Keynes Was Right (says Krugman)

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/opinion/keynes-was-right.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print

By PAUL KRUGMAN

“The boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity at the Treasury.” So declared John Maynard Keynes in 1937, even as F.D.R. was about to prove him right by trying to balance the budget too soon, sending the United States economy — which had been steadily recovering up to that point — into a severe recession. Slashing government spending in a depressed economy depresses the economy further; austerity should wait until a strong recovery is well under way.

Unfortunately, in late 2010 and early 2011, politicians and policy makers in much of the Western world believed that they knew better, that we should focus on deficits, not jobs, even though our economies had barely begun to recover from the slump that followed the financial crisis. And by acting on that anti-Keynesian belief, they ended up proving Keynes right all over again.

In declaring Keynesian economics vindicated I am, of course, at odds with conventional wisdom. In Washington, in particular, the failure of the Obama stimulus package to produce an employment boom is generally seen as having proved that government spending can’t create jobs. But those of us who did the math realized, right from the beginning, that the Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (more than a third of which, by the way, took the relatively ineffective form of tax cuts) was much too small given the depth of the slump. And we also predicted the resulting political backlash.

So the real test of Keynesian economics hasn’t come from the half-hearted efforts of the U.S. federal government to boost the economy, which were largely offset by cuts at the state and local levels. It has, instead, come from European nations like Greece and Ireland that had to impose savage fiscal austerity as a condition for receiving emergency loans — and have suffered Depression-level economic slumps, with real G.D.P. in both countries down by double digits.
This wasn’t supposed to happen, according to the ideology that dominates much of our political discourse. In March 2011, the Republican staff of Congress’s Joint Economic Committee released a report titled “Spend Less, Owe Less, Grow the Economy.” It ridiculed concerns that cutting spending in a slump would worsen that slump, arguing that spending cuts would improve consumer and business confidence, and that this might well lead to faster, not slower, growth.

They should have known better even at the time: the alleged historical examples of “expansionary austerity” they used to make their case had already been thoroughly debunked. And there was also the embarrassing fact that many on the right had prematurely declared Ireland a success story, demonstrating the virtues of spending cuts, in mid-2010, only to see the Irish slump deepen and whatever confidence investors might have felt evaporate.

Amazingly, by the way, it happened all over again this year. There were widespread proclamations that Ireland had turned the corner, proving that austerity works — and then the numbers came in, and they were as dismal as before.

Yet the insistence on immediate spending cuts continued to dominate the political landscape, with malign effects on the U.S. economy. True, there weren’t major new austerity measures at the federal level, but there was a lot of “passive” austerity as the Obama stimulus faded out and cash-strapped state and local governments continued to cut.

Now, you could argue that Greece and Ireland had no choice about imposing austerity, or, at any rate, no choices other than defaulting on their debts and leaving the euro. But another lesson of 2011 was that America did and does have a choice; Washington may be obsessed with the deficit, but financial markets are, if anything, signaling that we should borrow more.

Again, this wasn’t supposed to happen. We entered 2011 amid dire warnings about a Greek-style debt crisis that would happen as soon as the Federal Reserve stopped buying bonds, or the rating agencies ended our triple-A status, or the superdupercommittee failed to reach a deal, or something. But the Fed ended its bond-purchase program in June; Standard & Poor’s downgraded America in August; the supercommittee deadlocked in November; and U.S. borrowing costs just kept falling. In fact, at this point, inflation-protected U.S. bonds pay negative interest: investors are willing to pay America to hold their money.

The bottom line is that 2011 was a year in which our political elite obsessed over short-term deficits that aren’t actually a problem and, in the process, made the real problem — a depressed economy and mass unemployment — worse.
The good news, such as it is, is that President Obama has finally gone back to fighting against premature austerity — and he seems to be winning the political battle. And one of these years we might actually end up taking Keynes’s advice, which is every bit as valid now as it was 75 years ago.

The climate of history: Four theses

Dipesh Chakrabarty

http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2009-10-30-chakrabarty-en.html#

While freedom has been the most important motif of accounts of human history since the Enlightenment, there has never been an awareness of the geological agency human beings were gaining through processes linked to their acquisition of freedom. Whatever the rights we wish to celebrate as our freedom, we cannot afford to destabilize conditions that work like boundary parameters of human existence.

The current planetary crisis of climate change or global warming elicits a variety of responses in individuals, groups, and governments, ranging from denial, disconnect, and indifference to a spirit of engagement and activism of varying kinds and degrees. These responses saturate our sense of the now. Alan Weisman's best-selling book The World without Us suggests a thought experiment as a way of experiencing our present: "Suppose that the worst has happened. Human extinction is a fait accompli. [...] Picture a world from which we all suddenly vanished. [...] Might we have left some faint, enduring mark on the universe? [...] Is it possible that, instead of heaving a huge biological sigh of relief, the world without us would miss us?"[1] I am drawn to Weisman's experiment as it tellingly demonstrates how the current crisis can precipitate a sense of the present that disconnects the future from the past by putting such a future beyond the grasp of historical sensibility. The discipline of history exists on the assumption that our past, present, and future are connected by a certain continuity of human experience. We normally envisage the future with the help of the same faculty that allows us to picture the past. Weisman's thought experiment illustrates the historicist paradox that inhabits contemporary moods of anxiety and concern about the finitude of humanity. To go along with Weisman's experiment, we have to insert ourselves into a future "without us" in order to be able to visualize it. Thus, our usual historical practices for visualizing times, past and future, times inaccessible to us personally – the exercise of historical understanding – are thrown into a deep contradiction and confusion. Weisman's experiment indicates how such confusion follows from our contemporary sense of the present insofar as that present gives rise to concerns about our future. Our historical sense of the present, in Weisman's version, has thus become deeply destructive of our general sense of history.

Climate of change?
Social agreement about the necessity of radical ecological change may be unprecedented, yet rhetoric and reality go their separate ways. Are multilateral climate deals inherently ineffective? Is the cap-and-trade approach being pursued at the expense of fairer alternatives? Is the declaration of commitment to sustainability an exercise in societal self-delusion? A Eurozine focal point debates the politics of global warming.

I will return to Weisman's experiment in the last part of this essay. There is much in the debate on climate change that should be of interest to those involved in contemporary discussions about history. For as the idea gains ground that the grave environmental risks of global warming have to do with excessive accumulation in the atmosphere of greenhouse gases produced mainly through the burning of fossil fuel and the industrialized use of animal stock by human beings, certain scientific propositions have come into circulation in the public domain that have profound, even transformative, implications for how we think about human history or about what the historian C. A. Bayly recently called "the birth of the modern world".[2] Indeed, what scientists have said about climate change challenges not only the ideas about the human that usually sustain the discipline of history but also the analytic strategies that postcolonial and post-imperial historians have deployed in the last two decades in response to the post-war scenario of decolonization and globalization.

In what follows, I present some responses to the contemporary crisis from a historian's point of view. However, a word about my own relationship to the literature on climate change – and indeed to the crisis itself – may be in order. I am a practicing historian with a strong interest in the nature of history as a form of knowledge, and my relationship to the science of global warming is derived, at some remove, from what scientists and other informed writers have written for the education of the general public. Scientific studies of global warming are often said to have originated with the discoveries of the Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius in the 1890s, but self-conscious discussions of global warming in the public realm began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the same period in which social scientists and humanists began to discuss globalization.[3] However, these discussions have so far run parallel to each other. While globalization, once recognized, was of immediate interest to humanists and social scientists, global warming, in spite of a good number of books published in the 1990s, did not become a public concern until the 2000s. The reasons are not far to seek. As early as 1988 James Hansen, the director of NASA's Goddard Institute of Space Studies, told a Senate committee about global warming and later remarked to a group of reporters on the same day, "It's time to stop waffling [...] and say that the greenhouse effect is here and is affecting our climate."[4] But governments, beholden to special interests and wary of political costs, would not listen. George H. W. Bush, then the president of the United States, famously quipped that he was going to fight the greenhouse effect with the "White House effect".[5] The situation changed in the 2000s when the warnings became dire, and the signs of the crisis – such as the drought in Australia, frequent cyclones and brush fires, crop failures in many parts of the world, the melting of Himalayan and other mountain glaciers and of the polar ice caps, and the increasing acidity of the seas and the damage to the food chain – became politically and economically inescapable. Added to this were growing concerns, voiced by many, about the rapid destruction of other species and about the global footprint of a human population poised to pass the nine billion mark by 2050.[6]

As the crisis gathered momentum in the last few years, I realized that all my readings in theories of globalization, Marxist analysis of capital, subaltern studies, and postcolonial criticism over the last twenty-five years, while enormously useful in studying globalization, had not really prepared me for making sense of this planetary conjuncture within which humanity finds itself today. The change of mood in globalization analysis may be seen by comparing Giovanni Arrighi's masterful history of world capitalism, The Long Twentieth Century (1994), with his more recent Adam Smith in Beijing (2007), which, among other things, seeks to understand the implications of the economic rise of China. The first book, a long meditation on the chaos internal to capitalist economies, ends with the thought of capitalism burning up humanity "in the horrors (or glories) of the escalating violence that has accompanied the liquidation of the Cold War world order". It is clear that the heat that burns the world in Arrighi's narrative comes from the engine of capitalism and not from global warming. By the time Arrighi comes to write Adam Smith in Beijing, however, he is much more concerned with the question of ecological limits to capitalism. That theme provides the concluding note of the book, suggesting the distance that a critic such as Arrighi has travelled in the thirteen years that separate the publication of the two books.[7] If, indeed, globalization and global warming are born of overlapping processes, the question is, How do we bring them together in our understanding of the world?

Not being a scientist myself, I also make a fundamental assumption about the science of climate change. I assume the science to be right in its broad outlines. I thus assume that the views expressed particularly in the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change of the United Nations, in the Stern Review, and in the many books that have been published recently by scientists and scholars seeking to explain the science of global warming, leave me with enough rational ground for accepting, unless the scientific consensus shifts in a major way, that there is a large measure of truth to anthropogenic theories of climate change.[8] For this position, I depend on observations such as the following one reported by Naomi Oreskes, a historian of science at the University of California, San Diego. Upon examining the abstracts of 928 papers on global warming published in specialized peer-reviewed scientific journals between 1993 and 2003, Oreskes found that not a single one sought to refute the "consensus" among scientists "over the reality of human-induced climate change". There is disagreement over the amount and direction of change. But "virtually all professional climate scientists," writes Oreskes, "agree on the reality of human-induced climate change, but debate continues on tempo and mode".[9] Indeed, in what I have read so far, I have not seen any reason yet for remaining a global-warming sceptic.

The scientific consensus around the proposition that the present crisis of climate change is man-made forms the basis of what I have to say here. In the interest of clarity and focus, I present my propositions in the form of four theses. The last three theses follow from the first one. I begin with the proposition that anthropogenic explanations of climate change spell the collapse of the age-old humanist distinction between natural history and human history and end by returning to the question I opened with: How does the crisis of climate change appeal to our sense of human universals while challenging at the same time our capacity for historical understanding?

Thesis 1: Anthropogenic explanations of climate change spell the collapse of the age-old humanist distinction between natural history and human history
Philosophers and students of history have often displayed a conscious tendency to separate human history – or the story of human affairs, as R. G. Collingwood put it – from natural history, sometimes proceeding even to deny that nature could ever have history quite in the same way humans have it. This practice itself has a long and rich past of which, for reasons of space and personal limitations, I can only provide a very provisional, thumbnail, and somewhat arbitrary sketch.[10]

We could begin with the old Viconian-Hobbesian idea that we, humans, could have proper knowledge of only civil and political institutions because we made them, while nature remains God's work and ultimately inscrutable to man. "The true is identical with the created: verum ipsum factum" is how Croce summarized Vico's famous dictum.[11] Vico scholars have sometimes protested that Vico did not make such a drastic separation between the natural and the human sciences as Croce and others read into his writings, but even they admit that such a reading is widespread.[12]

This Viconian understanding was to become a part of the historian's common sense in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It made its way into Marx's famous utterance that "men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please" and into the title of the Marxist archaeologist V. Gordon Childe's well-known book, Man Makes Himself.[13] Croce seems to have been a major source of this distinction in the second half of the twentieth century through his influence on "the lonely Oxford historicist" Collingwood who, in turn, deeply influenced E. H. Carr's 1961 book, What Is History?, which is still perhaps one of the best-selling books on the historian's craft.[14] Croce's thoughts, one could say, unbeknown to his legatees and with unforeseeable modifications, have triumphed in our understanding of history in the postcolonial age. Behind Croce and his adaptations of Hegel and hidden in Croce's creative misreading of his predecessors stands the more distant and foundational figure of Vico.[15] The connections here, again, are many and complex. Suffice it to say for now that Croce's 1911 book, La filosofia di Giambattista Vico, dedicated, significantly, to Wilhelm Windelband, was translated into English in 1913 by none other than Collingwood, who was an admirer, if not a follower, of the Italian master.

However, Collingwood's own argument for separating natural history from human ones developed its own inflections, while running, one might say, still on broadly Viconian lines as interpreted by Croce. Nature, Collingwood remarked, has no "inside". "In the case of nature, this distinction between the outside and the inside of an event does not arise. The events of nature are mere events, not the acts of agents whose thought the scientist endeavours to trace." Hence, "all history properly so called is the history of human affairs". The historian's job is "to think himself into [an] action, to discern the thought of its agent". A distinction, therefore, has "to be made between historical and non-historical human actions. [...] So far as man's conduct is determined by what may be called his animal nature, his impulses and appetites, it is non-historical; the process of those activities is a natural process." Thus, says Collingwood, "the historian is not interested in the fact that men eat and sleep and make love and thus satisfy their natural appetites; but he is interested in the social customs which they create by their thought as a framework within which these appetites find satisfaction in ways sanctioned by convention and morality." Only the history of the social construction of the body, not the history of the body as such, can be studied. By splitting the human into the natural and the social or cultural, Collingwood saw no need to bring the two together.[16]

In discussing Croce's 1893 essay "History Subsumed under the Concept of Art," Collingwood wrote, "Croce, by denying [the German idea] that history was a science at all, cut himself at one blow loose from naturalism, and set his face towards an idea of history as something radically different from nature."[17] David Roberts gives a fuller account of the more mature position in Croce. Croce drew on the writings of Ernst Mach and Henri Poincaré to argue that "the concepts of the natural sciences are human constructs elaborated for human purposes". "When we peer into nature," he said, "we find only ourselves". We do not "understand ourselves best as part of the natural world". So, as Roberts puts it, "Croce proclaimed that there is no world but the human world, then took over the central doctrine of Vico that we can know the human world because we have made it." For Croce, then, all material objects were subsumed into human thought. No rocks, for example, existed in themselves. Croce's idealism, Roberts explains, "does not mean that rocks, for example, 'don't exist' without human beings to think them. Apart from human concern and language, they neither exist nor do not exist, since 'exist' is a human concept that has meaning only within a context of human concerns and purposes."[18] Both Croce and Collingwood would thus enfold human history and nature, to the extent that the latter could be said to have history, into purposive human action. What exists beyond that does not "exist" because it does not exist for humans in any meaningful sense.

In the twentieth century, however, other arguments, more sociological or materialist, have existed alongside the Viconian one. They too have continued to justify the separation of human from natural history. One influential though perhaps infamous example would be the booklet on the Marxist philosophy of history that Stalin published in 1938, Dialectical and Historical Materialism. This is how Stalin put the problem:

Geographical environment is unquestionably one of the constant and indispensable conditions of development of society and, of course, [...] [it] accelerates or retards its development. But its influence is not the determining influence, inasmuch as the changes and development of society proceed at an incomparably faster rate than the changes and development of geographical environment. In the space of 3000 years three different social systems have been successfully superseded in Europe: the primitive communal system, the slave system and the feudal system. [...] Yet during this period geographical conditions in Europe have either not changed at all, or have changed so slightly that geography takes no note of them. And that is quite natural. Changes in geographical environment of any importance require millions of years, whereas a few hundred or a couple of thousand years are enough for even very important changes in the system of human society.[19]

For all its dogmatic and formulaic tone, Stalin's passage captures an assumption perhaps common to historians of the mid-twentieth century: man's environment did change but changed so slowly as to make the history of man's relation to his environment almost timeless and thus not a subject of historiography at all. Even when Fernand Braudel rebelled against the state of the discipline of history as he found it in the late 1930s and proclaimed his rebellion later in 1949 through his great book The Mediterranean, it was clear that he rebelled mainly against historians who treated the environment simply as a silent and passive backdrop to their historical narratives, something dealt with in the introductory chapter but forgotten thereafter, as if, as Braudel put it, "the flowers did not come back every spring, the flocks of sheep migrate every year, or the ships sail on a real sea that changes with the seasons". In composing The Mediterranean, Braudel wanted to write a history in which the seasons – "a history of constant repetition, ever-recurring cycles" – and other recurrences in nature played an active role in moulding human actions.[20] The environment, in that sense, had an agentive presence in Braudel's pages, but the idea that nature was mainly repetitive had a long and ancient history in European thought, as Gadamer showed in his discussion of Johann Gustav Droysen.[21] Braudel's position was no doubt a great advance over the kind of nature-as-a-backdrop argument that Stalin developed. But it shared a fundamental assumption, too, with the stance adopted by Stalin: the history of "man's relationship to the environment" was so slow as to be "almost timeless."[22] In today's climatologists' terms, we could say that Stalin and Braudel and others who thought thus did not have available to them the idea, now widespread in the literature on global warming, that the climate, and hence the overall environment, can sometimes reach a tipping point at which this slow and apparently timeless backdrop for human actions transforms itself with a speed that can only spell disaster for human beings.

If Braudel, to some degree, made a breach in the binary of natural/ human history, one could say that the rise of environmental history in the late twentieth century made the breach wider. It could even be argued that environmental historians have sometimes indeed progressed towards producing what could be called natural histories of man. But there is a very important difference between the understanding of the human being that these histories have been based on and the agency of the human now being proposed by scientists writing on climate change. Simply put, environmental history, where it was not straightforwardly cultural, social, or economic history, looked upon human beings as biological agents. Alfred Crosby, Jr., whose book The Columbian Exchange did much to pioneer the "new" environmental histories in the early 1970s, put the point thus in his original preface: "Man is a biological entity before he is a Roman Catholic or a capitalist or anything else."[23] The recent book by Daniel Lord Smail, On Deep History and the Brain, is adventurous in attempting to connect knowledge gained from evolutionary and neurosciences with human histories. Smail's book pursues possible connections between biology and culture – between the history of the human brain and cultural history, in particular – while being always sensitive to the limits of biological reasoning. But it is the history of human biology and not any recent theses about the newly acquired geological agency of humans that concerns Smail.[24]

Scholars writing on the current climate-change crisis are indeed saying something significantly different from what environmental historians have said so far. In unwittingly destroying the artificial but time-honoured distinction between natural and human histories, climate scientists posit that the human being has become something much larger than the simple biological agent that he or she always has been. Humans now wield a geological force. As Oreskes puts it: "To deny that global warming is real is precisely to deny that humans have become geological agents, changing the most basic physical processes of the earth."

For centuries, [she continues,] scientists thought that earth processes were so large and powerful that nothing we could do could change them. This was a basic tenet of geological science: that human chronologies were insignificant compared with the vastness of geological time; that human activities were insignificant compared with the force of geological processes. And once they were. But no more. There are now so many of us cutting down so many trees and burning so many billions of tons of fossil fuels that we have indeed become geological agents. We have changed the chemistry of our atmosphere, causing sea level to rise, ice to melt, and climate to change. There is no reason to think otherwise.[25]

Biological agents, geological agents – two different names with very different consequences. Environmental history, to go by Crosby's masterful survey of the origins and the state of the field in 1995, has much to do with biology and geography but hardly ever imagined human impact on the planet on a geological scale. It was still a vision of man "as a prisoner of climate," as Crosby put it quoting Braudel, and not of man as the maker of it.[26] To call human beings geological agents is to scale up our imagination of the human. Humans are biological agents, both collectively and as individuals. They have always been so. There was no point in human history when humans were not biological agents. But we can become geological agents only historically and collectively, that is, when we have reached numbers and invented technologies that are on a scale large enough to have an impact on the planet itself. To call ourselves geological agents is to attribute to us a force on the same scale as that released at other times when there has been a mass extinction of species. We seem to be currently going through that kind of a period. The current "rate in the loss of species diversity," specialists argue, "is similar in intensity to the event around 65 million years ago which wiped out the dinosaurs."[27] Our footprint was not always that large. Humans began to acquire this agency only since the Industrial Revolution, but the process really picked up in the second half of the twentieth century. Humans have become geological agents very recently in human history. In that sense, we can say that it is only very recently that the distinction between human and natural histories – much of which had been preserved even in environmental histories that saw the two entities in interaction – has begun to collapse. For it is no longer a question simply of man having an interactive relation with nature. This humans have always had, or at least that is how man has been imagined in a large part of what is generally called the Western tradition.[28] Now it is being claimed that humans are a force of nature in the geological sense. A fundamental assumption of Western (and now universal) political thought has come undone in this crisis.[29]

Thesis 2: The idea of the anthropocene, the new geological epoch when humans exist as a geological force, severely qualifies humanist histories of modernity/globalization

How to combine human cultural and historical diversity with human freedom has formed one of the key underlying questions of human histories written of the period from 1750 to the years of present-day globalization. Diversity, as Gadamer pointed out with reference to Leopold von Ranke, was itself a figure of freedom in the historian's imagination of the historical process.[30] Freedom has, of course, meant different things at different times, ranging from ideas of human and citizens' rights to those of decolonization and self-rule. Freedom, one could say, is a blanket category for diverse imaginations of human autonomy and sovereignty. Looking at the works of Kant, Hegel, or Marx; nineteenth-century ideas of progress and class struggle; the struggle against slavery; the Russian and Chinese revolutions; the resistance to Nazism and Fascism; the decolonization movements of the 1950s and 1960s and the revolutions in Cuba and Vietnam; the evolution and explosion of the rights discourse; the fight for civil rights for African Americans, indigenous peoples, Indian Dalits, and other minorities; down to the kind of arguments that, say, Amartya Sen put forward in his book Development as Freedom, one could say that freedom has been the most important motif of written accounts of human history of these two hundred and fifty years. Of course, as I have already noted, freedom has not always carried the same meaning for everyone. Francis Fukuyama's understanding of freedom would be significantly different from that of Sen. But this semantic capaciousness of the word only speaks to its rhetorical power.

In no discussion of freedom in the period since the Enlightenment was there ever any awareness of the geological agency that human beings were acquiring at the same time as and through processes closely linked to their acquisition of freedom. Philosophers of freedom were mainly, and understandably, concerned with how humans would escape the injustice, oppression, inequality, or even uniformity foisted on them by other humans or human-made systems. Geological time and the chronology of human histories remained unrelated. This distance between the two calendars, as we have seen, is what climate scientists now claim has collapsed. The period I have mentioned, from 1750 to now, is also the time when human beings switched from wood and other renewable fuels to large-scale use of fossil fuel – first coal and then oil and gas. The mansion of modern freedoms stands on an ever-expanding base of fossil-fuel use. Most of our freedoms so far have been energy-intensive. The period of human history usually associated with what we today think of as the institutions of civilization – the beginnings of agriculture, the founding of cities, the rise of the religions we know, the invention of writing – began about ten thousand years ago, as the planet moved from one geological period, the last ice age or the Pleistocene, to the more recent and warmer Holocene. The Holocene is the period we are supposed to be in; but the possibility of anthropogenic climate change has raised the question of its termination. Now that humans – thanks to our numbers, the burning of fossil fuel, and other related activities – have become a geological agent on the planet, some scientists have proposed that we recognize the beginning of a new geological era, one in which humans act as a main determinant of the environment of the planet. The name they have coined for this new geological age is Anthropocene. The proposal was first made by the Nobelwinning chemist Paul J. Crutzen and his collaborator, a marine science specialist, Eugene F. Stoermer. In a short statement published in 2000, they said, "Considering [...] [the] major and still growing impacts of human activities on earth and atmosphere, and at all, including global, scales, it seems to us more than appropriate to emphasize the central role of mankind in geology and ecology by proposing to use the term 'anthropocene' for the current geological epoch."[31] Crutzen elaborated on the proposal in a short piece published in Nature in 2002:

For the past three centuries, the effects of humans on the global environment have escalated. Because of these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide, global climate may depart significantly from natural behaviour for many millennia to come. It seems appropriate to assign the term "Anthropocene" to the present, [...] human-dominated, geological epoch, supplementing the Holocene – the warm period of the past 1012 millennia. The Anthropocene could be said to have started in the latter part of the eighteenth century, when analyses of air trapped in polar ice showed the beginning of growing global concentrations of carbon dioxide and methane. This date also happens to coincide with James Watt's design of the steam engine in 1784.[32]
It is, of course, true that Crutzen's saying so does not make the Anthropocene an officially accepted geologic period. As Mike Davis comments, "in geology, as in biology or history, periodization is a complex, controversial art," involving, always, vigorous debates and contestation.[33] The name Holocene for "the post-glacial geological epoch of the past ten to twelve thousand years" ("A," p. 17), for example, gained no immediate acceptance when proposed – apparently by Sir Charles Lyell – in 1833. The International Geological Congress officially adopted the name at their meeting in Bologna after about fifty years in 1885 (see "A," p. 17). The same goes for Anthropocene. Scientists have engaged Crutzen and his colleagues on the question of when exactly the Anthropocene may have begun. But the February 2008 newsletter of the Geological Society of America, GSA Today, opens with a statement signed by the members of the Stratigraphy Commission of the Geological Society of London accepting Crutzen's definition and dating of the Anthropocene.[34] Adopting a "conservative" approach, they conclude: "Sufficient evidence has emerged of stratigraphically significant change (both elapsed and imminent) for recognition of the Anthropocene – currently a vivid yet informal metaphor of global environmental change – as a new geological epoch to be considered for formalization by international discussion."[35] There is increasing evidence that the term is gradually winning acceptance among social scientists as well.[36]

So, has the period from 1750 to now been one of freedom or that of the Anthropocene? Is the Anthropocene a critique of the narratives of freedom? Is the geological agency of humans the price we pay for the pursuit of freedom? In some ways, yes. As Edward O. Wilson said in his The Future of Life: "Humanity has so far played the role of planetary killer, concerned only with its own short-term survival. We have cut much of the heart out of biodiversity. [...] If Emi, the Sumatran rhino could speak, she might tell us that the twenty-first century is thus far no exception."[37] But the relation between Enlightenment themes of freedom and the collapsing of human and geological chronologies seems more complicated and contradictory than a simple binary would allow. It is true that human beings have tumbled into being a geological agent through our own decisions. The Anthropocene, one might say, has been an unintended consequence of human choices. But it is also clear that for humans any thought of the way out of our current predicament cannot but refer to the idea of deploying reason in global, collective life. As Wilson put it: "We know more about the problem now. [...] We know what to do" (FL, p. 102). Or, to quote Crutzen and Stoermer again:

Mankind will remain a major geological force for many millennia, maybe millions of years, to come. To develop a world-wide accepted strategy leading to sustainability of ecosystems against human-induced stresses will be one of the great future tasks of mankind, requiring intensive research efforts and wise application of knowledge thus acquired. [...] An exciting, but also difficult and daunting task lies ahead of the global research and engineering community to guide mankind towards global, sustainable, environmental management. ["A," p. 18]

Logically, then, in the era of the Anthropocene, we need the Enlightenment (that is, reason) even more than in the past. There is one consideration though that qualifies this optimism about the role of reason and that has to do with the most common shape that freedom takes in human societies: politics. Politics has never been based on reason alone. And politics in the age of the masses and in a world already complicated by sharp inequalities between and inside nations is something no one can control. "Sheer demographic momentum," writes Davis, "will increase the world's urban population by 3 billion people over the next 40 years (90 per cent of them in poor cities), and no one – absolutely no one [including, one might say, scholars on the Left] – has a clue how a planet of slums, with growing food and energy crises, will accommodate their biological survival, much less their inevitable aspirations to basic happiness and dignity" ("LIS").

It is not surprising then that the crisis of climate change should produce anxieties precisely around futures that we cannot visualize. Scientists' hope that reason will guide us out of the present predicament is reminiscent of the social opposition between the myth of Science and the actual politics of the sciences that Bruno Latour discusses in his Politics of Nature.[38] Bereft of any sense of politics, Wilson can only articulate his sense of practicality as a philosopher's hope mixed with anxiety: "Perhaps we will act in time" (FL, p. 102). Yet the very science of global warming produces of necessity political imperatives. Tim Flannery's book, for instance, raises the dark prospects of an "Orwellian nightmare" in a chapter entitled "2084: The Carbon Dictatorship?"[39] Mark Maslin concludes his book with some gloomy thoughts: "It is unlikely that global politics will solve global warming. Technofixes are dangerous or cause problems as bad as the ones they are aimed at fixing. [...] [Global warming] requires nations and regions to plan for the next 50 years, something that most societies are unable to do because of the very short-term nature of politics." His recommendation, "we must prepare for the worst and adapt," coupled with Davis's observations about the coming "planet of slums" places the question of human freedom under the cloud of the Anthropocene.[40]

Thesis 3: The geological hypothesis regarding the anthropocene requires us to put global histories of capital in conversation with the species history of humans

Analytic frameworks engaging questions of freedom by way of critiques of capitalist globalization have not, in any way, become obsolete in the age of climate change. If anything, as Davis shows, climate change may well end up accentuating all the inequities of the capitalist world order if the interests of the poor and vulnerable are neglected (see "LIS"). Capitalist globalization exists; so should its critiques. But these critiques do not give us an adequate hold on human history once we accept that the crisis of climate change is here with us and may exist as part of this planet for much longer than capitalism or long after capitalism has undergone many more historic mutations. The problematic of globalization allows us to read climate change only as a crisis of capitalist management. While there is no denying that climate change has profoundly to do with the history of capital, a critique that is only a critique of capital is not sufficient for addressing questions relating to human history once the crisis of climate change has been acknowledged and the Anthropocene has begun to loom on the horizon of our present. The geologic now of the Anthropocene has become entangled with the now of human history.

Scholars who study human beings in relation to the crisis of climate change and other ecological problems emerging on a world scale make a distinction between the recorded history of human beings and their deep history. Recorded history refers, very broadly, to the ten thousand years that have passed since the invention of agriculture but more usually to the last four thousand years or so for which written records exist. Historians of modernity and "early modernity" usually move in the archives of the last four hundred years. The history of humans that goes beyond these years of written records constitutes what other students of human pasts – not professional historians – call deep history. As Wilson, one of the main proponents of this distinction, writes: "Human behaviour is seen as the product not just of recorded history, ten thousand years recent, but of deep history, the combined genetic and cultural changes that created humanity over hundreds of [thousands of] years."[41] It, of course, goes to the credit of Smail that he has attempted to explain to professional historians the intellectual appeal of deep history.[42]

Without such knowledge of the deep history of humanity it would be difficult to arrive at a secular understanding of why climate change constitutes a crisis for humans. Geologists and climate scientists may explain why the current phase of global warming – as distinct from the warming of the planet that has happened before – is anthropogenic in nature, but the ensuing crisis for humans is not understandable unless one works out the consequences of that warming. The consequences make sense only if we think of humans as a form of life and look on human history as part of the history of life on this planet. For, ultimately, what the warming of the planet threatens is not the geological planet itself but the very conditions, both biological and geological, on which the survival of human life as developed in the Holocene period depends.

The word that scholars such as Wilson or Crutzen use to designate life in the human form – and in other living forms – is species. They speak of the human being as a species and find that category useful in thinking about the nature of the current crisis. It is a word that will never occur in any standard history or political-economic analysis of globalization by scholars on the Left, for the analysis of globalization refers, for good reasons, only to the recent and recorded history of humans. Species thinking, on the other hand, is connected to the enterprise of deep history. Further, Wilson and Crutzen actually find such thinking essential to visualizing human well-being. As Wilson writes: "We need this longer view [...] not only to understand our species but more firmly to secure its future" (SN, p. x). The task of placing, historically, the crisis of climate change thus requires us to bring together intellectual formations that are somewhat in tension with each other: the planetary and the global; deep and recorded histories; species thinking and critiques of capital.

In saying this, I work somewhat against the grain of historians' thinking on globalization and world history. In a landmark essay published in 1995 and entitled "World History in a Global Age," Michael Geyer and Charles Bright wrote, "At the end of the twentieth century, we encounter, not a universalizing and single modernity but an integrated world of multiple and multiplying modernities." "As far as world history is concerned," they said, "there is no universalizing spirit. [...] There are, instead, many very specific, very material and pragmatic practices that await critical reflection and historical study." Yet, thanks to global connections forged by trade, empires, and capitalism, "we confront a startling new condition: humanity, which has been the subject of world history for many centuries and civilizations, has now come into the purview of all human beings. This humanity is extremely polarized into rich and poor."[43] This humanity, Geyer and Bright imply in the spirit of the philosophies of difference, is not one. It does not, they write, "form a single homogenous civilization." "Neither is this humanity any longer a mere species or a natural condition. For the first time," they say, with some existentialist flourish, "we as human beings collectively constitute ourselves and, hence, are responsible for ourselves" ("WH," p. 1059). Clearly, the scientists who advocate the idea of the Anthropocene are saying something quite the contrary. They argue that because humans constitute a particular kind of species they can, in the process of dominating other species, acquire the status of a geologic force. Humans, in other words, have become a natural condition, at least today. How do we create a conversation between these two positions?

It is understandable that the biological-sounding talk of species should worry historians. They feel concerned about their finely honed sense of contingency and freedom in human affairs having to cede ground to a more deterministic view of the world. Besides, there are always, as Smail recognizes, dangerous historical examples of the political use of biology.[44] The idea of species, it is feared, in addition, may introduce a powerful degree of essentialism in our understanding of humans. I will return to the question of contingency later in this section, but, on the issue of essentialism, Smail helpfully points out why species cannot be thought of in essentialist terms:

Species, according to Darwin, are not fixed entities with natural essences imbued in them by the Creator. [...] Natural selection does not homogenize the individuals of a species. [...] Given this state of affairs, the search for a normal [...] nature and body type [of any particular species] is futile. And so it goes for the equally futile quest to identify "human nature." Here, as in so many areas, biology and cultural studies are fundamentally congruent.[45]

It is clear that different academic disciplines position their practitioners differently with regard to the question of how to view the human being. All disciplines have to create their objects of study. If medicine or biology reduces the human to a certain specific understanding of him or her, humanist historians often do not realize that the protagonists of their stories – persons – are reductions, too. Absent personhood, there is no human subject of history. That is why Derrida earned the wrath of Foucault by pointing out that any desire to enable or allow madness itself to speak in a history of madness would be "the maddest aspect" of the project.[46] An object of critical importance to humanists of all traditions, personhood is nevertheless no less of a reduction of or an abstraction from the embodied and whole human being than, say, the human skeleton discussed in an anatomy class.

The crisis of climate change calls on academics to rise above their disciplinary prejudices, for it is a crisis of many dimensions. In that context, it is interesting to observe the role that the category of species has begun to play among scholars, including economists, who have already gone further than historians in investigating and explaining the nature of this crisis. The economist Jeffrey Sachs's book, Common Wealth, meant for the educated but lay public, uses the idea of species as central to its argument and devotes a whole chapter to the Anthropocene.[47] In fact, the scholar from whom Sachs solicited a foreword for his book was none other than Edward Wilson. The concept of species plays a quasi-Hegelian role in Wilson's foreword in the same way as the multitude or the masses in Marxist writings. If Marxists of various hues have at different times thought that the good of humanity lay in the prospect of the oppressed or the multitude realizing their own global unity through a process of coming into self-consciousness, Wilson pins his hope on the unity possible through our collective self-recognition as a species: "Humanity has consumed or transformed enough of Earth's irreplaceable resources to be in better shape than ever before. We are smart enough and now, one hopes, well informed enough to achieve self-understanding as a unified species. [...] We will be wise to look on ourselves as a species."[48]

Yet doubts linger about the use of the idea of species in the context of climate change, and it would be good to deal with one that can easily arise among critics on the Left. One could object, for instance, that all the anthropogenic factors contributing to global warming – the burning of fossil fuel, industrialization of animal stock, the clearing of tropical and other forests, and so on – are after all part of a larger story: the unfolding of capitalism in the West and the imperial or quasi-imperial domination by the West of the rest of the world. It is from that recent history of the West that the elite of China, Japan, India, Russia, and Brazil have drawn inspiration in attempting to develop their own trajectories toward superpower politics and global domination through capitalist economic, technological, and military might. If this is broadly true, then does not the talk of species or mankind simply serve to hide the reality of capitalist production and the logic of imperial – formal, informal, or machinic in a Deleuzian sense – domination that it fosters? Why should one include the poor of the world – whose carbon footprint is small anyway – by use of such all inclusive terms as species or mankind when the blame for the current crisis should be squarely laid at the door of the rich nations in the first place and of the richer classes in the poorer ones?

We need to stay with this question a little longer; otherwise the difference between the present historiography of globalization and the historiography demanded by anthropogenic theories of climate change will not be clear to us. Though some scientists would want to date the Anthropocene from the time agriculture was invented, my readings mostly suggest that our falling into the Anthropocene was neither an ancient nor an inevitable happening. Human civilization surely did not begin on condition that, one day in his history, man would have to shift from wood to coal and from coal to petroleum and gas. That there was much historical contingency in the transition from wood to coal as the main source of energy has been demonstrated powerfully by Kenneth Pomeranz in his pathbreaking book The Great Divergence.[49] Coincidences and historical accidents similarly litter the stories of the "discovery" of oil, of the oil tycoons, and of the automobile industry as they do any other histories.[50] Capitalist societies themselves have not remained the same since the beginning of capitalism.[51] Human population, too, has dramatically increased since the Second World War. India alone is now more than three times more populous than at independence in 1947. Clearly, nobody is in a position to claim that there is something inherent to the human species that has pushed us finally into the Anthropocene. We have stumbled into it. The way to it was no doubt through industrial civilization. (I do not make a distinction here between the capitalist and socialist societies we have had so far, for there was never any principled difference in their use of fossil fuel.)

If the industrial way of life was what got us into this crisis, then the question is, Why think in terms of species, surely a category that belongs to a much longer history? Why could not the narrative of capitalism – and hence its critique – be sufficient as a framework for interrogating the history of climate change and understanding its consequences? It seems true that the crisis of climate change has been necessitated by the high-energy consuming models of society that capitalist industrialization has created and promoted, but the current crisis has brought into view certain other conditions for the existence of life in the human form that have no intrinsic connection to the logics of capitalist, nationalist, or socialist identities. They are connected rather to the history of life on this planet, the way different life-forms connect to one another, and the way the mass extinction of one species could spell danger for another. Without such a history of life, the crisis of climate change has no human "meaning." For, as I have said before, it is not a crisis for the inorganic planet in any meaningful sense.

In other words, the industrial way of life has acted much like the rabbit hole in Alice's story; we have slid into a state of things that forces on us a recognition of some of the parametric (that is, boundary) conditions for the existence of institutions central to our idea of modernity and the meanings we derive from them. Let me explain. Take the case of the agricultural revolution, so called, of ten thousand years ago. It was not just an expression of human inventiveness. It was made possible by certain changes in the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, a certain stability of the climate, and a degree of warming of the planet that followed the end of the Ice Age (the Pleistocene era) – things over which human beings had no control. "There can be little doubt," writes one of the editors of Humans at the End of the Ice Age, "that the basic phenomenon – the waning of the Ice Age – was the result of the Milankovich phenomena: the orbital and tilt relationships between the Earth and the Sun."[52] The temperature of the planet stabilized within a zone that allowed grass to grow. Barley and wheat are among the oldest of such grasses. Without this lucky "long summer" or what one climate scientist has called an "extraordinary" "fluke" of nature in the history of the planet, our industrial-agricultural way of life would not have been possible.[53] In other words, whatever our socioeconomic and technological choices, whatever the rights we wish to celebrate as our freedom, we cannot afford to destabilize conditions (such as the temperature zone in which the planet exists) that work like boundary parameters of human existence. These parameters are independent of capitalism or socialism. They have been stable for much longer than the histories of these institutions and have allowed human beings to become the dominant species on earth. Unfortunately, we have now ourselves become a geological agent disturbing these parametric conditions needed for our own existence.

This is not to deny the historical role that the richer and mainly Western nations of the world have played in emitting greenhouse gases. To speak of species thinking is not to resist the politics of "common but differentiated responsibility" that China, India, and other developing countries seem keen to pursue when it comes to reducing greenhouse gas emissions.[54] Whether we blame climate change on those who are retrospectively guilty – that is, blame the West for their past performance – or those who are prospectively guilty (China has just surpassed the United States as the largest emitter of carbon dioxide, though not on a per capita basis) is a question that is tied no doubt to the histories of capitalism and modernization.[55] But scientists' discovery of the fact that human beings have in the process become a geological agent points to a shared catastrophe that we have all fallen into. Here is how Crutzen and Stoermer describe that catastrophe:

The expansion of mankind [...] has been astounding. [...] During the past 3 centuries human population increased tenfold to 6000 million, accompanied e.g. by a growth in cattle population to 1400 million (about one cow per average size family). [...] In a few generations mankind is exhausting the fossil fuels that were generated over several hundred million years. The release of SO2 [...] to the atmosphere by coal and oil burning, is at least two times larger than the sum of all natural emissions [...]; more than half of all accessible fresh water is used by mankind; human activity has increased the species extinction rate by thousand to ten thousand fold in the tropical rain forests. [...] Furthermore, mankind releases many toxic substances in the environment. [...] The effects documented include modification of the geochemical cycle in large freshwater systems and occur in systems remote from primary sources. ["A," p. 17]

Explaining this catastrophe calls for a conversation between disciplines and between recorded and deep histories of human beings in the same way that the agricultural revolution of ten thousand years ago could not be explained except through a convergence of three disciplines: geology, archaeology, and history.[56]

Scientists such as Wilson or Crutzen may be politically naive in not recognizing that reason may not be all that guides us in our effective collective choices – in other words, we may collectively end up making some unreasonable choices – but I find it interesting and symptomatic that they speak the language of the Enlightenment. They are not necessarily anti-capitalist scholars, and yet clearly they are not for business-as-usual capitalism either. They see knowledge and reason providing humans not only a way out of this present crisis but a way of keeping us out of harm's way in the future. Wilson, for example, speaks of devising a "wiser use of resources" in a manner that sounds distinctly Kantian (SN, p. 199). But the knowledge in question is the knowledge of humans as a species, a species dependent on other species for its own existence, a part of the general history of life. Changing the climate, increasingly not only the average temperature of the planet but also the acidity and the level of the oceans, and destroying the food chain are actions that cannot be in the interest of our lives. These parametric conditions hold irrespective of our political choices. It is therefore impossible to understand global warming as a crisis without engaging the propositions put forward by these scientists. At the same time, the story of capital, the contingent history of our falling into the Anthropocene, cannot be denied by recourse to the idea of species, for the Anthropocene would not have been possible, even as a theory, without the history of industrialization. How do we hold the two together as we think the history of the world since the Enlightenment? How do we relate to a universal history of life – to universal thought, that is – while retaining what is of obvious value in our postcolonial suspicion of the universal? The crisis of climate change calls for thinking simultaneously on both registers, to mix together the immiscible chronologies of capital and species history. This combination, however, stretches, in quite fundamental ways, the very idea of historical understanding.

Thesis 4: The cross-hatching of species history and the history of capital is a process of probing the limits of historical understanding

Historical understanding, one could say following the Diltheyan tradition, entails critical thinking that makes an appeal to some generic ideas about human experience. As Gadamer pointed out, Dilthey saw "the individual's private world of experience as the starting point for an expansion that, in a living transposition, fills out the narrowness and fortuitousness of his private experience with the infinity of what is available by re-experiencing the historical world." "Historical consciousness," in this tradition, is thus "a mode of self-knowledge" garnered through critical reflections on one's own and others' (historical actors') experiences.[57] Humanist histories of capitalism will always admit of something called the experience of capitalism. E. P. Thompson's brilliant attempt to reconstruct working-class experience of capitalist labour, for instance, does not make sense without that assumption.[58] Humanist histories are histories that produce meaning through an appeal to our capacity not only to reconstruct but, as Collingwood would have said, to re-enact in our own minds the experience of the past.

When Wilson then recommends in the interest of our collective future that we achieve self-understanding as a species, the statement does not correspond to any historical way of understanding and connecting pasts with futures through the assumption of there being an element of continuity to human experience. (See Gadamer's point mentioned above.) Whois the we? Wehumans never experience ourselves as a species.Wecan only intellectually comprehend or infer the existence of the human species but never experience it as such. There could be no phenomenology of us as a species. Even if we were to emotionally identify with a word like mankind, we would not know what being a species is, for, in species history, humans are only an instance of the concept species as indeed would be any other life form. But one never experiences being a concept.

The discussion about the crisis of climate change can thus produce affect and knowledge about collective human pasts and futures that work at the limits of historical understanding. We experience specific effects of the crisis but not the whole phenomenon. Do we then say, with Geyer and Bright, that "humanity no longer comes into being through 'thought'" ("WH," p. 1060) or say with Foucault that "the human being no longer has any history"?[59] Geyer and Bright go on to write in a Foucaultian spirit: "Its [world history's] task is to make transparent the lineaments of power, underpinned by information, that compress humanity into a single humankind" ("WH," p. 1060).

This critique that sees humanity as an effect of power is, of course, valuable for all the hermeneutics of suspicion that it has taught postcolonial scholarship. It is an effective critical tool in dealing with national and global formations of domination. But I do not find it adequate in dealing with the crisis of global warming. First, inchoate figures of us all and other imaginings of humanity invariably haunt our sense of the current crisis. How else would one understand the title of Weisman's book, The World without Us, or the appeal of his brilliant though impossible attempt to depict the experience of New York after we are gone![60] Second, the wall between human and natural history has been breached. We may not experience ourselves as a geological agent, but we appear to have become one at the level of the species. And without that knowledge that defies historical understanding there is no making sense of the current crisis that affects us all. Climate change, refracted through global capital, will no doubt accentuate the logic of inequality that runs through the rule of capital; some people will no doubt gain temporarily at the expense of others. But the whole crisis cannot be reduced to a story of capitalism. Unlike in the crises of capitalism, there are no lifeboats here for the rich and the privileged (witness the drought in Australia or recent fires in the wealthy neighbourhoods of California). The anxiety global warming gives rise to is reminiscent of the days when many feared a global nuclear war. But there is a very important difference. A nuclear war would have been a conscious decision on the part of the powers that be. Climate change is an unintended consequence of human actions and shows, only through scientific analysis, the effects of our actions as a species. Species may indeed be the name of a placeholder for an emergent, new universal history of humans that flashes up in the moment of the danger that is climate change. But we can never understand this universal. It is not a Hegelian universal arising dialectically out of the movement of history, or a universal of capital brought forth by the present crisis. Geyer and Bright are right to reject those two varieties of the universal. Yet climate change poses for us a question of a human collectivity, an us, pointing to a figure of the universal that escapes our capacity to experience the world. It is more like a universal that arises from a shared sense of a catastrophe. It calls for a global approach to politics without the myth of a global identity, for, unlike a Hegelian universal, it cannot subsume particularities. We may provisionally call it a "negative universal history."[61]


This essay is dedicated to the memory of Greg Dening. Thanks are due to Lauren Berlant, James Chandler, Carlo Ginzburg, Tom Mitchell, Sheldon Pollock, Bill Brown, Françoise Meltzer, Debjani Ganguly, Ian Hunter, Julia A. Thomas, and Rochona Majumdar for critical comments on an earlier draft. I wrote the first version of this essay in Bengali for a journal in Calcutta and remain grateful to its editor, Asok Sen, for encouraging me to work on this topic.



[1] Alan Weisman, The World without Us (New York, 2007), pp. 3-5.
[2] See C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Malden, Mass., 2004).
[3] The prehistory of the science of global warming going back to nineteenth-century European scientists like Joseph Fourier, Louis Agassiz, and Arrhenius is recounted in many popular publications. See, for example, the book by Bert Bolin, the chairman of the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1988-1997), A History of the Science and Politics of Climate Change: The Role of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, 2007), pt. 1.
[4] Quoted in Mark Bowen, Censoring Science: Inside the Political Attack on Dr. James Hansen and the Truth of Global Warming (New York, 2008), p. 1.
[5] Quoted in ibid., p. 228. See also "Too Hot to Handle: Recent Efforts to Censor Jim Hansen," Boston Globe, 5 Feb. 2006, p. E1.
[6] See, for example, Walter K. Dodds, Humanity's Footprint: Momentum, Impact, and Our Global Environment (New York, 2008), pp. 11-62.
[7] Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times (1994; London, 2006), p. 356; see Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century (London, 2007), pp. 227-389.
[8] An indication of the growing popularity of the topic is the number of books published in the last four years with the aim of educating the general reading public about the nature of the crisis. Here is a random list of some of the most recent titles that inform this essay: Mark Maslin, Global Warming: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, 2004); Tim Flannery, The Weather Makers: The History and Future Impact of Climate Change (Melbourne, 2005); David Archer, Global Warming: Understanding the Forecast (Malden, Mass., 2007); Global Warming, ed. Kelly Knauer (New York, 2007); Mark Lynas, Six Degrees: Our Future on a Hotter Planet (Washington, D.C., 2008); William H. Calvin, Global Fever: How to Treat Climate Change (Chicago, 2008); James Hansen, "Climate Catastrophe," New Scientist, 28 July-3 Aug. 2007, pp. 30-34; Hansen et al., "Dangerous Human-Made Interference with Climate: A GISS ModelE Study," Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 7, no. 9 (2007): 2287-2312; and Hansen et al., "Climate Change and Trace Gases," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 15 July 2007, pp. 1925-54. See also Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The "Stern Review" (Cambridge, 2007).
[9] Naomi Oreskes, "The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change: How Do We Know We're Not Wrong?" in Climate Change: What It Means for Us, Our Children, and Our Grandchildren, ed. Joseph F. C. Dimento and Pamela Doughman (Cambridge, Mass., 2007), pp. 73, 74.
[10] A long history of this distinction is traced in Paolo Rossi, The Dark Abyss of Time: The History of the Earth and the History of Nations from Hooke to Vico, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (1979; Chicago, 1984).
[11] Benedetto Croce, The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico, trans. R. G. Collingwood (1913; New Brunswick, N.J., 2002), p. 5. Carlo Ginzburg has alerted me to problems with Collingwood's translation.
[12] See the discussion in Perez Zagorin, "Vico's Theory of Knowledge: A Critique," Philosophical Quarterly 34 (Jan. 1984): 15-30.
[13] Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, trans. pub., 3 vols. (Moscow, 1969), 1:398. See V. Gordon Childe, Man Makes Himself (London, 1941). Indeed, Althusser's revolt in the 1960s against humanism in Marx was in part a jihad against the remnants of Vico in the savant's texts; see Étienne Balibar, personal communication to author, 1 Dec. 2007. I am grateful to Ian Bedford for drawing my attention to complexities in Marx's connections to Vico.
[14] David Roberts describes Collingwood as "the lonely Oxford historicist [...], in important respects a follower of Croce's" (David D. Roberts, Benedetto Croce and the Uses of Historicism [Berkeley, 1987], p. 325).
[15] On Croce's misreading of Vico, see the discussion in general in Cecilia Miller, Giambattista Vico: Imagination and Historical Knowledge (Basingstoke, 1993), and James C. Morrison, "Vico's Principle of Verum is Factum and the Problem of Historicism," Journal of the History of Ideas 39 (Oct.-Dec. 1978): 579-95.
[16] Collingwood, The Idea of History (1946; New York, 1976), pp. 214, 212, 213, 216.
[17] Ibid., p. 193.
[18] Roberts, Benedetto Croce and the Uses of Historicism, pp. 59, 60, 62.
[19] Joseph Stalin, Dialectical and Historical Materialism (1938), www.marxists.org
[20] Fernand Braudel, "Preface to the First Edition," The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. Siân Reynolds, 2 vols. (1949; London, 1972), 1:20. See also Peter Burke, The French Historical Revolution: The "Annales" School, 1929-89 (Stanford, Calif., 1990), pp. 32-64.
[21] See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2d ed., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (1975, 1979; London, 1988), pp. 214-18. See also Bonnie G. Smith, "Gender and the Practices of Scientific History: The Seminar and Archival Research in the Nineteenth Century," American Historical Review 100 (Oct. 1995): 1150-76.
[22] Braudel, "Preface to the First Edition," p. 20.
[23] Alfred W. Crosby, Jr., The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492 (1972; London, 2003), p. xxv.
[24] See Daniel Lord Smail, On Deep History and the Brain (Berkeley, 2008), pp. 74-189.
[25] Oreskes, "The Scientific Consensus," p. 93.
[26] Crosby Jr., "The Past and Present of Environmental History," American Historical Review 100 (Oct. 1995): 1185.
[27] Will Steffen, director of the Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies at the Australian National University, quoted in "Humans Creating New ŒGeological Age,'" The Australian, 31 Mar. 2008, www.theaustralian.news.com.au. Steffen's reference was the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Report of 2005. See also Neil Shubin, "The Disappearance of Species," Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 61 (Spring 2008): 17-19.
[28] Bill McKibben's argument about the "end of nature" implied the end of nature as "a separate realm that had always served to make us feel smaller" (Bill McKibben, The End of Nature [1989; New York, 2006], p. xxii).
[29] Bruno Latour's Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, trans. Catherine Porter (1999; Cambridge, Mass., 2004), written before the intensification of the debate on global warming, calls into question the entire tradition of organizing the idea of politics around the assumption of a separate realm of nature and points to the problems that this assumption poses for contemporary questions of democracy.
[30] Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 206: The historian "knows that everything could have been different, and every acting individual could have acted differently."
[31] Paul J. Crutzen and Eugene F. Stoermer, "The Anthropocene," IGBP [International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme] Newsletter 41 (2000): 17; hereafter abbreviated "A."
[32] Crutzen, "Geology of Mankind," Nature, 3 Jan. 2002, p. 23.
[33] Mike Davis, "Living on the Ice Shelf: Humanity's Meltdown," 26 June 2008, tomdispatch.com/post/174949; hereafter abbreviated "LIS." I am grateful to Lauren Berlant for bringing this essay to my attention.
[34] See William F. Ruddiman, "The Anthropogenic Greenhouse Era Began Thousands of Years Ago," Climatic Change 61, no. 3 (2003): 261-93; Crutzen and Steffen, "How Long Have We Been in the Anthropocene Era?" Climatic Change 61, no. 3 (2003): 251-57; and Jan Zalasiewicz et al., "Are We Now Living in the Anthropocene?" GSA Today 18 (Feb. 2008): 4-8. I am grateful to Neptune Srimal for this reference.
[35] Zalasiewicz et al., "Are We Now Living in the Anthropocene?" p. 7. Davis described the London Society as "the world's oldest association of Earth scientists, founded in 1807" ("LIS").
[36] See, for instance, Libby Robin and Steffen, "History for the Anthropocene," History Compass 5, no. 5 (2007): 1694-1719, and Jeffrey D. Sachs, "The Anthropocene," Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet (New York, 2008), pp. 57-82. Thanks to Debjani Ganguly for drawing my attention to the essay by Robin and Steffen, and to Robin for sharing it with me.
[37] Edward O. Wilson, The Future of Life (New York, 2002), p. 102; hereafter abbreviated FL.
[38] See Latour, Politics of Nature.
[39] Flannery, The Weather Makers, p. xiv.
[40] Maslin, Global Warming, p. 147. For a discussion of how fossil fuels created both the possibilities for and the limits of democracy in the twentieth century, see Timothy Mitchell, "Carbon Democracy," forthcoming in Economy and Society. I am grateful to Mitchell for letting me cite this unpublished paper.
[41] Wilson, In Search of Nature (Washington, D.C., 1996), pp. ix-x; hereafter abbreviated SN.
[42] See Smail, On Deep History and the Brain.
[43] Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, "World History in a Global Age," American Historical Review 100 (Oct. 1995): 1058-59; hereafter abbreviated "WH."
[44] See Smail, On Deep History and the Brain, p. 124.
[45] Ibid. pp. 124-25.
[46] Jacques Derrida, "Cogito and the History of Madness," Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, 1978), p. 34.
[47] See Sachs, Common Wealth, pp. 57-82.
[48] Wilson, foreword to Sachs, Common Wealth, p. xii. Students of Marx may be reminded here of the use of the category "species being" by the young Marx.
[49] See Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: Europe, China, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, N.J., 2000).
[50] See Mitchell, "Carbon Democracy." See also Edwin Black, Internal Combustion: How Corporations and Governments Addicted the World to Oil and Derailed the Alternatives (New York, 2006).
[51] Arrighi's The Long Twentieth Century is a good guide to these fluctuations in the fortunes of capitalism.
[52] Lawrence Guy Straus, "The World at the End of the Last Ice Age," in Humans at the End of the Ice Age: The Archaeology of the Pleistocene-Holocene Transition, ed. Lawrence Guy Straus et al. (New York, 1996), p. 5.
[53] Flannery, Weather Makers, pp. 63, 64.
[54] Ashish Kothari, "The Reality of Climate Injustice," The Hindu, 18 Nov. 2007, www.hinduonnet.com
[55] I have borrowed the idea of "retrospective" and "prospective" guilt from a discussion led at the Franke Institute for the Humanities by Peter Singer during the Chicago Humanities Festival, November 2007.
[56] See Colin Tudge, Neanderthals, Bandits, and Farmers: How Agriculture Really Began (New Haven, Conn., 1999), pp. 35-36.
[57] Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 232, 234. See also Michael Ermarth, Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason (Chicago, 1978), pp. 310-22.
[58] See E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (Harmondsworth, 1963).
[59] Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Knowledge, trans. pub. (1966; New York, 1973), p. 368.
[60] See Weisman, The World without Us, pp. 25-28. Critical Inquiry / Winter 2009 221
[61] I am grateful to Antonio Y. Vasquez-Arroyo for sharing with me his unpublished paper "Universal History Disavowed: On Critical Theory and Postcolonialism," where he has tried to develop this concept of negative universal history on the basis of his reading of Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin.

The Caste, etc.

Catastrophic, but not serious

Slavoj Zizek: Catastrophic But Not Serious from The Graduate Center, CUNY on FORA.tv

Belief is Symbolic; Knowledge is Real

from "THE INTERPASSIVE SUBJECT,"
by SLAVOJ ZIZEK.

http://www.egs.edu/faculty/slavoj-zizek/articles/the-interpassive-subject/

[...]
The two notions, that of the subject supposed to believe and that of the subject supposed to know, are not symmetrical since belief and knowledge themselves are not symmetrical: at its most radical, the status of the (Lacanian) big Other qua symbolic institution, is that of belief (trust), not that of knowledge, since belief is symbolic and knowledge is real (the big Other involves, and relies on, a fundamental "trust"). The two subjects are thus not symmetrical since belief and knowledge themselves are not symmetrical: belief is always minimally "reflective," a "belief in the belief of the other" ("I still believe in Communism" is the equivalent of saying "I believe there are still people who believe in Communism"), while knowledge is precisely not knowledge about the fact that there is another who knows. For this reason, I can BELIEVE through the other, but I cannot KNOW through the other. That is to say, due to the inherent reflectivity of belief, when another believes in my place, I myself believe through him; knowledge is not reflective in the same way, i.e. when the other is supposed to know, I do not know through him.
[...]

Zizek in India

Paul Krugman talks to Al Jazeera

Stiglitz: The State of the Global Economy

Prof. Joseph E. Stiglitz: The State of the Global Economy from World Bank on Vimeo.

http://www.ici-berlin.org/docu/one-divides-into-two/

Kazakhstan: Striking Oil Workers Killed by USA-supported Dictator

Dilemma of the Left today

Ideology at its most elementary

David Harvey: lectures on Marx's Capital

Very Relevant Interview - full transcript

Jonathan Derbyshire

Published 29 October 2009

http://www.newstatesman.com/ideas/2009/10/today-interview-capitalism

NS: What relationship, if any, do you think your work has to the mainstream, normative, liberal political philosophy done in English and American universities?

SZ: I noticed something -- maybe I'm just generalising this; I don't know to what extent this is a rule-- I noticed how many of the people who consider themselves to be more radical than the liberal standard, the left-liberal standard, most of them do not work in political philosophy properly but, as it were, hide themselves as literary critics or philosophers. It's as if it's an excess which requires you to change genre. Another tendency of these "radicals" is moralization connected with legalization. It's a certain pose in which they want to deliver the message that they are really more radical. But this excess of radicality only concretely articulates itself in some kind of a general moralistic outrage -- "what are we doing to immigrants?!" I think they often tend to be a little bit hypocritical. I always read the liberal anti-communists, liberal leftists - they're interesting, one can learn from them. I read a wonderful essay by Orwell from 1938. There he has a wonderful analysis of the typical leftist liberal. He says they ask for a change, but they do it in a hypocritical way: they ask for a change but it's almost as if to make sure that no real change will happen.

Don't you suspect a little bit that there's something of this in today's typical radical liberal - in today's anti-immigrant campaign for instance? The standard idea is to say, like my friend Alain Badiou in France, "those who are here are from here". That is to say, no check for roots, open to all of them. Legalize everything. The problem is that they know very well that this radical opening will never happen. So it's very easy to have a radical position which costs you nothing and for the price of nothing it gives you some kind of moral superiority. It also enables them to avoid the truly difficult questions. For example, my conflict with my radical leftist friends is when they want total openness and so on. I say to them, are you aware that anti-immigrant are mostly spontaneous, lower working-class attitudes? They talk as if some big imperialist power centre decides to be against immigrants. No! If anything, capital is more liberal about immigrants. So, I think this is not a good thing - I think of all these theorists, like Giddens and Held, who are left-wing, but left within the establishment ...

NS: Would you say that thinkers of that sort, establishment leftists if you like, are insufficiently materialist?

SZ: Exactly, exactly. Apart from their very general anti-capitalist thunder--this is my biggest reproach to them. Despite the financial crisis, we do not have a serious leftist attempt to deal with what, in old Marxist terms, we called the critique of political economy. It's obvious to me that Marx has to be repeated, but repeated not as he was. Isn't it clear today that with all the problems of natural resources, intellectual property and so on, that the whole notion of exploitation, if it has any meaning at all should be radically redefined? I don't see enough work of this sort. I think it's either some kind of an abstract, moralistic politics where you focus on groups which are obviously under-privileged--other races, gays and so on--and then you can explode in all your moralistic rage. Or, another thing that I really hate as a leftist who tries to be a communist--did you notice how the standard academic left likes nothing more than an attempted revolution going on, but far away from where you are? Today it's Venezuela, which is why I like to be critical from time to time of Chavez. It's a very comfortable position: you can do all the dirty work, you struggle for your career, compromises in your country in the west, but your heart is somewhere far away but it in no way affects what you are doing. This is another thing which I think is a fake.

So, if anything was proven by this financial crisis, it is that apart from left-radical Keynesians like Paul Krugman, with whom I'm sympathetic, I don't see any serious counter-proposal by the left.

NS: So we have lost the political economy in Marx?

SZ: There are some marginal good signs--Moishe Postone is one of the few people who really asks the question, what to do with Marx's political economy today? Then there are of course some economists and so on--David Harvey, for example. But the question is not properly addressed and that's very sad. If you read the predominant cultural left, you'd have thought that Marx's Capital is some kind of treatise on commodity fetishism and other cultural phenomena. Sorry, but Marx meant it as a critical theory of society, giving a diagnosis and so on. I think things today call for analysis. Let me give me your analysis--don't be afraid, I will be short.

I claim that we have two opponents: pro-capitalist liberals and old Marxists, as far as they still exist. They claim that it's the same capitalism going on. This is obviously not true--in China and other places, something new is emerging. Then you have all these, I call them, ironically, "post-theorists"--like Giddens, for example. I claim that their work is, unfortunately, a journalistic patchwork. Many leftists say: we know what is wrong--capitalism, imperialism. We just don't know how to mobilise people; the problem is political. But I think we don't know what's going on.

This is typical theoretical arrogance. We don't know what is going on. This is the point of my book: terrific new things are emerging. What's going on in China today is something very ominous. Here I disagree with liberals who say, wait for another ten years and we'll have another Tiananmen in China. I doubt it. Something genuinely new is emerging today in the guise of what are ridiculously called "Asian values", authoritarian capitalism. A capitalism which, we can see now, is doing better in the crisis than the west. A capitalism that is more dynamic and efficient than our Western, liberal capitalism, but precisely as such functions perfectly with an authoritarian state. My pessimism is that this is the future. This is what I think we should watch. This is why I wrote that piece about Berlusconi [in the LRB], which many people thought was crazy - Berlusconi's still democratically elected, after all. But I see signs of this new authoritarianism.

There's a kind of total devaluation of politics. Of course, this new post-democratic capitalism will take different forms. There will be [what are ridiculously called] “Asian values”, more traditionally authoritarian; in Russia, it's emerging; in Italy, it's emerging in its own way. This is the fear. We who pretend in some way to be more radical, where we should make a pact with honest liberals is precisely along this axis: we should all be aware that what was precious in the liberal democratic legacy. What, for example, Hannah Arendt noticed in the US during the Vietnam War. What fascinated her was the level of public debate--people in town meetings debating. This is disappearing.

NS: Arendt thought political participation was an intrinsic good didn't she?

SZ: The problem I have with her is that she dismissed the economy as the space of truth, so to speak. For her, the economy was just utilitarian stuff. The authentic big politics doesn't happen there for her. But we need what Marx called a political economy. You know the basic Marxist insight that politics is not just politics--politics is in the economy. We should rehabilitate this. Isn't this becoming clear? And here's somewhere else where I don't agree with many leftists: you know this Toni Negri mantra--"Empire", nation states no longer matter and so on. It's crazy.

If there is a lesson from so-called postmodern, post-68 capitalism, it's that the regulatory role of the state is getting stronger. So much for this stupid story, the state disappearing etc. Not true! More and more if you want to have a company today, you have to be so deeply entwined with the state apparatus.

This is was the point of my big fight with Simon Critchley. I think it's too easy to play this moralistic game--state power is corrupted, so let's withdraw into this role of ethical critic of power. Here, I'm an old Hegelian. I hate the position of "beautiful soul", which is: ""I remain outside, in a safe place; I don't want to dirty my hands." In this ironic sense, I am a Leninist. Lenin wasn't afraid to dirty his hands. That's what I miss in today's left. When you get power, if you can, grab it, even if it is a desperate situation. Do whatever is possible. This is why I supported--ok, my support doesn't mean anything, but as a public gesture- Obama. I think the battle that he is fighting now for healthcare is extremely important, because it concerns the very core of the ruling ideology. The real core of the anti-Obama campaign is freedom of choice. And the lesson, if he wins, is how freedom of choice is something beautiful, but works only against a very thick background of regulations, ethical presuppositions, economic conditions and so on. This is the problem. As I like to emphasise here in the States, there are freedoms of choice which I am glad to renounce. I like to do a parallel between healthcare and water and electricity.

Yes, you can say I don't have a choice in choosing my water provider. It's imposed by where I live. But, my god, I gladly renounce this choice. I prefer to have some basic choices made by society--water, electricity, and some elementary healthcare. This precisely opens up the choice, opens up the freedom for other choices. Another important thing, and here I agree with that great British sceptic, John Gray (I don't agree with his conclusions), who says today we are forced to live "as if" we are free. We are all the time bombarded choices--and he's not making the old, boring Marxist point that these are inessential choices. No, the point is rather that you are obliged to choose without even having the background qualification to make the choice.

My position isn't that we should sit down and wait for some big revolution to come. We have to engage wherever we can. If Obama wins his battle over healthcare, if some kind of a blow will made against this freedom of choice ideology, it will be a great victory worth having fought for.

NS: Those short-term gains shouldn't be underestimated?

SZ: No. That was Critichley's misunderstanding of me: as if I wanted to sit down and dream of a big revolution. All I'm saying is that one should distinguish between short-term battles worth fighting and short-term battles where your protest is of the kind that those in power like. There was a little bit of that in the marches against the Iraq war. Everyone was satisfied. Those who organised the protests knew they wouldn't change anything. Blair like the protests--he or Bush said, you see, this is what we want in Iraq: a society in which people will be able to protest like we do. So, one should be very careful when doing something which appears as a protest measure. How does it really function? And it's not difficult. If you look closely, you always know what you are doing.

NS: You're talking about the ideological function of protest.

SZ: More than ever, the battle to be won is ideological. I don't mean in any obscure, pseudo-Marxist sense--it's a very spontaneous ideology. But isn't it interesting that the most influential public intellectual in political matters is Noam Chomsky, who knows practically nothing about political theory. I met a guy who recently had lunch with Chomsky and he told me that Chomsky said something very sad: Chomsky said that today we don't need theory. Power is cynical and all we need to do is tell people, empirically, what is going on. Here, I violently disagree. I don't think you just have to tell the truth in this factual sense. Truth in the sense of facts--facts are facts and they are precious, but they can work this way or that. A nice example here: there is a new generation of Israeli historians who are much more open about Jewish violence against Arabs before independence. And people say, "my god, they are telling the truth!" But this truth was easily appropriated by zionists, who say, "you see, that's how you fight wars--we had to do it." If you don't change the ideological background, facts alone don't do the job.

NS: That's an argument for theory in the critical sense then?

SZ: Yes, sorry: I'm an old fashioned continental European! Theory is sacred, we need it more than ever.

NS: The first chapter of your new book is called "It's Ideology, Stupid!" And it strikes me that ideology is, for you, the most important conceptual tool bequeathed to us by Marx.

SZ: Yes, but if you read the concept of ideology the way I develop it in my other books, I'm critical of Marx. Ideology is not so-called "superstructure", a shadowy realm and real things are happening elsewhere. For me, the core of Marx's theory of ideology is not to be found in the German Ideology, and those stupid, simplistic, youthful works, which are totally outdated. But in Capital, when Marx speaks about commodity fetishism, he speaks about fetishism as some kind of ideology, even if he doesn't use the term ideology. Here Marx outgrew his early simplicities, the distinction between the economic base and the ideological superstructure. This is the lesson of this crisis. Even intelligent neo-conservatives recognise that we are in deadlock and there is no way out. Someone like Fukuyama asks to what extent the functioning of the economy rests on people's ideological attitudes--whether they trust each other, what they think and so on.

One big false rumour can practically ruin a small country today. So, I'm not saying that everything dissolves into psychology or whatever. No, the trick is precisely to see what extent the economy itself, in order to function, has to rely on the fact of ideological attitudes. And this is what fascinates me.

I don't have answers. When people ask me what we should do about ecology, the financial crisis--my god, what do I know? What I can do, as a critical intellectual, is to ask the right questions. Sometimes the way you formulate or perceive a problem can be itself be part of the problem. The classical example is tolerance. Why is it that we today automatically translate or perceive problems of racism or sexism into problems of tolerance.

NS: It's the historical legacy of classical liberalism isn't it, going back to Locke?

SZ: Yes, but on the other hand, but look at the great anti-racist struggle of Martin Luther King. He never uses the word "tolerance". For him it would have been ridiculous to say that we blacks want more "tolerance" from the whites. I think it has something to do with what you might call our cultural, post-political capitalism, in which the most passionate struggles are cultural struggles. A large majority of the left doesn't question liberal democracy and capitalism as such. In the same way that when we were young we wanted socialism with a human face, for a large part of today's left, what they want is global capitalism with a human face. This is why the only way you can perceive problems is to transform or transpose them into cultural problems. I don't find this self-evident. Critical intellectuals today should be working to enable people to raise the right questions.

NS: Unlike mainstream political philosophers, you're not that interested in the question of legitimacy are you?

SZ: This focus on legitimate power is the topic on which I would definitely not focus. It's not the topic that I think is crucial. I don't despise democracy, but, for me, democracy, in the formal sense, is precious but it is not in itself a measure of any infinite truth, authenticity or whatever. It's something precious, I know, but we all know this. You can have elections where people get seduced by right-wing populists. And here I'm an unashamed anarchist. I'm ready to say here that the result is in some way untrue or false. Even Karl Popper said this. All I'm saying is that we shouldn't fetishise democracy. I'm ready to claim that you can have democratic elections where the majority for a rightist populist and that you have the right to treat that government as illegitimate. I don't think that this formal democratic procedure as such should be taken as equaling legitimacy.

NS: Let's talk about the left's response to the financial crisis. The left has consoled itself with the idea that this crisis is some grand ideological opportunity. Whereas you write that the main victim of the crisis will not be capitalism but the left itself.

SZ: Yes. In the long term, it will work as yet another shock therapy, in the Naomi Klein sense. A kind of shattering of the system which, in the long run, will help make capitalism leaner and meaner. The battle is not lost in advance, however. In the US, for example, what is important is to make acceptable the idea of large, collective actions. We should make this idea acceptable. I'm not saying everything is lost. It's an open battle. Let's not be seduced by the simple idea that this is a crisis and we can use this opportunity to impose our agenda. When the economy is in crisis, the first reaction of the people is to cling to their fundamental principles. So you get this renewed social-demoractic welfarism in the US--Krugman, Stiglitz etc. But at the same time, there was an explosion of interest in Ayn Rand. So, it's a battle and we should be aware that battles are always difficult. The only serious true serious proposal that we know about is, on the one hand this Krugman-Stiglitz leftist Keynesianism, and on the other this idea, popularised in Europe and latin America, of basic income. I like it as an idea but I think it's too much of an ideological utopia. For structural reasons, it can't work. It's the last desperate attempt to make capitalism work for socialist ends. The guy who developed it, Robert Van Parijs, openly says that this is the only way to legitimise capitalism. Apart from these two, I don't see anything else.

NS: Van Parijs is associated, as you know, with analytical Marxism. And I was wondering what you make of that strain of Marxist theory?

SZ: I know some British guys and I had a debate with them. It's the same problem with John Rawls. Rawls himself, when he was confronted with his critics, admitted one thing: that his model of distributive justice, the difference principle etc, works on one fateful condition: that there is no resentment. That is to say, given the way we are libidinally structured in modern societies, envy and resentment are crucial. Rawls doesn't take into account the irrationality of envy. Capitalism takes much better of it. Although these analytical Marxists want to be "no-bullshit" analysts, the ultimate image of human being it is based on is way too naïve and utopian. I don't think the socialist project can be reduced to this. But nonetheless I claim that in capitalist relations today, envy is crucial. Never underestimate the power of envy. This is a psychoanalytic insight.

NS: I want to ask you finally about what you follow Alain Badiou in calling the "Communist Hypothesis". You say that the great barrier to the realisation of that hypothesis being the problem of agency. Do you see a new revolutionary agent actor on the horizon?

SZ: No, no. But let me clearly define to you the limits of my communism. My problem with Badiou is that he totally dismisses the economy as a site of political struggle. The only real question for me is very simple: was Fukuyama right or not? That is to say, do we have today antagonisms which, in the long term, can be resolved or at least coped with within the liberal-democratic, capitalist frame. This is the question. The way I see it, unfortunately, is that all the problems that we have -ecological catastrophe, problems of intellectual property and so on- can be solved within the liberal-capitalist framework. This era is slowly coming to an end. The problem for me is that if we don't want to end up in some kind of neo-authoritarian society, in which we'll have all our private freedoms (you can have sex with animals and so on), but in which the social space will be depoliticized and much more authoritarian--here we should make a pact with liberals. Only a more fundamental questioning of our society can save us. It's clear that we are approaching some kind of apocalyptic zero-point. So, no, I don't see any immediate agent. I see tendencies of proletarianization. By proletarianization I mean people being reduced almost to a kind of Cartesian zero-level - you are a free agent but deprived of substance. Then it's a question of coalitions, how to do it. My unconditional insight is that we will be pushed into a situation where we will have to make a choice: either we do something or we are slowly approaching a society I'm not sure I'd like to live in.