The Top 2 Traits Indicating A Lack Of Narcissism

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8FgwC3GuIM&feature=em-lsp

Some Haitians want U.S. to weigh in on crisis. But Trump administration is focused elsewhere

JACQUELINE CHARLES AND NORA GÁMEZ TORRES. Miami Herald. OCTOBER 30, 2019

As Haiti continues to descend into chaos, with gangs dismembering the bodies of rivals, police protesting their own government and marchers setting businesses ablaze, Haitians on both sides of the crisis are looking to the United States to help solve their problem.

Those who support Haitian President Jovenel Moïse want the U.S. to send food, money and logistics support — which some have taken to mean the U.S. military — to help him deal with the crisis. Those in opposition want the U.S. to stop supporting him.

But the Trump administration appears to have little interest in getting involved in Haiti, where many banks and businesses, the schools and the courts remained shuttered Tuesday for the seventh week.

Washington’s lack of a clear policy on Haiti is not lost on Haitians or Haiti observers who, whether true or not, believe the U.S. is standing by Moïse because of his decision in January to break with a longtime ally, Venezuela and leader Nicolás Maduro.

The U.S. does not appear to be doing anything to overtly support Moïse, but its lack of public criticism of the president and a series of recent decisions are being perceived by Haitians as a sign of diplomatic support. There was the invitation to Mar-a-Lago to Moïse to meet with Trump in March, the swift removal of armed U.S. mercenaries the month before and the periodic statements couched as support for elections and democratic values.

Short of removing Moïse, the opposition believes the Trump administration and others in the international community can send a signal that they will not interfere in the opposition’s mission to force his resignation and put a transition government in place.

During a visit to the U.S. State Department two weeks ago, Gary Bodeau, the president of the Lower Chamber of Deputies in Parliament, argued that the U.S. support of Moïse requires more than subtle diplomacy.

“They need to step up, otherwise he won’t survive,” Bodeau told the Miami Herald. “It can’t just be them saying, ‘I support Haiti. I support democracy.’ No, we have a political crisis, we have social issues, we have economic issues so they need to bring money to the table, which I don’t see. The U.S. support is not sustainable without help.”

Bodeau, who was also looking for statements from members of Congress in support of Moïse’s embattled administration, said he visited Washington at the request of fellow pro-government lawmakers in the lower chamber. In March, the lawmakers fired Prime Minister Jean Henry Céant after only six months, making the crisis worse. In August, they also blocked an attempt by opposition members to impeach Moïse.

Bodeau described Moïse as a U.S. ally. As proof, he cited Moïse’s decision to support the Trump administration on Venezuela and to have Foreign Minister Bocchit Edmond serve as one of two vice chairs of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, which last month imposed new sanctions against members of Maduro’s regime.

“If you say you support the president, you need to put your hands in your pockets; give him help,” Bodeau said.

That was also the sentiment expressed by Edmond in an Oct. 11 letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, in which he asked for “urgent humanitarian aid and logistics support” to distribute it.

Moïse, in a pre-taped interview with Radio Metropole on Monday, confirmed the request. Asked by the journalist if logistics support means foreign soldiers, the president implied there was nothing wrong with such an arrangement, responding: “I didn’t hear anyone say anything when ... the Americans came with aid during Hurricane Matthew. Did they come by themselves?”

During the interview, in which he adamantly defended a decision to arbitrarily cancel the electricity contracts of three private power providers, Moïse continued to reject calls for his resignation, renewed his calls for a dialogue and proposed a government of national unity. He also sought to cast himself as the people’s protector against “the system.”

Following the interview, Bodeau tweeted that in three interviews the president had failed to make any effort at dealing with the unrest. “The head of state has to listen to the people. ... The head of state @moisejovenel is not the only one on board.”

Hours after the tweet, Bodeau went further, indicating that he too may be ready to abandon the president’s ship. In an interview with Haiti’s Le Nouvelliste newspaper, Bodeau said “the departure of the president can be an option.”

A spokesperson with the U.S. Agency for International Development told the Herald that the agency is aware of Haiti’s humanitarian request and is “in close coordination with the U.S. Embassy in Haiti to determine the nature of any requests for additional USAID food assistance.”

A spokesperson with the State Department did not directly address the question of whether Moïse, who has hired a foreign security team, asked for U.S. military assistance. The spokesperson said the USAID’s Office of Food for Peace, which Haiti requested, works with organizations such as the U.N. World Food Program and other non-governmental organizations to get food to those in need.

But even the logistics of delivering aid is unclear. The U.N. announced earlier this month that it had been forced to suspend its food assistance program and cash transfers due to the ongoing violence.

The State Department spokesperson did confirm that the U.S. Navy medical ship Comfort is scheduled to conduct a port call in Haiti in the coming days. But the long planned mission is to provide medical, not military, assistance.

“The decision by the Moïse government to flip its position on Venezuela and side against Maduro and with the United States was strategically smart and bought some good will,” said Daniel Erikson, a former adviser for the Western Hemisphere at the State Department and special adviser to then-Vice President Joe Biden in the White House. “But this should not be confused with a permanent alliance between the Trump administration and Moïse. One ironclad rule of Washington is that the White House does not want to find problems emanating from Haiti in its inbox.”

Last week during a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on aid and U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. Rep Andy Levin, D-Mich., broached the subject of Haiti. He asked Michael Kozak, the acting assistant secretary of state for the Western Hemisphere, if the administration’s lack of public statements on the crisis in Haiti and its “failing to defend good governance” had anything to do with Haiti’s stance on Venezuela.

Kozak, a seasoned diplomat who was involved in Haiti 25 years ago, responded: “I don’t think so.” But Levin didn’t appear convinced.

“It seems to be that the Trump administration is reverting to this horrible Cold War approach to Haiti,” Levin later told the Herald, referring to the days when the U.S. supported the Duvalier family dictatorship because the father and son rulers opposed communism.

Though he has no love for Maduro, Levin said, “The U.S. should not base its policy on Haiti on how Haiti votes or what attitude they take on the Maduro regime.”

”People are protesting and we have to take that seriously,” he added.

The day after Levin’s questioning, and after the Herald’s inquiries about the U.S. stance on the Haiti crisis, the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince finally made its first public comments — more than six weeks after the latest round of protests began. In a tweet, the embassy urged Haiti’s various political actors to enter without delay or preconditions into a dialogue to form a functioning government.

Three days later, the embassy spoke out — again in a tweet. By now, images of chopped-up body parts, from warring gangs in Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite, were circulating on social media; the French and Canadian embassies in Port-au-Prince had been attacked with Molotov cocktails by demonstrators; and a U.S. flag had been burned in Cap-Haitien. Haiti’s foreign affairs ministry swiftly condemned the attacks, which included a man bludgeoned to death after he fired on a group of protesters. The killing was captured on video.

The mobilization by the opposition to oust Moïse also included hundreds of Haiti National Police officers, who defied internal regulations against demonstrations to join a more peaceful protest against the government to demand better working conditions and wages.

“These shootings, killings, arson, and destruction not only hurt Haitian citizens, but also add to Haiti’s economic and social instability and prolong the interruption of daily life for the Haitian people, particularly Haiti’s school children,” the embassy tweeted. “The apparent lack of urgency to resolve the extended political stalemate is increasingly worrisome, as is the growing negative impact on public security, the economy, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including food aid.”

Neither of the embassy tweets mentioned Moïse, and instead stressed the need for dialogue. However, with the opposition digging its heels in and the president’s own dialogue commission imploding following the resignation of several key members after he refused to negotiate on his five-year term, it’s unclear whether any dialogue can begin.

“No one is willing to make a compromise,” said Robert Fatton, a Haiti expert and author of “Haiti’s Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy.”

“What I am afraid, though, is that this situation can easily degenerate into mass violence,” he added. ”At one point this may happen; people may start getting so angry that they start burning everything.”

Fatton said beyond the recent statements out of the U.S. Embassy, he isn’t sure any top Trump officials are even thinking about Haiti and its deteriorating political impasse.

The White House did not reply to questions about Haiti and deferred to the State Department on the issue. Since January, the administration has been busy trying to deal with Venezuela, working on several rounds of sanctions against Maduro’s government and his closest ally, the Cuban government. At the same time, Trump’s aides have been negotiating immigration agreements with Mexico and several Central American nations. Haiti policy seems to have fallen through the cracks.

“I don’t think the United States is going to intervene unless it becomes absolutely clear that [Moïse] is no longer useful to them,” Fatton said. “And I don’t know at what point they reach that decision, because he clearly has lost essentially the support of every sector in society, whether it’s the private sector, the church, the police, the popular sectors, the vast majority of the population. I don’t know when they will say ‘Enough is enough,’ and they are going to tell him, ‘You should exit.’ ”

It is not unexpected that Haitians wish the United States would step in. The U.S. has a long history of becoming involved in Haitian affairs. And when it has not deposed its leaders, the U.S. has interfered by changing the course of elections.

In 1915, after Haitians went into the French embassy and dragged then Haiti-president Jean Vilbrun Guillaume Sam out into the streets and dismembered him, U.S. Marines began a 19-year occupation of the country. In 1986, Washington sent a C-141 U.S. Air Force plane to take President-for-Life Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier and his family out of Haiti to France.

In 2004, the U.S. again sent in a plane to Haiti. This time it was to ferry then-president Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his family out of Haiti via Antigua and Barbuda. Behind the scenes, U.S. officials persuaded Aristide to pack his bags and get on the plane in the midst of a bloody revolt. Aristide called it a kidnapping.

And in 2011, amid allegations of ballot fraud, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton flew to Port-au-Prince to tell President René Préval to remove his preferred presidential candidate, Jude Célestin, out of the election in favor of musician Michel Martelly in the second round.

This time around, Haiti’s opposition isn’t asking for an airplane — they want Moïse to stay in the country to stand trial on corruption allegations — and they want to lead their own transition, rather than have the U.S. take charge as it did in 2004 after dropping Aristide.

“Haitians have a love-hate relationship with the U.S. When the U.S. intervenes, they don’t like it, and when it doesn’t, they ask for it,” said Fatton. “It depends on whether you’re in the opposition or the government.”

But he’s not so sure this administration will pay attention to Haiti.

“Haiti doesn’t really matter to them unless you have boat people,” Fatton said. “Ultimately the ball is in the hands of Haitians. If they want to change the situation, they have to do it, and they have to do it on their own and not expect any significant assistance from the external community.”

Mexico among Top Countries Where Killers of Journalists Enjoy Impunity

EFE. October 29, 2019

NEW YORK – Mexico is one of the countries where the killers of journalists enjoy the most impunity, according to a ranking published Tuesday by the Committee to Protect Journalists.

According to the New York-based organization, Mexico has not yet resolved the murders of 30 journalists, a number that is only exceeded by The Philippines, with 41 such cases.

The CPJ’s 2019 Global Impunity Index focuses on countries where journalists have been slain but their killers have not yet been brought to justice.

Next, with 25 unsolved murders of journalists, comes Somalia, which has headed the percentage impunity rankings prepared each year by the CPJ, an indicator that calculates the number of unresolved cases as a percentage of a country’s population.

Thus, with its more than 126 million people, the 30 unresolved murders of journalists put Mexico in seventh place in that percentage index.

Ahead of it, besides Somalia, are only Syria, Iraq, South Sudan, The Philippines and Afghanistan, all of which are countries experiencing ongoing armed conflicts.

Following Mexico on the list of the 13 worst countries in terms of impunity for the murders of journalists are Pakistan, Brazil, Bangladesh, Russia, Nigeria and India.

In its ongoing tally, the CPJ has examined the murders of journalists taking place between September 2009 and August 2019.

“The impunity we have witnessed in these countries year after year, and the knowledge that authorities take little action against those who attack the press, cripples the ability of journalists around the world to do their job,” said CPJ Advocacy Director Courtney Radsch in a statement.

“Democratic governments cannot stand silent in the face of impunity if they want to be seen as supporting press freedom. It is imperative that journalists and their families receive the justice they deserve, and that world leaders demand accountability,” Radsch added.

Over the past 10 years, 318 journalists have been killed around the world as a result of their profession and in about 86 percent of the cases those responsible have not been successfully prosecuted, the CPJ said.

Of those, 31 of the murders took place in Mexico, where there has only been one conviction in all those cases, the organization said.

Mexico’s impunity indicator has not stopped getting worse over time, with drug trafficking cartels frequently targeting the press, the CPJ emphasized.

So far this year, Mexico has been the country where the most journalists have been killed, with 11 deaths and five other cases in which it was confirmed that the motive for the attack was the target’s profession, the organization said.

Meanwhile, in 2018, Colombia was the only country that managed to move off the CPJ list after the death in a security operation of Walter Patricio Arizala, alias “Gaucho,” the head of the Oliver Sinisterra front, who had been accused of kidnapping and later killing two journalists working for the Ecuadorian daily El Comercio and their driver.

Mexican Economy Barely Grew in Third Quarter

Anthony Harrup. Wall Street Journal. October 30, 2019

MEXICO CITY—Mexico’s economic activity expanded modestly in the third quarter amid weakness in industrial production and a slowdown in services, keeping the economy on track this year for its weakest performance in a decade.

Gross domestic product, a measure of output of goods and services, expanded 0.1% in seasonally adjusted terms from the second quarter, the National Statistics Institute said Wednesday.

Industrial production shrank 0.1%, services were unchanged and agricultural production grew 3.5%.

It was the first quarter this year in which the economy showed any growth, after GDP contracted in the first quarter and was flat in the second.

GDP was down 0.4% from the third quarter of 2018.

In the first nine months of the year, GDP was flat compared with the same period of 2018. The lack of growth leaves the economy on track for its worst showing since the recession of 2009.

The slowdown, amid declines in both public and private investment, poses a challenge for the government of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador in his first year in office as he seeks to increase social spending while keeping a lid on budget deficits.

“It’s clear that the economy is very weak and that services—which previously had been the strong point in the economy—are now faltering,” Capital Economics chief emerging-markets economist William Jackson said in a note. “Although we think the economy will strengthen in the coming quarters, these data reinforce our downbeat view.”

Revised third-quarter GDP numbers are due on Nov. 25.

The spectre of IMF in Ecuador

VIJAY PRASHAD. Front Line. October 29, 2019

Everything about Ecuador President Lenin Moreno’s speech on October 1 appeared to be anachronistic. There he was, a smile on his face, offering his people an end to fuel subsidies for this energy-rich country and massive cuts in public workers’ benefits and wages. This, he said, was the price to be paid by the Ecuadorean people for a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The next day, the IMF described Moreno’s package as one that would “protect the poor and most vulnerable” and “generate jobs in a more competitive economy”.

Few Ecuadoreans believed either Moreno or the IMF. It appeared that once more the people were being asked to tighten their belts so that the country’s oligarchy and international creditors could emerge from the crisis unscathed. No wonder that the trade unions (the United Workers Front, FUT), the students, and most importantly, the indigenous organisation (the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, CONAIE) came out onto the streets to protest against Moreno and the IMF on October 3. They said they would go on an indefinite general strike as long as Moreno and the IMF continued to push the austerity agenda. For weeks now, Ecuador has been in crisis, with the momentum no longer in the hands of Moreno or the IMF; the streets are in charge, and Moreno appears less and less confident of remaining the country’s President.

It was this fragility that led Moreno to declare a state of emergency on October 4, on the second day of the protests. The Constitution allows the President to sustain this emergency for 60 days. Nonetheless, the declaration of emergency did not stop the protests. They continue unabated. Matters became so difficult for Moreno that he relocated his government from Quito to the city of Guayaquil. The protests, like a wave, crashed on the Carondelet Palace and the National Assembly. He ran from the anger, only to return days later when his armed forces had beaten back the protests for the moment.

Moreno has been trying to curry favour with the United States in order to secure both the IMF loan and political cover for the unrest that would necessarily follow. As a gift to the U.S., Moreno had WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange removed from the Ecuadorian embassy in London and he called for the arrest of the Swedish Internet activist Ola Bini. Moreno’s government backed away from prosecuting Chevron, the multinational U.S. energy corporation, for creating an “Amazon Chernobyl” in Ecuador. Moreno appeared willing to do anything to please the U.S. and get the IMF deal.

CONAIE called for negotiations with the government as a sign of good faith. As a precondition, CONAIE asked Moreno to dismiss some of his Cabinet Ministers (including his Minister of Defence), take responsibility for the deaths during this unrest and repeal the gas subsidies decree. When Moreno appeared ready to talk, CONAIE struck the demand for the return of the subsidies. But the streets did not respond well. The protests intensified, as did the repression. There is no guarantee that any deal will be possible as long as the IMF-imposed austerity programme remains in place.

IMF riots
A few days before Moreno’s announcement, Bulgaria’s Kristalina Georgieva was appointed the new head of the IMF. She came to the IMF from the World Bank, where she had made a name for herself as a major fund-raiser for the bank. Its assets have increased substantially. When she took the helm, she said, “It is a huge responsibility to be at the helm of the IMF at a time when global economic growth continues to disappoint, trade tensions persist, and debt is at historically high levels.” She said that the IMF’s “immediate priority” would be to build up the resources for countries so that they are “ready to cope with downturns”. The IMF has forecast that world output will grow by a mere 3.2 per cent this year, lower than the 3.8 per cent in 2017 and the 3.6 per cent in 2018. A crisis in the financial markets is long expected. All this means that the IMF under Kristalina Georgieva will have to be prepared for major problems from a host of countries.

These problems are already before her. Ecuador’s unrest is an early canary in the coal mine. That the IMF went for an orthodox austerity programme with Ecuador suggests that few lessons have been learned from the past. When the IMF created the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in the 1980s as a response to the Third World debt crisis, it produced a decade of unrest that took its name from the Fund, the IMF Riots. Neither Moreno nor the IMF is willing to roll back their proposals. These are not to be brought before the National Assembly or to the electorate. The niceties of Brexit—a referendum, a parliamentary debate, a media firestorm—are not to be granted to countries like Ecuador. The IMF comes with its medicine; Ecuadorians are expected to swallow it or be held down while it is being administered.

South of Ecuador, in Argentina, the IMF is also embroiled in crisis. It had provided the government of Mauricio Macri with the largest bailout in its history—$57 billion. Neither does Argentina have the funds to service this debt nor do the Argentinian people have the patience to give Macri a second term. He will likely lose the elections in late October. The likely removal of Macri and the political chaos around Moreno suggest that the IMF has failed in its two largest interventions in South America. The ballot and the riot have embarrassed Kristalina Georgieva even before she has had a chance to put her mark on the IMF.

Kristalina Georgieva came to the IMF with a commitment to tackle the climate catastrophe. She said that she would find the tools to involve the organisation in this arena. But the IMF is merely a lending agency. It does not have the mandate to demand policy changes to tackle budgetary problems faced by countries although this is precisely what the austerity programmes that emerged out of the SAPs produced. Cutting subsidies on fuel is not a good way to enter the climate change debate. This is not so much an environmental policy as fiscal austerity. The IMF, Kristalina Georgieva will find, cannot put a green cloak over its demand for budget cuts.

It is worthwhile to recall that a rise in fuel prices in France led to the yellow vest (gilets jaunes) protests. The protests in Ecuador now are both part of that yellow vest dynamic and part of the broader anti-austerity drive that runs across the world. More and more people are unwilling to buckle down to austerity so as to allow their creditors to be paid off. It will not do to dismiss this anger and try to paint it as a dynamic that is against a new environmentally conscious world economy. The indigenous protesters in Ecuador, for instance, are perfectly prepared for a new economic dispensation that is friendly to the environment; but they are not prepared to starve for it.

Moreno sat with the representatives of the streets on October 13, two weeks into the protests. He has now room to manoeuvre. He withdrew the decree that enforced the end of the subsidies. A wave of calm came over Ecuador, but this is not permanent. Moreno will have to return to the IMF and sell his withdrawal. He is caught between the people on the one side and the IMF on the other. Popular struggle put too much pressure on him and he had to withdraw the decree. But what will the IMF say?

Peru's Top Court Accepts Lawsuit Against Vizcarra's Closure of Congress

Reuters. October 29, 2019

BUENOS AIRES - Peru's top court on Tuesday accepted a lawsuit to determine whether President Martin Vizcarra exceeded his powers by dissolving Congress last month amid a long-running standoff with lawmakers over anti-corruption reforms.

The seven members of Peru's Constitutional Tribunal unanimously voted to admit the suit, court president Ernesto Blume said, the latest development in a battle between Vizcarra and lawmakers that has rattled the South American country.

Pedro Olaechea, the former Congress president who now leads a smaller permanent parliamentary commission, submitted the appeal earlier this month against the "arbitrary" dissolution of Congress.

Vizcarra's shutdown of Congress garnered support from the armed forces in the copper-rich nation, as well as the police and Peru's voters. A poll showed his popular support had jumped to the highest level during his administration.

The past three years in Peru have been marked by repeated clashes between the executive and legislative branches and back-to-back corruption scandals, including one that led former president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski to resign in March last year.

Blume said on Tuesday the court would not for now overturn the closure of Congress, and previously at least two members of the court have said that the legal process could take up to three or four months.

There are legislative elections already scheduled for Jan. 26 to elect new Congress members.

OAS audit of October 20 election result will be 'binding': Bolivia Foreign Minister

Vivian Sequera. Reuters. October 30, 2019

LA PAZ (Reuters) - An Organisation of American States (OAS) audit of Bolivia’s disputed election results will begin on Thursday and be binding for all parties, Foreign Minister Diego Pary said on Wednesday.

The results of the Oct. 20 election handed a slim victory to President Evo Morales, a leftist seeking a fourth term, but his oppponent Carlos Mesa and his supporters cried foul after a delay in publishing the voting scores.

Pary said that the report resulting from the review would be “binding” for all parties, who would sign an agreement to that effect on Wednesday.

He said Bolivia had invited observers to the process from Spain, Mexico and Paraguay. He did not say when the audit report would be completed.

“This agreement will enter into force upon signature by the authorized representatives of the parties, remaining in force until the electoral audit process is concluded,” he told reporters at the government headquarters in La Paz.

Mesa said on Tuesday that he believed the OAS audit would demonstrate that the election was fraudulent “in a clear and unequivocal way”.

A wave of protests has rocked Bolivia since the elections in which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) unexpectedly suspended the publication of results of an electronic vote count, which eventually granted Morales a fourth term of five years.

The US Double Standard in Venezuela vs. Honduras

STEVE ELLNER TERI MATTSON. Jacobin. October 29, 2019

If you want evidence that the US government doesn't actually care about drug trafficking, violation of democratic norms, violation of human rights, or widespread corruption, just look at how the Trump administration has treated Honduras versus how it has treated Venezuela.

The recent conviction of Tony Hernández for massive cocaine smuggling in a federal court case in which his brother, Honduran president Juan Orlando Hernández, was an unindicted co-conspirator demonstrates one thing beyond a doubt: Honduras is a narco-state. The equally compelling evidence of widespread corruption, electoral fraud, and savage repression confirms Honduras’s status as a rogue state and begs comparison with Venezuela, which has faced similar accusations.

Venezuela, however, is paying an infinitely higher price in the form of international sanctions and other regime-change efforts. Even if one accepts as accurate the denunciations against the government of President Nicolas Maduro put forward by most of its critics, Venezuela doesn’t reach Honduras’s level of unethical and undemocratic behavior.

This is just one example of the notorious inconsistencies of US foreign policy, dating back to the beginning of the Cold War. Long before Trump, Washington condemned some governments for violating democratic norms and embraced others that were just as bad, if not worse. It threatened military intervention or carried it out against nations for reasons that could have applied to others that received substantial military assistance from Washington.

Under Trump, these inconsistencies and gaps between rhetoric and practice have widened. Consider the democratic credentials of presidents who Trump lavishly praises while condemning Maduro for allegedly undemocratic behavior: Rodrigo Duterte (the Philippines), Jair Bolsonaro (Brazil), Prince Mohammad bin Salman (Saudi Arabia); and Andrzej Duda (Poland). Many European leaders have harshly criticized these regimes for their blatantly undemocratic behavior.

Consider also that while Trump threatens Iran and Venezuela with military invasion, if not obliteration, he pledges to put an end to the “endless wars” throughout the Middle East, the longstanding and high-risk stalemate with North Korea, and antagonistic relations with Russia. These latter positions may actually be worthy of support, unlike the bellicose rhetoric of Democratic party leaders.

There is no better contrast that demonstrates the contradictory nature of Trump’s foreign policy than that of Venezuelan and Honduras. What makes the comparison so compelling is the four principal accusations that Washington hurls at Maduro to justify the imposition of crippling economic sanctions: drug trafficking, violation of democratic norms, violation of human rights and widespread corruption. All four could well be cited to justify international measures against Honduras.

So let’s make the comparison. For the sake of argument, we’ll accept the validity of the accusations against Maduro coming from detractors, other than those of the most blatant fabricators of fake news.

Drug Trafficking
President Juan Orlando Hernández was accused of receiving a million-dollar bribe from Mexico’s El Chapo in the trial of Tony Hernández, who was found guilty on counts of “Cocaine Importation Conspiracy” and “Possession of Machineguns and Destructive Devices,” Yet, just one day after the trial ended, US charge d’affaires in Tegucigalpa Colleen Hoey was photographed at a public gathering smiling alongside the president. But the case for calling Honduras a narco-state goes deeper than that.

The president’s sister, the late Hilda Hernández, was also the subject of a major drug trafficking and money laundering investigation by US authorities. The evidence against the Honduran state even goes back further in time. The son of Hernández’s predecessor Fabio Lobo received a twenty-four-year sentence in US prison following a guilty plea of “conspiring to import cocaine into the United States.”

Compare this solid case against Honduras with that against Venezuela. November 2015 saw the arrest of two of Venezuelan First Lady Cilia Flores’s nephews in Haiti in a sting operation by the US Drug Enforcement Agency. Both received an eighteen-year prison sentence in US court, although they were not linked to a cartel and (in the words of their lawyers) “never had the intention or the ability to deliver a huge amount of drugs” as charged.

The other main drug-trafficking charge involving the Venezuelan government lacks verified evidence. Days before the 2018 presidential election, the US government accused Diosdado Cabello, the second in command after Maduro, of drug trafficking and slapped him with financial sanctions. Unlike Lobo’s son and Hernández brother, no formal US judicial charges have been lodged against Cabello nor has he been granted the right of reply.

Democratic Norms
Honduras also compares unfavorably in the area of electoral fraud. The November 2017 presidential election suffered a thirty-six-hour delay in ballot counting when center-leftist candidate Salvador Nasralla had taken a decisive lead. When the process resumed, the election swung in favor of Hernández, the incumbent.

Nasralla noted that a rectification of the fraudulent results was unlikely given the fact that the nation’s supreme court and electoral tribunal were in Hernández’s camp. In contrast to many governments throughout the region as well as the Organization of American States, Washington immediately recognized Hernández’s presidency as legitimate and called on Nasralla to do the same.

Venezuela’s last presidential election held in May 2018 saw a 46 percent voter turnout despite a boycott by most, though not all, of the major opposition parties. The opposition’s objections to the electoral process centered on unfair practices — such as the failure of the state-run TV channel to provide all candidates with the stipulated advertising time — but did not, for the most part, consist of allegations that votes were not properly counted or that voting was not secret. Following the elections, President Trump issued an executive order restricting Venezuela’s ability to liquidate state assets and debt in the United States.

Human Rights
Venezuela’s record on human rights has been denounced on many grounds with well-founded evidence. The government has jailed opposition leaders, and security forces have clashed with protesters in 2014 and 2017 resulting in nearly two hundred deaths in total. An objective evaluation, however, needs to consider context.

On both occasions, urban areas were paralyzed for four months, hundreds of barricades built, and arms used by protesters resulting (in 2014) in the death of six national guardsmen and two policemen while military and police installations were fired upon and overrun. On August 4, 2018, two drones attempted to assassinate President Maduro, who was addressing a rally, along with his wife and members of the military high command. One can only imagine the response of other governments in the face of similar tactics.

In Honduras, President Hernandez’s security forces are not victims of violence — they are perpetrators. The UN’s Human Rights Council (UNHRC) report issued in March stated: “Impunity is pervasive, including for human rights violations, as shown by the modest progress made in the prosecution and trial of members of the security forces for the human rights violations committed in the context of the 2017 elections.”

Corruption
Few can deny that corruption is widespread in both nations. In the case of Venezuela, President Maduro acknowledged the possible veracity of denunciations formulated by insiders in 2014 regarding a multi-billion dollar swindle as a result of the system of exchange controls. He failed to act. Only in mid-2017 did he begin to clamp down on corruption through the appointment of a new attorney general.

In Venezuela, however, there is nothing equivalent to the type of evidence presented in the trial of Tony Hernández that millions of dollars of drug money contributed to the election of the president of Honduras.

Backlash on the Horizon?
Why are countries like Venezuela on Washington’s hit list while undemocratic ones like Honduras receive favorable treatment? One explanation is that while Venezuela has pursued anti-neoliberal policies, Honduras since the US-supported overthrow of President Manuel Zelaya ten years ago has implemented neoliberal policies. This includes the privatization of health and water this year, which was met with street protests that were harshly repressed.

Another explanation is that Washington has its eyes on Venezuelan oil, a policy objective that Trump has justified with the slogan “to the victor goes the spoils” and is now considering for Kurd-occupied territory in northeastern Syria. A third explanation is Venezuela’s cozy economic, political and military relations with Russia and China. Rather than mutually exclusive, all these arguments contain important elements of truth.

The Honduras-Venezuela comparison shows how self-serving and conspicuous Washington’s role as judge and cop has become under Trump. Although interventionism in favor of US interests has been a long-standing component of Washington’s foreign policy, it is now being applied with steroids.

An international backlash appears to be on the horizon. This was evident in the UN General Assembly on October 17 when 105 delegates voted to admit Venezuela as a member of the UNHRC, and many of them roundly applauded after the results were announced. The US had actively campaigned against Venezuela’s membership, but since the vote was secret, efforts at bullying combined with material inducements could not be effectively employed.

Meanwhile, protests on the streets of Tegucigalpa and other cities in Honduras are calling for the resignation of Juan Orlando Hernández in reaction to his brother’s conviction. It may be that in spite of all the efforts of the Trump administration to oust Maduro, our man in Tegucigalpa will end up going first.

Venezuelan Opposition Files Lawsuit Attacking Citgo-Backed Bonds

Andrew Scurria. Wall Street Journal. October 29, 2019

Venezuela’s opposition government escalated its efforts to protect Citgo Petroleum Corp. from seizure, seeking a U.S. court order erasing bondholders’ collateral rights over the state-owned refiner and invalidating $1.7 billion in debt.

U.S.-backed opposition leaders filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in New York on Tuesday claiming that bonds backed by the Houston-based, Venezuelan-owned refiner were issued illegally under President Nicolás Maduro and can’t be enforced.

The complaint marks the most direct confrontation yet between the country’s bondholders and opposition forces led by Juan Guaidó, who has tried for months to seize political power in Caracas.

The bonds, issued in a 2016 debt swap by state oil giant Petróleos de Venezuela SA, have clouded Citgo’s future as a Venezuelan asset. They were secured by a 50.1% stake in Citgo, potentially enabling bondholders to wrest control of the company if they weren’t paid.

At the urging of Mr. Guaidó’s opposition, the Trump administration last week extended a three-month shield over Citgo, preventing creditors from transferring and auctioning the shares through Jan. 22. With Citgo temporarily safe from seizure, the PdVSA bondholders weren’t paid $913 million they were owed on Monday.

Tuesday’s complaint said the PdVSA bonds are “null and void” because they were issued without the approval of Venezuela’s opposition-controlled legislature, the National Assembly. Creditors provided Mr. Maduro with “a financial and political lifeline,” knowing the bonds were questionable, according to the complaint.

Bondholders include Ashmore Group PLC, BlackRock Financial Management Inc. and Contrarian Capital Management LLC. A spokesperson for the bondholders wasn’t immediately available for comment.

Representatives for Mr. Maduro couldn’t immediately be reached for comment.

As Venezuela’s largest asset in the U.S., Citgo is a natural target for creditors that have grown impatient during Venezuela’s long economic meltdown. In addition to bondholders, multinational companies are also circling Citgo, viewing its valuable Gulf Coast refineries as possible compensation for assets in Venezuela that were expropriated under socialist rule.

There isn’t nearly enough of Citgo to go around, sparking a race among creditors to lay claim to the company.

The Venezuelan opposition has asked for permanent protection for Citgo, arguing that losing the company to creditors would discredit Mr. Maduro’s political rivals and undermine U.S. efforts to oust him from power. Members of Congress from Gulf Coast states have also urged the Trump administration to intervene on the company’s behalf.

With U.S. support, Mr. Guaidó and his allies took over Citgo’s boardroom in February, installed directors friendly to the opposition government and severed the company’s ties with its owner, PdVSA. The takeover delivered a potential revenue source to the opposition but meant payments on the Citgo-backed bonds were its responsibility to make.

The U.S. Treasury Department has said it would look favorably on a potential deal to restructure the debt. Citgo has considered bankruptcy as one option for sorting out claims on its assets if creditors closed in, The Wall Street Journal has reported.

How Pinochet's economic model led to the current crisis engulfing Chile

Kirsten Sehnbruch. The Guardian. October 30, 2019

After 12 days of mass demonstrations, rioting and human rights violations, the government of President Sebastián Piñera must now find a way out of the crisis that has engulfed Chile.

Analysts have correctly interpreted the wave of protests as a reflection of discontent with the material, political and social inequalities engendered by the economic model imposed by the country’s former dictator Augusto Pinochet.

That model deregulated markets and privatised social security systems, and was widely emulated by other countries in the region.

Now the Piñera government has the chance to transform the exhausted Chilean model and lay the foundation of a real welfare state, giving Chile a chance to become a genuinely developed country – not one which has merely seen an increase in GDP per capita.

Chile is notorious for its income inequality: the gap between rich and poor has widened in recent years as the combined wealth of its billionaires is equal to 25% of its GDP.

But inequality is multidimensional: Chile’s employment rate languishes at 55%, while employment conditions are so precarious that 50% of the workforce cannot possibly accumulate enough savings to fund a minimally adequate pension.

Thirty per cent of formal contracts are short-term and last an average of just 10 months, interspersed with lengthy periods of unemployment, leaving workers one step away from poverty if they become ill or unemployed.

They feel excluded and ignored by political power, which is highly concentrated among the elite. They feel cheated and exploited by firms and retailers, who have fixed prices for basic consumer goods.

Many Chileans live with high levels of debt and thus pay more for the same services (such as higher education or healthcare) than rich people, who get discounts because they can pay in cash.

But perhaps most importantly, they feel discriminated against and humiliated in all these areas as they battle with inadequate public services that fail to level the playing field.

The result is that the expectations for a better and more secure life have outpaced the opportunities for social mobility that the Chilean model actually delivers.

By now it should be obvious that in a (thankfully) fiscally balanced country, these inequalities cannot be overcome by patching up the deficiencies of the economic model through the country’s limited fiscal resources, which have stagnated at approximately 20% of GDP, compared with the OECD’s average of 34%.

Reforms such as increasing minimum wages or pensions through fiscal resources will fail to make a dent in inequalities generated by privatised social protection systems that barely share risk between their beneficiaries.

Nor will they help informal workers, who desperately require an earned income tax credit to motivate them to engage in formal and stable employment, while giving a significant redistributive boost to their disposable income.

The legacy of Pinochet’s economic model underlies existing social protection systems largely because political elites have refused to contemplate structural changes.

A significant proportion of contributions to social systems must now go towards sharing risk equally among the population so that rich and poor can receive the same level of care in hospitals, receive pensions that are a guarantee of old-age security and have the same chances of obtaining a good education.

This is the basic premise of public services as they exist in every developed country in the world.

But structural reforms are difficult to implement in any country, especially when the government does not command a majority in Congress. Most importantly, they require a social and political consensus.

The rage felt by marginalised youth explains – although does not justify – the violence that erupted during the protests, and it is accompanied by sharply declining credibility and trust in institutions, including all political parties.

Piñera now has a tremendous opportunity to generate the kind of social pact that could sustain such reforms, as requested by representatives from over 300 civil society leaders.

This week, he took an important step in this direction by reshuffling his cabinet to include younger and more liberal ministers, who have the ability to think creatively, establish a social dialogue and engage with civil society in a way that generates a new social pact. However, they should not be in this task alone.

Politicians from across the political spectrum must support such a pact. But it will be up to the president to lead the country in this process and make use of the opportunity that this crisis has generated.



Kirsten Sehnbruch is a British Academy global professor and a distinguished policy fellow at the International Inequalities Institute at the London School of Economics and Political Science, working on Latin American labour markets and social security systems. She has lived and worked in Chile for more than 10 years and was a founding board member of the Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion.

Chile protests sharpen as calls for constitutional change grow

Naomi Larsson. Al Jazeera. October 30, 2019

Santiago, Chile - Protesters in Chile rejected President Sebastian Pinera's political concessions as major demonstrations continued across the country demanding greater equality and constitutional changes.

Central Santiago was covered in smoke on Tuesday evening as a fire raged by the hill in Santa Lucia during unrest against social inequality and police violence.

Thousands more gathered in the streets in cities across the country, from Puerto Montt in the south to Antofagasta in the north.

In the coastal town of Valparaiso, demonstrators gathered to the sound of banging pots after another volatile night during which police fired tear gas.

Protests erupted again on Tuesday despite Pinera's decision to reshuffle his cabinet on Monday, as part of his moves to quell a weeklong uprising against his administration.

Pinera replaced one-third of his cabinet, including Andres Chadwick, the right-wing interior minister who was heavily criticised for calling protesters "criminals" last week.

Chadwick, who is Pinera's cousin, was openly supportive of Augusto Pinochet's regime during Chile's dictatorship that ended in 1990.

"Chile has changed and the government, too, has to change to confront these new challenges in these new times," Pinera said as he announced the replacement of his cabinet, which also includes the finance and labour ministers.

"These measures won't solve all our problems but they are an important first step. They reflect the firm will of our government and the strong commitment of each of us in favour of a socially more just and equitable Chile."

But the cabinet changes fell flat as new protests erupted after the announcement.

What started as a demonstration against a four percent increase in Santiago's metro rail fare earlier this month has evolved into a wider dissent against decades of growing inequality.

Many protesters say they are angry with the "neoliberalism" that has led to poor public services, including the almost complete privatisation of pensions, health and education.

Call for new constitution
Others are demanding a new constitution, which remains as a hangover of the Pinochet regime.

"A new constitution is the only way. All the past governments couldn't change the constitution, and this is what we need. The Chileans are clear," Patricia, a 62-year-old protester in Santiago, told Al Jazeera, adding she struggled to survive on her stagnant salary.

"The repression has to change because this social movement isn't going to stop."

On Tuesday afternoon, a peaceful march formed in Santiago's Plaza Italia, while vandalism and looting took place elsewhere in the city.

Armed police fired water cannon at protesters gathered along the Alameda, the main highway leading towards the presidential palace.

One staff member of the national human rights institute, the INDH, was wounded by armed forces during the clashes.

The incident took place following the arrival of rights watchdog Amnesty International to investigate allegations of human rights violations against the demonstrators. The UN Human Rights Commission will also send a team to Chile this week.

"Even though the eyes are on Chile, the president hasn't stopped the repression on the streets, and mobilisation continues to be massive," Amnesty's America director Erika Guevara told Al Jazeera.

"The demonstrators are not seeing genuine commitment from the government to really address their demands."

Allegations of rights abuses
At least 20 people have died since the unrest began.

Currently, 3,712 are detained and the INDH has filed 138 judicial cases of alleged violence, including sexual harassment and other forms of abuse.

Pinera has pledged full transparency in the investigations, and lifted the state of emergency that granted the state special powers to control the right to assembly and movement.

"It's quite clear there have been instances of human rights violations - if the reports are true about the nature of the injuries, and the video evidence," said Saladin D Meckled-Garcia, senior lecturer in the department of political science at University College London.

"People are unhappy and an authoritarian government that seems to respond with violence isn't going to solve it."

Opposition parties are reportedly working on a proposal to change the constitution, and are expected to present on Wednesday a case against Chadwick, the former minister of the interior.

Chilean Protestor: I Was Raped by Police

EFE. October 29, 2019

SANTIAGO – As Chile grapples with a wave of protests that show no sign of abating, allegations of police brutality have grabbed headlines.

Joshua Maureira was allegedly subjected to a sadistic attack by police and has become the face of victims of human rights violations.

The 23-year-old medical student reported he was beaten unconscious by officers, sexually assaulted with a baton and subjected to homophobic abuse and death threats.

He was imprisoned for allegedly assaulting police.

Maureira has spoken out about his alleged ordeal despite reportedly receiving threats from his attackers.

“It is so that never again in Chile any person sees their human rights violated,” he said during a statement at the prosecutor’s office.

He spoke to a crowd of hundreds of people who gathered on Monday in front of the building to show support for him and demand justice.

“It is a rather long and painful statement,” he added.

NIGHT OF HORROR

The attack allegedly took place at dawn on 21 October.

Maureira said he was standing outside a looted supermarket during a curfew and went into the shop after hearing cries for help.

The police arrived soon after, confiscated his phone and beat him until he lost consciousness, he stated.

He said he woke up in a police car and that the beatings continued until they reached the police station in the Pedro Aguirre Cerda municipality. It is one of the stations that has been accused of the largest number of sexual crimes since the protests started, Beatriz Contreras, head of the National Institute of Human Rights (NHRI) for the Santiago region, told Efe.

HOMOPHOBIC ABUSE

At the police station, the violence was allegedly stepped up when officers noticed he was wearing red nail polish and realized that he was gay.

Maureira said he was forced to repeatedly shout “I’m a fag” while officers hit him.

He said that four officers, including at least one woman, were directly involved in the physical attacks whilst six others witnessed events without attempting to stop the assault.

There were photographs of his bruised body but a medical evaluation that was issued during his detention classified his injuries as minor.

RAPED AND JAILED

Maureira said that the worst was still to come.

After the initial attack, officers continued to beat him until they broke his nose and then raped him.

“Two of them took me by the waist and lowered my pants and underwear,” he said.

The officers then sexually assaulted him with a baton, he continued.

When he went to court, Maureira learned police had accused him of stealing from the supermarket and attacking officers, so he spent several more days in jail.

Gonzalo Cid, leader of the Sexual Diversity Movement, told Efe: “Here the most serious thing is that they are agents of the state.

“It is the National Police of Chile that is doing that, and that generates a lot of fear.

“Who do you denounce if it is the police itself that tortures upon learning that one is homosexual?”

ALLEGATIONS OF UNPRECEDENTED BRUTALITY

Until now there was no precedent in Chile for institutionalized brutality towards homosexuals.

The only incident that came anywhere close was the murder of Daniel Zamudio who was killed by neo-Nazis 2012.

The crime paved the way for the Zamudio Law which banned discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, gender, appearance or disability.

Maureira’s complaint has shocked the country.

The Ministry of Justice and Human Rights has expressed its “greatest concern” over the alleged attack.

Police have been removed from the investigation into Maureira’s report.

Sergio Micco, director of the NHRI, told Efe there may be more people who have suffered similar attacks and remained silent out of fear or shame.

The organization has been encouraging any victims who have not yet done so to come forward to seek advice from NHRI on how to issue their reports.

REPORTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE

So far 17 reports of sexual violence have been filed.

The protests in Chile have been marred by human rights violations and 20 people have died, including three Peruvians, two Colombians and an Ecuadorian national.

The deaths include five homicides allegedly committed by police officers.

All of the reports will be assessed by the United Nations mission for human rights which this week will evaluate the allegations that have been made since 18 October when the protests started.

People have taken to the streets to demand better salaries and pensions and fairer electricity and gas prices as well as improvements in education and healthcare.

In Argentina, a "Right Turn" That Wasn't and Left-Peronism's Unlikely Comeback

Santiago Anria and Gabriel Vommaro. NACLA. October 29, 2019

Latin America’s “left turn,” which started in 1998 with the election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, is not over, even though its obituary has been written several times. Rather than turning in any clear direction, political winds in the region appear to be blowing in all sorts of directions, with no discernable underlying pattern.

In particular, the victory of left-Peronism in Sunday’s elections in Argentina suggests that writing an obituary on the Left may have been premature. The winning formula, which includes former president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner as vice-presidential candidate and her hand-picked running-mate Alberto Fernández as presidential candidate, obtained 48.1 percent of the votes, well above the 40.3 percent of incumbent Mauricio Macri, who was running for re-election. With two antagonistic camps capturing almost 90 percent of the vote, Sunday’s elections were probably the most polarized elections since Argentina entered its democratic transition in 1983—a polarization that is likely to stay.

Macri’s 2015 electoral victory in Argentina was widely seen as a bellwether of a broader “right turn” in the region—a turn that also spread to countries like Brazil and Chile. In Argentina, it meant something even deeper: For the very first time since the country’s democratic transition, a right-wing political party, in alliance with other parties, gained national power via democratic elections.

Macri’s 2015 victory also signaled the return to power of non-Peronist forces. Since the country’s transition to democracy, not a single non-Peronist president had been able to finish a regularly scheduled term in office. To avoid that fate and build broad societal bases of support, Macri formed a national coalition called Cambiemos (Let’s Change), which united his party, Republican Proposal (PRO), the Radical Civil Union, and the Civic Coalition Ari (CC-ARI). While Macri placed second in the 2015 first-round vote, by uniting the disparate opposition parties he secured 51.34 percent in the second round.

In light of Cambiemos’s victory and the subsequent election of conservative parties and leaders in the region, analysts anticipated the consolidation of a region-wide rightward wave.

Today, however, it is less certain that such a systemic shift was ever truly underway.Today, however, it is less certain that such a systemic shift was ever truly underway. Instead, Latin American electoral politics appear to follow a routine alternation-of-power type of logic between left and right explained by retrospective, anti-incumbency voting driven by broad societal discontent. In the case of Argentina specifically, moreover, electoral politics appear to have aligned around a left-right axis of competition with two major coalitions structuring the electoral supply. This new configuration, moreover, is marked by high levels of polarization— today, there are two major antagonistic poles that dispute the center.

In light of Macri’s defeat and the comeback of a left-center coalition led by the Peronists, and backed by progressive parties and movements, it is useful to reflect on the factors that impeded the consolidation of a “right turn” in the country. What explains the failure of Macri’s first experience of government and the weakening of his support coalition? What are the reasons behind the strengthening of opposition forces on the left? And finally, what are the relevant domestic and regional implications of these trends?

The Failure of the Pro-Market Project

Cambiemos’s electoral defeat expresses the loss of a "historic opportunity" for a center-right party to carry out its desired free-market reforms aimed at dismantling the statist economic model hitherto in place—one based on the domestic market, wide social protections, and state intervention in the economy.

The difficulties of Cambiemos's reformist program can be explained by three political factors:

First, the Macri administration did not have enough political resources to carry out its program. Its electoral coalition was not consistent in programmatic terms, and coalitional partners were among the first ones to block and/or promote substantial modifications to some key government proposals, including the pension reform. They also opposed measures implemented by the government, such as the dramatic reduction of subsidies to public services.

This meant that Macri and his inner-circle had to embrace “gradualism”—a slow-paced approach to market reform. Applying this gradual approach entailed high political costs for Macri and his inner circle.

After the 2018 crisis, a non-trivial part of Argentina’s business class asked Macri to not run for re-election. Second, the business world, which formed a core societal ally for Macri’s coalition, did not provide consistent political support to the Macri administration. Instead, business owners maintained a short-term, particularistic, and poorly coordinated behavior. For instance, business owners did not carry out any coordinated action to support the reforms that the government wanted to carry out. In addition, business was not a consistent financial support in terms of increased private investment. After the 2018 crisis, a non-trivial part of Argentina’s business class asked Macri to not run for re-election. They proposed both an alternative candidacy within the Cambiemos coalition, as well as one outside of the coalition, noting a declining electoral support for Cambiemos.

Third, the policy legacies of the previous Kirchnerist governments weighed in as severe obstacles to Macri’s reformist project. On the one hand, social policies implemented during the Kirchnerist governments constrained attempts to make drastic cuts on public spending, given the visibility and popularity of some of those policies. On the other hand, trade unions and social movements representing informal popular sectors retained a high mobilization capacity and blocked attempts to remove state protections—the inability of Macri to pass labor reform is an egregious example of this.

These three factors, when combined, formed a perfect storm. And once the government lost access to international credit and asked the IMF for a bail-out—the largest in the IMF’s history—the government began to lose its capacity to maintain expectations and support from social sectors that had been important to its rise, including large segments of the middle-class.

Cambiemos ends its four years in government with a dire economic record and unable to consolidate a viable economic model.Cambiemos ends its four years in government with a dire economic record and unable to consolidate a viable economic model. Though weakened, it leaves office with a relatively high level of support among the electorate, especially in the country’s metropolitan area. Cambiemos won big in Argentina’s “metropolitan” region—including in the provinces of Entre Ríos, Santa Fe, Córdoba, and Mendoza, and in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires. It also did very well in the agricultural productive core of the country. Precisely, the agrarian vote has been identified as part of the Cambiemos’s core constituency, which was validated in these elections. This socio-economic anchor, as well as Cambiemos’ electoral and legislative strength, configures a force that the future government will have to reckon with.

Has “the Left” Returned?

It’s the economy, che! Cambiemos’s defeat in the 2019 presidential elections can be largely explained by its poor economic performance. This was particularly damaging because Cambiemos led a government that presented itself as the only one capable of redirecting Argentina toward a path of sustained economic growth.

But it’s not just the economy. In spite of its terrible economic performance, Cambiemos maintained a significant level of support.

The strategic ability of the opposition, dominated by center-left Peronism, must be taken into account to explain the success of the Left. Thus, Cambiemos’s defeat also offers an account of the Left’s continued vitality. Parties widely discredited a few years ago, especially due to corruption allegations, were able to maintain a relatively high core of adherents while in opposition—and from that base they built alliances with moderate actors.

How, then, can we best explain the continued vitality of the Left?

Kirchnerist Peronism left power in 2015 with a high degree of discredit among its non-core supporters. Accusations of corruption and judicial convictions against some of its leaders created the image of a retreating force.

However, Kirchnerist Peronism remained a weighty actor in opposition. First, it maintained strong ties to its core constituency, which consists of informal sectors of the popular classes and progressive sectors of the middle classes. It kept strong connections with its societal core not only through the memory of the good old days of redistributive policies associated with the commodity boom, but also because there was no major shift in the political orientation of its main leader, Cristina Kirchner. In fact, representatives of Kirchnerism in Congress were among the most visible opponents of the bills proposed by the Macri government. This programmatic alignment runs counter to the conventional wisdom on Peronism—which would have anticipated more leadership pragmatism and ideological eclecticism.

Second, after the defeat of Kirchner Peronism in the 2017 midterm elections, Kirchnerist leaders began to rebuild relations with non-Kirchnerist Peronist leaders to form a coalition. Cambiemos’s failed economic policy enabled this approach. It also facilitated alliance-building with other center-left parties.

By 2017, the Kircherist Left that governed until 2015 became, rather quickly, the new core of a broader opposition coalition.By 2017, the Kircherist Left that governed until 2015 became, rather quickly, the new core of a broader opposition coalition. The coalitional character of this opposition must be stressed, since all its components are not necessarily a part of the Peronist movement—and some splintered from Peronism during the Kirchnerist governments.

The Left might return to power with the Fernández-Fernández formula, but it will look and govern differently than it did during the Kirchnerist governments. It will be a broader center-left coalition formed by the Peronists and backed by a wide array of progressive parties and movements.

The new leftist government will face many challenges. It will be especially hard to keep the governing coalition together and to maintain broad electoral support in a society that accumulated so many pressing demands during the ongoing Argentine economic crisis. Macri will leave office in the midst of a profound economic recession, and Fernández will inherit extraordinarily high levels of debt, soaring inflation, and rapidly rising unemployment and poverty levels. Fernández’s “honeymoon” period, as some of his allies openly say, will be short. In addition to having to reconcile the multiple demands from his coalitional partners, he will likely encounter strong opposition from Cambiemos.

An Unlikely Comeback

Macri’s loss, the resilience of left-Peronism and its unlikely comeback have far-reaching regional and domestic implications.

Clearly, the political winds in the region have shifted when compared to the early 2000s, when about two-thirds of all Latin Americans lived under some form of leftist government.

Since 2015, left parties and governments have experienced a number of electoral defeats in a number of former stronghold—not only in Argentina, but also in Chile and Brazil. Right-wing presidents govern today in Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Honduras, Panama, and Peru, as well. In light of the series of victories by conservative parties in the region, and particularly after the election of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, astute observers proclaimed a region-wide shift to the right.

However, the counter-cyclical election of Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico in July 2018 suggested that it was premature to write the obituary of Latin America’s “left turn.” The recent Fernández’s victory in Argentina adds a further challenge to that thesis and defies any notion of a systemic rightward shift in Latin American politics.

Rather than a rightward shift, trends in Argentina—and probably beyond—are better understood as a reinforcement of the post-neoliberal left-right programmatic structuring of political competition. In our assessment, both right and left turns in the country—in 2015 and 2019, respectively—followed a routine alternation-of-power dynamics explained by anti-incumbency voting in contexts of deep economic crises after the end of the “commodity boom,” strong inflationary pressures, and broad societal discontent.

Despite all the drama in the lead-up to these 2019 elections, in short, electoral politics in Argentina appear to have aligned around a left-right axis of competition with two major rival coalitions—Peronists and non-Peronists. It remains to be seen if the high degree of political polarization in the country will allow either of these coalitions to govern with broad consensus and redress postponed needs.










Santiago Anria is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Latin American Studies at Dickinson College.

Gabriel Vommaro is Full Professor of Political Sociology at the National University of San Martín and Researcher at CONICET. His last book is La Larga Marcha de Cambiemos (Siglo XXI Editores, 2017).

Can Alberto Fernandez woo China and ease Argentina’s economic woes?

Albert Han. South China Morning Post. October 30, 2019

Alberto Fernandez may have won the presidency in Argentina but he still has work to do if he wants to nurture a successful relationship with China that could help him lift the country out of its economic doldrums, observers say.

Latin America’s third-largest economy is crippled by rising inflation and a plummeting currency, and those things could see it moving ever closer to Beijing, they say.

“The way the global chessboard works, Argentina might fall into the arms of China,” said Nicolas Saldias, an expert on Argentina and senior researcher at the Wilson Centre, a think tank in Washington.

“Cristina [Fernandez de Kirchner] supporters tend to see China very favourably and perceive it as a counter-hegemonic power to the US,” he said, referring to Argentina’s former president and Fernandez’s vice-president, whom some regard as the real power in the pairing.

China is Argentina’s largest lender, the biggest buyer of its exports, and since 2007 has invested almost US$17 billion in infrastructure projects in the country.

However, Margaret Myers, director of the Asia and Latin America Programme at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, said Beijing was being more cautious about its investment decisions given its slower economic growth at home and fears Argentina might default on its debts.

“What China is looking for now is a degree of stability and some return on those investments and outstanding debts,” she said.

Despite multiple deals signed under previous administrations and projects under construction – including two hydroelectric dams in Patagonia and a stalled nuclear power plant – Argentina has yet to sign up to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Lin Zhimin, a professor of political science and international relations at Valparaiso University in Indiana, said this would be a priority for Fernandez, if he was serious about boosting Argentina’s economy.

“To join the BRI is a matter of when and under what terms,” he said. But Fernandez’s government may “ask for other concessions from China, especially ways to reduce the trade imbalance as one of the conditions of joining”.

The fact that none of Latin America’s three largest economies – Brazil, Mexico and Argentina – have signed up to Beijing’s ambitious infrastructure development plan could be indicative of their reluctance to upset the United States, which is wary of China’s growing presence in its “backyard”.

So the spotlight would be on Fernandez’s ability to manage “the two most important foreign relations for any Argentine government – the US and China”, Lin said.

In October last year, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned Latin American nations against accepting Chinese investment, saying that “when China comes calling, it’s not always to the good of your citizens”.

And US Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross said in a meeting with Latin American leaders last year that Washington had no intention of ceding leadership in the region to “authoritarian states”.

Nevertheless, according to a study carried out by the Wilson Centre last year 76 per cent of Argentines expressed a positive view of China, while 54 per cent said they would choose Beijing over Washington if forced to opt for one or the other.

Jorge Malena, director of the graduate course on contemporary China at Catholic University of Argentina in Buenos Aires, said that given Argentina’s economic woes, geopolitical concerns may have to take a back seat.

“Strategy isn’t just talking about China, they need to do something about investments,” he said.

While Argentina might be able to cash in on the US-China trade war – by selling more soybeans to the world’s most populous nation – Malena said that Fernandez’s Peronist political stance – named after former Argentine leader Juan Peron – might also be a positive.

“Peronists still see China as both a champion of the third world and a growth engine,” he said.

'This will not stick’: Brazilian president lashes out over alleged links to left-wing politician’s killing

Terrence McCoy, Marina Lopes and Teo Armus. Washington Post. October 30, 2019

RIO DE JANEIRO — For months after Marielle Franco was killed last year, Rio de Janeiro wrestled with questions about who had targeted the city councilwoman — and who had ordered her mysterious, execution-style death.

Authorities seemed to answer one of those questions in March, charging two former police officers with the murder of the leftist politician, a rising star and an advocate for the city’s blacks and poor.

But now their alleged plot appears to have embroiled a new figure: Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro.

Late Tuesday night, local media reported that hours before Franco’s murder, one of the alleged killers had visited the other at a tony seaside complex in Rio’s far west side. On the complex’s security books, however, the man allegedly was logged as a visitor to Bolsonaro.

Following the report, the right-wing president — who was in Brasilia the night of Franco’s killing, but has denied any involvement — erupted in a live stream on Facebook. In more than 20 minutes of freewheeling attacks against the “foul, lowlife, immoral media,” he denied any wrongdoing and accused the media and rival politicians of trying to undermine his government.

“I had no reason to kill anyone in Rio de Janeiro,” he said, filming the video at 4 a.m. in the Middle East, where he has spent this week on a diplomatic trip. “This will not stick.”

With his voice breaking at times, Bolsonaro threatened to take away the broadcasting license for Globo, the media organization that first reported the alleged ties between him and the men charged with killing Franco.

“Why this scheming?” he yelled at one point. “Let me govern Brazil! And you, TV Globo, you make my life hell dammit.”

“I shouldn’t lose it,” he said, with a tear trickling down his cheek. “I’m the president of the republic.”

The explosive media reports linking Bolsonaro to Franco’s killing, coupled with his emotional and profane response, threaten to further isolate him at what was already a vulnerable time in his presidency. The country has lurched from one environmental disaster to another. He’s openly feuding with the president-elect of Argentina, one of Brazil’s most important trading partners. He was assailed this week for posting — then quickly deleting — a video that showed him as lion being attacked by a pack of hyenas representing his critics in the media and government, including Brazil’s Supreme Court.

Now that court has to decide whether to open an investigation into Bolsonaro, who has immunity from being tried in the country’s lower courts. Supporters of Franco are calling for an inquiry.

“We demand immediate clarifications,” said Juliano Medeiros, president of Franco’s Socialism and Liberty Party. “Brazil cannot live with any doubt about the link between the President of the Republic and a murder. We demand answers."

Some observers here are beginning wonder whether Bolsonaro is in control of his impulses.

“Bolsonaro’s first reaction to the case may even gain him the support of his base, but a more impartial observer saw an uncontrolled president saying he didn’t kill anyone,” columnist Igor Gielow wrote in the Sao Paulo newspaper Folha.

Lucas de Aragão, director of a political risk company in Brasilia, said the negative publicity could further damage Bolsonaro’s approval ratings, mired in the low 30s. “This is a moment of extreme tension in the government,” he said. “They go hard and they go aggressive and those that like him like this attitude and those who dislike him think he is losing his mind.”

Questions already had circulated about connections between the president and the two men charged with Franco’s killing: Ronnie Lessa, 48, a retired officer who allegedly fired the bullets that killed Franco, and Élcio Vieira de Queiroz, 46, who had allegedly driven Lessa to the scene of the crime.

Before Bolsonaro’s election in 2018, the president and Lessa both lived in the same upscale condominium in Rio de Janeiro. Their children had once dated, according to police reports. In March, scandal erupted when a photo of de Queiroz and Bolsonaro emerged on social media, showing the two men in a friendly embrace.

Bolsonaro had denied knowing both men personally, and police had previously discarded connections between the president and the suspects. But Tuesday night’s reports dragged Bolsonaro yet again into the infamous killing.

A doorman at Bolsonaro’s gated community told Jornal Nacional, a well-respected TV news program, that on March 14, 2018 — the day of Franco’s killing — de Queiroz identified himself as a visitor to Bolsonaro’s residence. When the doorman called that house to confirm, a man he had identified as “Mr. Jair” said to allow the visitor through.

The doorman kept watching de Quieroz’s car on security cameras and saw that the vehicle was heading to Lessa’s home inside the complex instead. So he called the apartment back. Yet “Mr. Jair” said that he knew where de Quieroz was going and to let him continue, the TV news program reported.

Bolsonaro was in the country’s capital of Brasilia that day for two plenary votes, the report said. Prosecutors say they are searching for audio recordings of those phone calls to identify who the doorman talked to that day — and who was in Bolsonaro’s home.

Later that evening, as Franco was in a car heading home, two other vehicles pulled up to hers. Someone began firing at the councilwoman, who died almost instantly. Nine police-issue bullets were lodged in her body.

Franco, who was 38, had been elected in 2016 as the only black woman on Rio de Janeiro’s 51-person city council. A left-wing lesbian activist and champion for the rights of Afro-Brazilians, she emerged as a powerful critic of Brazil’s security forces — and a voice for the civilians who had been killed in a crackdown on poor neighborhoods, much like the one she was raised in.

Following her death, her name became a worldwide symbol of the fight against racial oppression. Crowds around the globe protested her murder with the chant, “Marielle Presente”: Marielle Is Here.

All the while, Bolsonaro remained nearly silent on the matter as he ascended to the presidency, taking office in January after a campaign that polarized the South American country. And his critics noticed.

“The execution of Marielle, and the election of the current president, revealed to the world that we are racist, that we are sexist, misogynist, LGBT-phobic,” Franco’s partner, Mônica Benício, told the New York Times earlier this year.

Brazilian officials took nearly a year to unravel the case, finally charging the two alleged hit men in March. But further details — namely, who ordered the killing and why — remained unanswered.

In his video early on Wednesday morning, Bolsonaro also pointed fingers at the Wilson Witzel, the governor of Rio de Janeiro state, accusing him of leaking details of an investigation by Rio’s police.

Witzel denied those charges outright. “I’m being unfairly attacked,” he said in an emailed statement to Bloomberg News. “Yet I’ll continue to seek balance and common sense in personal and institutional relations.”

The president’s lawyer, Frederick Wassef, also appeared on TV to deny the new claims about Bolsonaro.

“It’s a lie, a typo, something,” Wassef said. “I say with absolute certainty and challenge anyone to prove otherwise. It is a lie, a fraud, a scam, to attack the president of the republic."

As Climate Crisis-Fueled Fires Rage, Fears Grow of an 'Uninhabitable' California

As activist Bill McKibben put it, "We've simply got to slow down the climate crisis."

Jon Queally, staff writer, Jessica Corbett, staff writer

Wednesday, October 30, 2019

Common Dreams

https://www.commondreams.org/news/2019/10/30/climate-crisis-fueled-fires-rage-fears-grow-uninhabitable-california

With wildfires raging across California on Wednesday—and with portions of the state living under an unprecedented "Extreme Red Flag Warning" issued by the National Weather Service due to the severe conditions—some climate experts are openly wondering if this kind of harrowing "new normal" brought on by the climate crisis could make vast regions of the country entirely uninhabitable.

Lack of rain coupled with powerful Santa Ana winds in the state, some gusting with hurricane-level force, have left officials warning residents in many communities that the worst is yet to come even as firefighters already report being stretched to the max.

Reflecting on the current and recent devastating fires in California, climate activist Bill McKibben wrote in an op-ed for The Guardian Tuesday that what the state has been experiencing "starts to feel like the new, and impossible, normal" for both residents and victims as well as those witnessing the destruction from afar.

Citing an article in the San Francisco Chronicle published Tuesday—which described how the fires had "intensified fears that parts of California had become almost too dangerous to inhabit"—McKibben wrote: "Read that again: the local paper is on record stating that part of the state is now so risky that its citizens might have to leave."

Writing for The Atlantic, journalist Annie Lowery detailed the dynamics leading increasing numbers of people to believe the state has become "unlivable":

Wildfires and lack of affordable housing—these are two of the most visible and urgent crises facing California, raising the question of whether the country's dreamiest, most optimistic state is fast becoming unlivable. Climate change is turning it into a tinderbox; the soaring cost of living is forcing even wealthy families into financial precarity. And, in some ways, the two crises are one: The housing crunch in urban centers has pushed construction to cheaper, more peripheral areas, where wildfire risk is greater.

The state's "housing crisis has exacerbated its wildfire crisis, and its wildfire crisis has exacerbated its housing crisis," explained Lowery, and that "vicious cycle is nowhere near ending."

For many critics, the state's largest utility PG&E remains a chief corporate culprit in the mess. As Common Dreams has reported, the company's has failed to adequately respond to the increased fire dangers—choosing to reward investors and seek profits instead of making the kind of changes and safety investments that communities and experts have demanded.

Meanwhile, as the following Now This video details, the scenes created by the California wildfires in recent weeks depict a hellscape fueled by the climate crisis—the scale and destruction of which fulfill some of the dire warnings scientists have been making for years:

In response to the video, climate activist group Friends of the Earth declared: "Thanks to the climate crisis, this is the new normal in California. To save lives, communities and wildlife, we must #ActOnClimate."

After a new fire broke out in Simi Valley on Wednesday, fire crews spent the day protecting—among other homes and structures—the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

Speaking to Democracy Now! on Tuesday, Leah Stokes, assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, criticized the corporate media for ignoring the role of the climate crisis in the fires and explained that the scientific research about what's happening in California is crystal clear.

"There is research that says that fires have gotten 500% more risky as a result of climate change and that two times more area has burned because of climate change," Stokes explained. "We know that the drought that California has recently come out of was also caused by climate change. And yet some of these deeper stories about what is happening in California, what is happening across the United States with climate change, are not told by the media."

In California, the threat to residents and wildlife as well as the loss of property has been devastating. As The New York Times reported Tuesday:

California's catastrophic wildfires have not discriminated between rich and poor. In recent years tens of thousands of people lost their homes, from trailer parks to mansions. But the aftermath of the fires has produced a spectrum of misery and recovery, ranging from the wealthy, who with insurance money rebuilt houses sometimes worth more than the ones that burned, to those who lost everything and years later still have nothing.

Like access to quality education and clean water, natural disasters are another prism through which California's vast income inequalities can be viewed.

A lawyerly knowledge of the peculiarities of the insurance industry, a pool of savings to fall back on, and the time and grit to deal with the state's labyrinthine regulations have helped some in California bounce back from the infernos. Others have not been so lucky.

For example,  44-year-old Gina Wheeler "lost her uninsured trailer that she rented on family land" in the Camp Fire that devastated Paradise, California and the surrounding area late last year.

"Every place I've ever set foot in has been touched by fire," Wheeler told the Times. "I don't think anybody that's not gone through this will ever, ever understand what it's like to lose your entire community."

"I can't even describe the empty feeling that we have," she said. "I talk friends and family members out of suicide, and they talk me out of it."

Jenn Wilcox, who worked at residential care facility in Paradise and lost the uninsured cabin where she lived, has also struggled in the year since the fire. "I'm a refugee," she said. "I'm broke."

This week, PBS aired its one-hour documentary, titled "Fire in Paradise," which details what happened on November 8 of last year as the flames ripped through the California town. While the community was not unfamiliar with the threat of wildfires—and had done more than most, local officials claimed, to prepare for such an emergency—the episode details just how quickly the strength of the fire overwhelmed detailed evacuation plans and made fighting the flames an impossible task.

Watch the trailer:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j-Dj1a1ZTck

At the conclusion of the film, Capt. Matt McKenzie, a member of California Fire Station 36, offers an ominous warning in the context of what the people of Paradise suffered that day and what scientists say are conditions across the country that will make wildfires more frequent and more ferocious in the decades ahead.

"Everything was perfect that day for a massive, destructive incident to do what it did and it's in place everywhere—everywhere in California, Arizona, Nevada, Washington, Oregon," McKenzie says. "And you don't even wanna think about what's next. Can it be worse than that? And the answer is: Yes."

In his op-ed, McKibben said the idea that California may one day be a place where fewer and fewer people can live should come "as no real surprise" to anyone who has been paying attention to global trends and the warnings of scientists.

"My most recent book, Falter, centered on the notion that the climate crisis was making large swaths of the world increasingly off-limits to humans," McKibben wrote. "Cities in Asia and the Middle East where the temperature now reaches the upper 120s—levels so high that the human body can't really cool itself; island nations (and Florida beaches) where each high tide washes through the living room or the streets; Arctic villages relocating because, with sea ice vanished, the ocean erodes the shore."

Speaking with USA Today, Beth Fulton, a resident of Sebastopol who was evacuated this week from her town as the Kincade Fire approached, said more and more people are deciding to leave the area and never come back.

"People are naturally resilient, but to deal with this year after year can be traumatizing," Fulton said. She explained that several people who lost their homes in previous fires moved off to New Mexico and Oregon.

"This seems like it'll be a yearly thing," she said, "and some people say, 'I've had enough.'"