” the gap of universality AS SUCH, irrecoverable in any positivity?13 In Alain Badiou’s terms, proletariat is not another PARTICULAR class, but a SINGULARITY of the social structure, and AS SUCH the universal class, the non-class among the classes.

What is crucial here is the properly temporal-dialectical tension between the Universal and the Particular. When Marx says that, in Germany, because of the compromised pettiness of the bourgeoisie, it is too late for the partial bourgeois emancipation, and that, because of it, in Germany, the condition of every particular emancipation is the UNIVERSAL emancipation, one way to read this is to see in it the assertion of the universal “normal” paradigm and its exception: in the “normal” case, partial (false) bourgeois emancipation will be followed by the universal emancipation through the proletarian revolution, while in Germany, the “normal” order gets mixed up. There is, however, another, much more radical way to read it: the very German exception, the inability of its bourgeoisie to achieve partial emancipation, opens up the space for the possible UNIVERSAL emancipation. The dimension of universality thus emerges (only) where the “normal” order enchaining the succession of the particulars is perturbed. Because of this, there is no “normal” revolution, EACH revolutionary explosion is grounded in an exception, in a short-circuit of “too late” and “too early.” The French Revolution occurred because France was not able to follow the “normal” English path of capitalist development; the very “normal” English path resulted in the “unnatural” division of labor between the capitalists who hold socio-economic power and the aristocracy to which was left the political power.

One can also make the same point in the terms of the opposition between interpretation and formalization14: the external agent (Party, God, Analyst) is NOT the one who “understands us better than ourselves,” who can provide the true interpretation of what our acts and statements mean; it rather stands for the FORM of our activity. Say, Marx’s deployment of the commodity form in the Chapter 1 of Capital is NOT a “narrative,” aVorstellung, but a Darstellung, the deployment of the inner structure of the universe of merchandises — the narrative is, on the contrary, the story of the “primitive accumulation,” the myth capitalism proposes about its own origins. (Along the same lines, Hegel’s Phenomenology — contrary to Rorty’s reading — does not propose a large narrative, but the FORM of subjectivity; as Hegel himself emphasizes in the Foreword, it focuses on the “formal aspect /das Formelle/.15 This is how one should approach the absence of large all-encompassing narratives today — recall Fredric Jameson’s supple description of the deadlock of the dialogue between the Western New Left and the Eastern European dissidents, of the absence of any common language between them:

“To put it briefly, the East wishes to talk in terms of power and oppression; the West in terms of culture and commodification. There are really no common denominators in this initial struggle for discursive rules, and what we end up with is the inevitable comedy of each side muttering irrelevant replies in its own favorite language."16

Jameson at the same time insists that Marxism still provides the universal meta-language enabling us to situate and relate all other partial narrativizations/interpretations — is he simply inconsistent? Are there two Jamesons: one, postmodern, the theorist of the irreducible multiplicity of the narratives, the other, the more traditional partisan of the Marxist universal hermeneutics? The only way to save Jameson from this predicament is to insist that Marxism is here not the all-encompassing interpretive horizon, but the matrix which enables us to account for (to generate) the multiplicity of narratives and/or interpretations. It is also here that one should introduce the key dialectical distinction between the FOUNDING figure of a movement and the later figure who FORMALIZED this movement: ultimately, it was Lenin who effectively “formalized” Marx by way of defining the Party as the political form of its historical intervention, in the same way that St. Paul “formalized” Christ and Lacan “formalized” Freud.17

This formalization is strictly correlative to focusing on the Real of an antagonism: “class struggle” is not the last horizon of meaning, the last signified of all social phenomena, but the formal generative matrix of the different ideological horizons of understanding. That is to say, one should not confuse this properly dialectical notion of Form with the liberal-multiculturalist notion of Form as the neutral framework of the multitude of “narratives” — not only literature, but also politics, religion, science, they are all different narratives, stories we are telling ourselves about ourselves, and the ultimate goal of ethics is to guarantee the neutral space in which this multitude of narratives can peacefully coexist, in which everyone, from ethnic to sexual minorities, will have the right and possibility to tell his story. The properly dialectical notion of Form signals precisely the IMPOSSIBILITY of this liberal notion of Form: Form has nothing to do with “formalism,” with the idea of a neutral Form, independent of its contingent particular content; it rather stands for the traumatic kernel of the Real, for the antagonism, which “colors” the entire field in question. In this precise sense, class struggle is the Form of the Social: every social phenomenon is overdetermined by it, which means that it is not possible to remain neutral towards it.

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12. See Ernesto Laclau, “The Politics of Rhetoric,” intervention at the conference Culture and Materiality, University of California, Davis, 23-25 April 1998. When today’s postmodern political philosophers emphasize the paradox of democracy, how democracy is possible only against the background of its impossibility, do they not reproduce the paradoxes of the Kantian practical reason discerned long ago by Hegel?

13. See Eustache Kouvelakis’s commentary to L'Introduction a la Critique de la philosophie du droit de Hegel, Paris: Ellipses 2000.

14. I owe this distinction to Alain Badiou (private conversation).

15. This should be the answer to Veit Harlan, the Nazi director who, around 1950, despaired about the fact that Jews in the US did not show any understanding for his defense for making The Jew Suess, claimed that no American Jew can really understand what was his situation in the Nazi Germany: far from justifying him, this obscene (factual) truth is the ultimate lie. — At a different level, there are in Palestine today two opposite narratives (the Jewish and the Palestinian one) with absolutely no common horizon, no “synthesis” in a larger meta-narrative; the solution thus cannot be found in any all-encompassing narrative.

16. Quoted from Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe, Cambridge (Ma): MIT Press 2000, p. 237.

17. This difference between interpretation and formalization is also crucial to introduce some (theoretical) order into the recent debates on the holocaust: although it is true that the holocaust cannot be adequately interpreted or narrated, in short: rendered meaningful, that all the attempts to do it fail and have to end in silence, it can and should be “formalized,” situated in its structural conditions of possibility. [....]